believing war would end the China threat?

Not sure where this would take us

I lectured inside Beltway early in August, receiving some welcome feedback this morning. Someone thought I was too academic, a couple of people thought I knew my material, and a couple of people found it informative.

One person said she was concerned that I named China as a competitor rather than an adversary. I am pretty sure I used both terms but I am so intensely thinking about time, the subject matter, and keeping the audience engaged as I lecture that I may not have.

I am not entirely sure it matters, however, as I was giving a lecture on East Asia, the region where everyone both has China as their primary trading partner while they worry a great deal (except the DPRK which is such an outlier in every manner) about China’s bullying behavior. Under no circumstances should the person commenting on my lecture come away thinking I would invite any CCP members for dinner, regardless which term I used.

Yesterday, I got an almost frantic note from someone forwarding a note from some guy who says he was in the U.S. intel community (where I confess I have never worked) for 40 years but is now an outside observer. My contact forwarded the note because this erstwhile intel guy (no name on the message) says he has pinpointed that China would launch an amphibious invasion of Taiwan on 20/21 September between 0500 and 0530. My interlocutor asked whether I have any indication this is happening?

Um, no. I have not had access to classified information for several years as I saw no need for a clearance once I retired. I never saw much classified stuff when I was cleared for it because I did not need it to do my job as a professor of national security strategy. I was not an operator nor was I a decision-maker.

But, my response was that it could certainly be true, but an amphibious invasion was probably low on Beijing’s probable actions because the wee island actually has a couple of strengths. The southwest of Taiwan, an area I have driven from the southern tip at Kenting National Park where I weathered a typhoon in 2001 northwest to Chaiyi City is replete with wide mudflats. Ugly mudflats. The kind of area any invading force would avoid if they hoped to achieve a successful operation. Similarly, northeast Taiwan has sheer cliffs making amphib operations unthinkable.

The area immediately west and southwest of Taipei itself could be a target for these operations but the Taiwan military is well aware of this possibility and I assume preparing for it. While I remain critical of Taiwan’s overall defense spending over the past quarter century as the PLA modernized, I do not doubt the Taiwan military’s understanding of the challenges they face. These are not stupid people.

But Taiwan is not us. It is a lovely, energetic successful island of 24 million people who are so important for semi-conductors, for thriving democracy, and for a wonderful standard of living as a Japanese colony from 1895-1945, then the influx of Guomindang fleeing the mainland as the civil war was lost. But we do not even have diplomatic relations with them. Nor do the Japanese, Koreans, Filipinos, Thais, Singaporans, Australians, British, German, or the overwhelming majority of nations of the world.

That that that is the horrible reality Taiwan confronts because Beijing makes countries choose one side or the other with major ramifications for the dozen countries choosing Taiwan.

Taiwan’s position sucks.

We could recognize Taiwan as a sovereign government but Beijing would not stand by without reacting. At a minimum, China would break diplomatic relations with U.S., if no go to war over this status question.in brutal terms, how does that help us or Taiwan?

If having diplomatic relations with an odious regime if what we seek to end, we need end ties with a lot more places than just China. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Russia, Sudan, and many others come to mind.

But who benefits from war should it come to that over Taiwan? Does anyone?

I wonder, however, if enough people in this country recognize what a war with China would mean. With the 9/11 attack commemorations this week, it is a solemn opportunity to remember the damage of war following an attack on our homeland rather than on an island we don’t even recognize formally as a sovereign government over more than two decades. We went into Afghanistan because we suffered three thousand deaths in three horrible, brazen hits on our territory. The lives lost (we are still losing lives as veteran suicides plague us) and still devastating mental and physical injuries (an ongoing, if not permanent, debilitation for thousands who volunteered) were immense against an adversary seeking to live in the eighth century rather than the twenty-first. The financial investment of $2.313 trillion between 2001 and 2021 would likely pale in comparison should we experience a similarly lengthy conflict with the PRC. In an era when the federal debt is now $35 trillion and mounting by the second, these are daunting concerns—or they should be as I think about the future, though many economists disagree, admittedly.

The most concerning part is what I detect is a hidden assumption I have mentioned previously. I fear we are largely looking at our relationship with China as a zero-sum, “one and done” exercise. I think that is naive, if we simply listen to our own arguments about that country. If China is determined to retake Taiwan, when will they give up that aspiration?

If China is as determined in Taiwan as we imply in many of our Beltway conversations, what would make them stop menacing the island or the region?

Frequently, pundits seem to identify the answer as contingent purely on the nature of the CCP regime. Let me reiterate: it is as appealing a regime as I can imagine. I am actually relieved I doubt I will visit again as I oppose so much of what the regime does to its people with little, if any, concern for their welfare long term. I always say, because I believe, the CCP did raise more people out of poverty through the Four Modernizations than any other government has but at what sustained cost? How could it have been worth it? What did they measure as success versus failure? The environmental sacrifices alone will take decades, if not much longer, to make some portions of the country livable. Reading the Brannigan book I mentioned yesterday is a harsh reminder of the government’s willingness under Mao to sew chaos for the sake of upheaval rather than because the population would benefit.

But, what is our evidence that a post-CCP regime would fundamentally different on Taiwan sovereignty? I am not even discussing how a country with zero participatory history would embrace a more democratic future as I don’t see the logic that turns whomever rules the country into George Washington. A post CCP China will likely be ugly for a while, hurting the population for a couple of generations. Tha doesn’t mean I like what is there now but the people, the ones we profess to feel oppressed, are at least living without the on going upheaval of the 1911-roughly 1976 period.

Yes, Taiwan is democratic; I have labeled it hyper democratic for twenty years as the free and energetic press, the multiple parties, the vigorous campaigns, the excitement about self government as a democracy is genuine, exciting, and firm at this point. But it is also a small place with 24 million people instead of a huge country with more than a billion people, 56 minorities, and a history of being hard to govern no matter who is trying.

More basically, why do we assume an authoritarian like Vlad the Impaler would not come to power should the CCP fall because of a defeat in Taiwan? This is germane because the Soviet leaders lost their hold on power but Ukraine is now at war with a man determined to ignore the Soviet collapse in favor of a personal revisionist history of a Russian nationalism. What are the odds of that occurring in a post-CCP China where long-standing aspirations to “reunite the island with the Motherland” seem plausible, if not likely? Obviously this is speculation but one must recognize that a war with the CCP over Taiwan does not guarantee a Chinese defeat would mean the people in China abandoned demands and aspirations.

Would we want to see reunification if we sacrificed lives and treasure to support Taiwan in conflict?

Does this mean I somehow consider China more desirable as a competitor rather than adversary? Never. I don’t understand how China remains one of our top trading partners a decade after we first began worrying about their possible adversary status if we are so concerned yet our two economies remain intertwined, under Republican and Democratic administrations. Some companies have returned to CONUS for manufacturing or sought locations elsewhere beyond China’s borders but many businesses focus their goals on access to the Chinese market as if that were something Beijing would allow without a quid pro quo. The irony, of course, is that Xi Jinping talks his own talk about delinking with us to protect China yet he often is pulled by Chinese economists seeking foreign investment to assure jobs for mainlanders. Put another way, the economic ties between the United States and China are still beneficial enough for both sides to continue. That could change with the next administration but I am skeptical.

Let me be direct: China and the United States have a number of competing interests in several spheres that are important and are complex. But I worry that the possible war that both sides increasingly see as likely will be much more debilitating than seems understood. Does that mean we would not pursue it? No, U.S. forces will assuredly conduct operations as ordered by the Commander-in-Chief.

But I am not entirely certain we all agree on what that conflict might accomplish. The most vivid lesson of Afghanistan, twenty-three years later, is that we went in for perfectly understandable reasons of national pride and fury following the 9/11 attacks. But we really didn’t think much beyond that as a nation.

Let’s say we went to war with China over Taiwan this decade. Let’s say the PRC lost and let’s go a step further to say the CCP fell, as happened in Afghanistan by late 2001. With regard to China, then what? It really is not intended to be an academic question but a serious assurance we think this through.

Colin Powell famously told President George Bush that Iraq (he actually was discussing Afghanistan as painful as it was to acknowledge) would be our problem like anything broken at Pottery Barn, the home decor haven for clay pots and glass. Are we really foolish enough to think we can remake China after a conflict should that arise? Too many voices seem hinting at that for my comfort.

The CCP does horrible things. They threaten Taiwan and the Philippines, even Japan occasionally. But the idea that we somehow would be better at fixing or ruling China is dangerous. Is that really where some of these conversations are going as we increasingly focus on adversarial stances? I hope not. I am an academic not a policy maker but I do hope we are really thinking through possible outcomes as we have evidence we don’t always.

All your thoughts are welcome: I mean that. I appreciate you taking time to read this newsletter today or any other day. Please feel free to circulate. Thank you to the subscribers.

Be well and be safe. FIN

“Human and Budgetary Costs to date of U.S. War in Afghanistan, 2001-2022“, Watson.Institute.edu, August 2021, retrieved at https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/human-and-budgetary-costs-date-us-war-result of a conflict over-Afghanistan-2001-2022#:~:text=Figures-,Human%20and%20Budgetary%20Costs%20to%20Date%20of%20the%20U.S.%20War,in%20both%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan.

“What is the federal debt today?”, PeterGPetersonFoundation.org, 9 September 2024, retrieved at https://www.pgpf.org/national-debt-clock?gad_source=1&gbraid=0AAAAABdefgaP8m22fFKJAdGEU3GpwuzUK&gclid=CjwKCAjwufq2BhAmEiwAnZqw8ko_Cz0LH0Dyj6V-zJhVRQbdRMoVxZiGO3uybgRf5foXmzZvX4h6CxoCYFgQAvD_BwE