Aren’t they there yet?

corruption, end of November edition

Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party twelve years ago this month. Known for his Belt and Road Initiative expanding China’s engagements across the globe, his signature emphasis within the Middle Kingdom has been actually anti-corruption.

Upon assuming his position, Xi recognized what countless cynical citizens understood about their nation: corruption was endemic. In this case, corruption doesn’t just mean storing gold bars in the freezer as a U.S. politician did about a generation ago. In China corruption is manipulating the relationships—guanxi—at the heart of society for personal gain. Foreign analysts commonly opine that what Americans—a rather puritanical crowd in thought, if not deed—see as corruption is simply how relationships unfold in China. Perhaps but evidence is that the average Wen or Lu on the street of any city still understand fully that mounting disparities in a society under CCP rule for three quarters of century mean generalized doubt, regardless of the improved standard of living.

Xi launched an anti-corruption program of immense proportions to include appearances of exaggerated wealth. The initial years of his rule saw strict limits, actually quotas, on how often Chinese officials could travel abroad. State banquets became far less lavish to show the public that the Party officials (remember the Party itself is fewer than a hundred million members out of a population of 1.4 billion) were not squandering resources. People were to be accountable in every sense as Xi promoted a view of probity.

The leadership of the Party and of the People’s Liberation Army received special scrutiny—and often lost their lofty positions. The inquiries unmasked those who had become fabulously wealthy in conjunction with the overall improvement in China’s economy. Officials declared so many guilty following secretive inspections by special party units acting under the Party’s veil of secrecy. These opaque moves culminated either had public trials for embarrassment or simple disappearances, assumably into prisons. The accountability in this case was within the Party on behalf of the society—at least in principle.

The Party discipliners removed hundreds from their posts, although a recent South China Morning Post story suggests, unsurprisingly, that the reasons may be less straightforward than simply corruption. The danger of this process introducing personal competition, retribution for past decisions, and other circumstances has always been real. In a system without transparency or independent accountability, the legitimacy of rules applying equally to all is dubious.

People’s Liberation Army flag and general officers were major targets for corruption—and for exemplifying them as failed leaders. Dozens of officers, many at the apex of the PLA, fell because of this scrutiny. if nothing else, Xi clearly intended to empower those he trusted to carry out his vision for a more powerful, agile Chinese armed force. His anti-corruption campaign, in conjunction with the 2015 organizational reforms, would create a world class institution replete with Chinese characteristics.

Yet earlier this week, the third Defense Minister in a row came under investigation for “serious discipline violations”, the common verbiage for corruption. Let me repeat that: the third one running. The Defense Minister is more of a political slot than an operational commander but it’s still a high viz position within a Party sensitive to image. Many analysts see this as an escalation in Xi’s determination to root out the problem. Perhaps but it also raises other questions about the jockeying for positions within PLA and China.

Xi has now been General Secretary, often described as the most powerful individual in that position since Mao Zedong, for more than a decade. One would expect that his choices by this point, almost a full generation of leaders, would reflect his vision (and their reliance on him)for the country. If eradicating corruption in the People’s Republic is his keen determination, several questions arise for me.

Have we misjudged the completeness of his power? The General Secretary is the top position within the CCP but it’s also a highly compartmentalized organization. Did he lack power over some of these people? Are those under him in the Party thwarting his goals? Not the way we generally look at China from abroad but a definite possibility.

Does he really care about corruption or is this a façade for putting his preferred network in place as he ages? The problem with this one is that the bloke under investigation this week, Admiral Miao Hua, was his preferred guy. This is not a system where someone reaches the pinnacle of power because the supreme leader doled out responsibility to underlinings to facilitate his time looking at something else. The Chinese system, Leninist in nature, is an exceptionally tightly controlled, hierarchical political mechanism. The PLA is an arm of the Party, not a state military. Xi farming out the responsibility ofchoosing leaders? I strong doubt it.

An alternate explanation is that Xi perhaps isn’t really as interested in corruption as he is assuring loyalty from those he empowers below him. Yet the longer leaders remain in power can allow them to become isolated, listening to an ever decreasing circle of voices, many of whom have their own axes to grind. Could that have happened here? We certainly have indications Xi’s buddy Vlad the Impaler is pretty isolated within the Kremlin walls but perhaps that speculation is fanciful regarding Xi. In non-transparent systems, we simply do not know. It’s possible Miao originally got the nod as Defense Secretary because someone other than Xi argued for him but this against seems unlikely to match what we know—or think we know.

Or is it simply that the amount of money sloshing around under the CCP and PLA is so vast that the temptation is too high? Could it be that a decade ago Miao or his two predecessors were not corruption but became lured into the sense of entitlement so common at higher levels? Did they think no one would catch them? Clearly corruption is indeed part of China’s culture in senior levels.

What is Xi actually doing about corruption for the future? Does he genuinely think he can impose accountability without transparency? Is this part of his apparent determination to remain in power?

Perhaps this is all a trick to allow us to relax under the premise that the PLA and China have corruption problems, undermining their operational capability That seems far-fetched but again, the lack of accountability and public understanding makes everything speculative from our perspective.

Or, is Xi simply gearing up as he claims to assure he roots out the problem he thus far failed to solve? That would be a possibility as well. But a system where image and projection of strength against any views to the contrary are so important strikes me as unlikely to allow questions about Xi’s judgement. If Xi can’t stand people calling him Winnie the Pooh with his gut, would he really tolerate reporting on this bad judgement about leaders defying his signature crusade?

And there are other ideas you may well have as to what we are witnessing. Will any of these explanations matter for PLA effectiveness or CCP aspirations?

My husband and I were discussed the topic as I put the finishing touches on this piece. He offered the most salient point of all: we need focus on what is best for our national interests rather than fixating on what is going on in the Middle Kingdom. Wise words so often ignored in practice.

What are your thoughts on this? What additional or alternate explanations are relevant or plausible? One doesn’t have to have any exposure to China to develop hypotheses for us to test so chime in, please.

Thank you for reading Actions today or any other day. I neglected to remind you yesterday how much I appreciate each and every one of you: thank you for being part of this dialogue. I especially thank the subscribers who support this column.

I hope you had a satisfying day of thanks yesterday. Be well and be safe. FIN

Chun Hang Wong, “China Targets Senior Admiral in New Round of Defense Purges”, WallStreetJournal.org, 28 November 2024, retrieved at https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-targets-senior-admiral-in-new-round-of-defense-purges-9f6d3c9e?mod=china_news_article_pos3

Xinlu Liang, “China confronts false accusations that plague Communist Party’s anti-corruption crusade”, SouthChinaMorningPost.com, 23 November 2024, retrieved at https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3287787/china-confronts-false-accusations-plague-communist-partys-anti-corruption-crusade?module=latest&pgtype=homepage