120 miles and millions of lives

Taiwan decisions--and non-decisions

Two competing political entities exist across the Taiwan Strait, fighting a civil war that lasted between the 1920-late 1940s. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek moved his Guomingdang (Nationalist Party) government and millions of supporters to the island of Formosa during the late 1940s, calling it the Republic of China (ROC). The ROC, against many odds, still operates as a de facto independent entity roughly 120 miles off the coast, with a handful of islands merely meters away from the much larger, more populous China.

The two Chinas speak mutually intelligible languages and use relatively similar written ideograms. The majority of citizens on both sides of the Strait trace ancestry to the mainland, although Taiwan’s population mostly arrived several centuries ago. Both societies share common cultural ideas like Daoism, Confucianism, and an appreciation for the role that Sun Yat-sen played in pushing China beyond the Qing Dynasty into a new era. Things begin fracturing in their mutuality at that point.

Taiwan’s citizens today increasingly profess they were never part of China and certainly not the People’s Republic of China. Increasing numbers, especially the young, dispute the effectiveness of Qing Dynasty governance over the island between roughly 1644 and 1895 when Japanese assumed control over the island through 1945. This is a different sense of history than a mere twenty years ago.

I have yet to meet anyone on the mainland who sees Taiwan as anything other than a historic part of the the realm of the China. Confronted with this Taiwanese rejection, mainlanders often blame the foreign devils (read United States and those supporting its views such as Japan) thwarting Beijing’s legitimate control. This harkens to the victimisation of the ‘Century of Humliation’ between 1842 and 1949 (I personally think it lasted through 1999 in their minds but that is another discussion).

Maoist China focused primarily on internal struggles to institutionalise the Party’s control. Many of the campaigns the CCP launched were heinously in their outcomes, such as the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s. It incentivised lying by Party officials regarding policies which led to famine in large swaths of the country. The Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution the following decade left China in a constant tumult that only benefitted one individual’s ability to remain in charge of the country as millions lost their livelihoods based and some their lives. Upon Mao’s merciful 1976 death, the Party had a herculean task to bring the PRC into the twentieth century, much less prepare for the twenty-first which was just over a generation away.

Chiang Kai-shek similarly passed from the scene in the mid-1970s after ruling over a de facto independent and dictatorial Republic of China. Taiwanese living on the island before the mainland-based ROC emigres arrived were treated as second-class citizens under Chiang, expunged from the political process. Taiwanese language was prohibited in schools and remained a mark against advancement in a society where the myth of retaking the Chinese mainland became an ever-increasing fantasy but one perpuated by U.S. assistance.

Chiang and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, supported greater trade with the international system, allowing Taiwan’s standard of living to flourish as it assumed the distinction as one of the ‘Asian Tigers’ with sustained economic growth in the 1970s and 80s. The younger Chiang, responding to the U.S. withdrawal from both a mutual defense treaty and diplomatic relations in 1979, chose to embrace democracy in the 1980s as the cornerstone of Taiwan’s position vis-a-vis a harshly repressive PRC.

The democracy on Taiwan has never implemented the steps one might have expected as it confronted the behemoth so geographically close. China’s economy had begun improving by Chiang Chin-kuo’s death in 1988, leading to more state options. It was Taiwan’s changes in the mid-1990s, such the true institutionalisation of a thriving competitive political system, along with U.S. military actions to deter the PRC from threatening Taiwan that led to changes in the views on both sides of the Strait, that bothered China. Beijing began dramatic military modernisation to thwart the U.S. role in protecting Taiwan’s democracy as the ROC political system continued developing its democracy. What did not happen was a commensurate Taiwan reaction to an every-increasing military mismatch across the Strait.

The election of the first non-Guomingdang president in 2000 and 2004 illustrated the stability of the democracy and its firm grip for the 23 million on Formosa. People on the island still seemed divorced from responding to implications of what was occurring in the PRC. chosing instead to rely almost entirely on its informal ties with Washington.

Taiwan’s democratic government, even with the opposition party winning the presidency in 2000, 2004, 2016, and 2020, has yet to deliver on the most fundamental responsibility any regime can have: to provide for the defense of its people. The ROC relies today as it has since the 1940s on two things for its survival: Beijing’s inability or choice not to force Taiwan into ‘reuniting’ (as Beijing sees it) and the United States as the primary purveyor of defense for the citizens.

Taiwan focused its efforts through most of its Republic of China period on advancing the standard of living which they have done nicely. Taibei is a glorious modern Asian masterpiece with phenomonal business prowess (Foxconn and ACER come to mind) rather than a backwater.

But Taiwan’s democracy has meant that debates within the Legislative Yuan have rarely led to anywhere near the level of spending on deefense one might expect for a much smaller, threatened entity 120 miles off meancing China’s coast. Defense spending remains a political hot potato versus the standard of living question with demands from the public less than six years ago for smaller defense expenditures rather than increased taxes.Taiwan Defense Budget, globalsecurity.org, 2022 The Taiwan president, Tsai Ing-wen and the political system have vowed real, substantial increased expenditure on security but this will not produce an overnight solution.

Taiwan has a perilous deficit in personnel. Ministry of Defence reform twenty years ago set for the goal of an all-volunteer force for the island, lauding a ‘leaner’ and higher tech force. As the United States learned, however, volunteers cost a great deal of money and Taiwan’s military has never met the enlistment or officer levels necessary to ensure robust national security for the island. Pay in the armed forces is not lucrative enough to entice many. The period of service is now less than a year, with no time to train and maintain readiness before a recruit transitions back to a post-defense role in society.

Taiwan relies on the United States to provide its national security needs. This is true in two ways. First, the United States is easily the largest provider of arms to Taiwan in any form since Washington is able to withstand Beujing’s fury when arms sales ‘interfere’ with ‘internal issues’ as China refers to matters on the island. Beijing’s retailiation on this score has had little, if any, effect on Washington’s decisions across presidential administrations from both sides of the aisle on the arms question. Commensurate Chinese measures have stopped others from selling arms to Taiwan over the years.

Additionally, Washington has a position, known as ‘Strategic Ambiguity’, of not committing on whether it would defend the ROC should the mainland attempt to force actions against Taiwan’s will. The United States, in turn, generally assumes this role willingly, leading one to imagine the U.S. intervnetion on Taiwan’s behalf would occur. The oddity, however, is the legal condition that the Mutual Defense Treaty which served as the basis for the beginning of this arrangement between 1954 and 1979 never returned to force so the defense arrangements between the United States and Taiwan are conducted under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (US law rather than a bilateral treaty). The US commitment also relies on believing that Taiwan’s needs coincide with U.S. interests.

As Beijing, with the myriad of problems plaguing Xi Jinping’s rule, increasingly pressures Taiwan with more overt coercive diplays of the modernised People’s Liberation Army Navy and Air Force, it begs the question of why Taiwan continues acting slowly? President Tsai Ing-wen reportedly met with her national security team today about ‘Strengthening the National Defence Force Structure’. This is an absolutely essential step but one that still begs more questions and realities.

How long will it take to shift the national mindset to the reality that China’s modernised military appears determined to increase pressure on the Taiwan military rather than perhaps occasionally annoying the island? This appears unlikely to slow down. China has assets to carry out these probes to remind Taibei of Beijing’s displeasure while Taiwan has little ability on its own to deter them.

How long will it take to recruit, train, and test Taiwan forces? This is not an idle question but one confronting decreasing population so fewer potential recruits available, a preference by Taiwan for high visibility weapons systems which may not meet the first needs that arise, and cultural norms of de facto one child Taiwan families not wanting male children in uniform. China’s repeated incursions into what it calls sovereign waters and air space, disputed by Taiwan, are increasingly aggressive, leaving little doubt that Taiwan’s Ministry of Defence needs to increase its capabilities dramatically.

Taiwan’s security problems will continue into the foreseeable future as China remains 120 miles away. Washington plays a role but Taiwan itself needs to make some commitments, put resources against them in a sustained manner, and recognise that its role in this is every bit as important as Washington’s. At times discussions within Taiwan truly focus on guns versus butter rather than the existential reality that the democratic ROC confronts. But the ROC citizens seem transfixed or comforted by assumptions Washington will save the day. That is not how a sovereign state would view its ability to secure its future.

Additionally, Taiwan must recognise that, even as global anxiety increases about the PRC’s aggressive behaviour, states are still not shifting diplomatic recognition to Taiwan but remaining formally committed to their existing ties with the People’s Republic to Taibei’s disappointment. Support for Ukraine should not be seen as the level of support for Taiwan as that seems quite unlikely.

China and Taiwan will always have 120 miles between them for our natural lifetimes. Let that soak in. FIN