assumptions on war between the U.S. and PRC
two publications this week spur thought
Dr. Taylor Fravel of MIT published a noteworthy piece in Foreign Affairs this week entitled “Is China’s Military Ready for War?” because it reminds us that the decisions to use force may surpass concerns about readiness. Put otherwise, Xi Jinping could decide to use the People’s Liberation Army regardless of its ability to assure victory in a conflict.
The gist of Fravel’s argument is a reminder that China’s use of its military during the CCP era has occurred more than once. The most important line is “it is useful to remember that Beijing has rarely waited for the right conditions before ordering the PLA into battle”. In other words, rather than focusing on the parlor game of who is under investigation versus who is now in a new position, we would be better off recognizing that Xi may feel the need or desire to employ the military instrument, regardless of whether he trusts his senior military personnel.
The PLA, after all, is an arm of the Communist Party rather than an autonomous body within the Chinese state apparatus. As I have mentioned many times over the past two and a half years, CCP General Secretaries scold the 2 million active-duty military members, stating that their role is to serve the Party rather than as a force with independent status; this occurs seemingly weekly, which raises doubts about whether the oft-repeated message is getting through.
These exhortations may imply anxiety about who controls the guns of the CCP. Still, surely Xi’s willingness to “bring down” some of the most prominent senior PLA officers is an ongoing reminder that CCP rules, regulations, and discipline loom at all times. The chagrin of removing those whom Xi himself promoted is less important than the reality that he will seemingly bring them up on disciplinary charges when it suits him. However, this is merely my speculation, as we know precious little about the internal decision-making of this system. Nevertheless, he repeatedly emphasizes that the Party is above the PLA in priority.
More relevant, Fravel’s article might lead one to muse on the backdrop that Beijing considers face if it elects to send its forces into a potential conflict without being fully prepared. Does the PRC now see its position in the western Pacific as so dominant as to minimize the relevance of full readiness? Is Beijing so worried that time is running out on its ability to lure Taiwan back under its control that coercion of any type, even if not easy or necessarily successful, is merited? Is Xi, with no military experience, so confident in his decision-making that he eschews the need for input from his PLA senior officers? Has the CCP leader already decided that Taiwan’s behavior will ultimately become so threatening (nearing, if not declaring, a formal course of independence perhaps) that he will go to war with the military he has, regardless of having senior positions filled (reminiscent of Donald Rumsfeld’s “you go to war with the military you have”)? Does Xi have no intention to use the military but wants to intimidate Taiwan into submission while deterring the United States and anyone else in Asia from intervening on the island’s behalf? These thoughts represent a brief introduction to possible assumptions that may be operational for the CCP leadership.
Fravel’s article coincides with a letter-to-the-editor published in the Wall Street Journal yesterday by Captain Brent Sadler, a retired U.S. naval officer, entitled “Staying the Course Means a War with China”. Author of the 2023 U.S. Naval Power in the 21st Century which argued for a substantial increase in our number of ships, Sadler argued in the Journal that the U.S. failure to build a modern fleet commensurate with the PLAN is tantamount to surrendering deterrence against Chinese activities, echoing some of the rationale ascribed so often to Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby when he criticizes attention to portions of the world such as the Middle East or Ukraine rather than directly relevant to China.
Sadler is correct that U.S. shipbuilding has not kept pace with the PLAN over the past twenty years, as the latter has grown to a fleet of nearly 400 platforms, while our inventory has steadily declined. As the Congressional Research Service’s apolitical specialist on shipbuilding, Ron O’Rourke testified this past March, the causes for the poor health of U.S. efforts go well beyond lack of political intention; the costs, the technical delays, the unrealistic expectations established when a ship receives Congressional funding, and a host of other problems thwart the solution Sadler advocates. But the U.S. Navy inventory remains roughly 100 ships fewer than the PLAN as of this year.
Sadler assumes that the only deterrent to China launching a war is an overpowering presence and capability on the part of the U.S. Navy, requiring a dramatic increase in its size in theater. That means he discounts allies such as the capable Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces, the Royal Australian Navy, or the Republic of Korea maritime capacity but, as I noted in a column last week, if Taiwan is the cause of the conflict, no one has signed up to defend the democratic islanders (not even the United States). Captain Sadler ignores the financial constraints burdening our system, implying we should ignore other possible spending choices in favor of somehow addressing the ship shortfall in record time (an unrealistic expectation if I ever heard one). Sadler also appears to disregard any diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict, but this may be in line with Beijing’s persistent threats to prevent Taiwan’s independence, implying that nothing would stop their use of force if the PRC felt compelled to coerce Taiwan into compliance.
Both Fravel and Sadler draw attention to the concerns of war between the United States and the People’s Republic, yet war is far from a given. Instead, what is striking is the tendency among many observers to default to a war scenario between the United States and China. Military planners, of course, must prepare for the worst-case scenario, as failure to do so can have catastrophic consequences.
Both Sadler and Fravel flag various aspects of the road to war for good reason, but war between our two states is not pre-ordained. China and the United States can each alter course, leading to war at any point. However, doing so would risk the leaders in either, if not both, capitals appearing to show a political weakness that their publics might not well receive. Nationalism is a powerful force driving a government to take actions that may not align with the interests of its population. Plus, these are two nuclear-armed nations who deeply distrust one another, raising the stakes of any conflict to much higher levels than a war between Rwanda and Uganda, for example.
Ultimately, war would occur if the leaders of the two nations deemed it in their interests to pursue that path. One would assume that Washington, as a somewhat more participatory political system, responds to citizens’s preferences for or against military actions than is the Beijing because the CCP, with a membership of 100 million out of a population of 1.3 billion, is the only body that matters; even the CCP boils down to a far smaller cadre of real decision-makers, despite rhetoric to the contrary.
Modern superpowers, however, are curious creatures that rely on a decision-making class, whether because many citizens are uninterested in or excluded from the process. The truth is that we don’t know the circumstances under which a war would begin, nor do we know for sure who or what would become the determinative factors, despite our assumptions to the contrary.
I never want to see the United States sacrifice its most precious treasure, our young women and men in uniform, if we can avoid using armed force. I accept that an all-volunteer force understands, in theory, the dangers of bloody conflict when individuals take the oath to serve. However, I wonder if a war between two superpowers could achieve an unconditional victory, as many on both sides of the Pacific seem to assume. A conflict between China and the United States, regardless of its cause, seems unlikely to result in a surrender as occurred on the USS Missouri in September 1945. I appreciate that wars never assure certain victory but all the more reason not to enter them without rigorous appraisal of assumptions, risks, and the importance of the purported endstate.
The value Fravel’s and Sadler’s pieces provide as we close this week is a reminder that we see many unknowns across both capitals about a risky conflict. This discussion might instill greater caution for decision-makers, but I worry that too much mirror-imaging of worst-case assumptions makes increases risks far more than we seem to realize.
That could be as risky as anything else.
I welcome your thoughts on today’s column, on China, on war between the U.S. and the PRC, or any aspect of this subject. I readily acknowledge that I have many questions, so I would appreciate hearing yours. It would be beneficial to hear non-American voices, as we often make assumptions about the rest of the world without validating them.
I thank the subscribers whose support helps me with each and every column, whether at $55 per annum or $8 monthly. I welcome readers every day on any and all topics. I appreciate suggestions for topics as well.
Be well and be safe. FIN
M. Taylor Fravel, “Is China’s Military Ready for War?”, Foreign Affairs, 18 July 2025, retrieved at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/chinas-military-ready-war
Ronald O’Rourke, “The State of U.S. Shipbuilding”, testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, House.gov, 11 March 2025, retrieved at https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/03.11.25_spf_state_of_shipbuilding_orourke_statement.pdf
Brent Sadler, “Staying the Course Means a War with China”, WSJ.com, 17 July 2025, retrieved at https://ereader.wsj.net/
—-, U.S. Naval Power in the 21st Century. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2023.