News that we are withdrawing troops from both Niger and Chad— you didn’t realise we had troops in both places? Yes, well, this is all linked—reflects the same problem we have in Latin America, although to a greater extent. Our interests in both regions only seems to revive when someone else arrives, and our primary means of trying to assert the regions’ importance to us invariably is a military one.
Today I focus on Africa.
U.S. officials increasingly worry about Chinese advances in both regions, hence we pay are more attentive than before Chinese appeared across the continent. Xi’s cherished Belt and Road Initiative focuses efforts on funding infrastructure, providing financial assistance to risky regimes and business efforts, and securing access to natural resources and food stuffs for the Middle Kingdom’s ever growing paranoia about depravation (conservation is not a Chinese concept, whether it’s desperately needed water, food, or natural resources). Most certainly the BRI brings additional Chinese investment, loans, workers, and attention to this region
How about our moves in the same continent?
Establishing Africa Command with the U.S. Unified Command structure to administer military activities marked the final step towards elaborating military ‘responsibilities’ around the world. Seen as an administrative need here at home, this action confirmed African views that our intentions were to extend U.S. military power. Africom found no welcome for its headquarters on the continent, thus the command is at Patch Barracks, Germany. Our primary focus for the region thus appears military rather than including broader interests.
Africa needs development assistance to provide the basis to expanding societal inclusion. We hope, in turn, this will incentivise citizens in the dozens of nations to embrace democracy. But we portray this as advancing our interests (spreading our values and government system) at least as much as we detail why it will benefit Africans.
But there in lies the problem: we only get aroused about the Africa when others become involved there. Our focus in the 1960s was on Soviet expansion rather than as an opportunity to nurture newly independent regimes laden with energy, enthusiasm, and ideas. Instead, we focused not on dialogue with these leaders but on preventing them from becomoing closer to the Soviets.
Of course the Soviets were interested in Africa because the bipolarity of the Cold War made everything into ‘ours’ or ‘theirs’ but the Soviets actually had little assistance they could offer beyond military linkages. While it took us until the Wall fell in 1989 to realise that the Soviet Union was a Potemkin village in many ways, African militaries rued their links to the Reds with poorer equipment, horrible maintenance, and only the prospect of education in cold, dark Moscow rather than elsewhere around the world.
But we did not invest enough in learning about these former colonies seeking to break away from colonial conditions. We viewed them as pawns in the bipolar struggle rather than as legitimate, sovereign entities. As a result, Africa continued frustration about the respect and assistance they received from the democratic model.
George W. Bush receives too little credit for the strength and depth of his administration’s reach towards Africa. He recognised the intrinsic problem HIV/AIDs imposed on the region so he pushed the United States to extend the medical solutions available to stem the epidemic. Bush introduced the Millennium Challenge Corporation to advance economic and health partnerships between this country and nations in need, particularly in Africa. Twenty years later, the MCC still supports work in Benin, Malawi, and a host of places Americans can barely spell, much less find on a map.
Bush advocated policy investments beyond military and traditional security foci as those both before and following him have done. I am not saying that U.S. presidents all have the harsh views of Africa ascribed to some individuals but Africa is definitely seen as a far lower priority than any other region.
Once China showed up, we took note. China’s investment through the BRI has made tremendous difference in African infrastructure—particularly ports and roads. Americans always charge that the BRI includes loans carrying unfavourable terms for the receiving nation to expand dependence on China, and by extension, inability to deviate from China’s positions on global governance at international fora. At least one major scholarly study questions that assertion, providing evidence that the loans are not leading to the effects either China expected or the receiving nations were forced to accept. We certainly worry China will lock up resources to everyone else’s detriment.
But we more recently only focus on bilateral military activities rather than sharing broader activities. The basing agreement for U.S. forces in Niger, a large nation in west central Africa, aimed at assuring Niger was ‘on our side’ rather than Beijing’s while also providing a lookout post for Islamic radicalism still relevant in the Subsaharan region. Those appear solely U.S.-centric objectives rather than addressing Niger’s many internal problems.
African states, as true with Latin Americans, are getting tired of one-way relationships as they see them. China is more admittedly transactional about its involvement: provide assistance for this stadium, then buy some bauxite.
Much more relevant, China doesn’t push these states for changes in their behaviour to conform with its domestic ideals. It’s hard to overstate how much hate and discontent U.S. caveats on bilateral relations, such as the Leahy Amendment prohibiting any support to militaries engaging in human rights violations, create in states in Africa or Latin America. Our belief is that by sanctioning these horrors, states will reform their militaries to prioritise human rights more highly to assure better mil-to-mil ties with us. China most definitely does not impose that sort of ideal on these countries.
Relations with China are pretty straightforward: a nation cannot have relations with Taiwan and it cannot promote the positions of internal critics within China to embarrass the government in Beijing. These are fundamentals which Beijing will invoke at a moment’s notice should the nation in question attempt to alter its policies—whether on the African continent or in Asia.
Additionally, China not only brings the BRI but a range of other instruments such as regionally-focused massive diplomatic gatherings in Beijing, vaccine diplomacy, sports diplomacy, or professional military education (en lieu of those states who have no access to U.S. schools due to human rights questions) as examples. Looking at these activities in aggregate, China’s interests appear somewhat broader than those of the United States which too often hone exclusively to our concerns about security. China, in the eyes of many Africans, treats them as more equals than our selective ties, even if this is a cynical behaviour by Beijing.
China’s forays into Africa have their natural limits. Without a historic connection to ‘overseas Chinese’ who emigrated in large numbers centuries ago, this region is not Beijing’s top priority yet we repeat warnings about the danger of links to the second largest economy in the world.
In the end, our lack of consistent interest in addressing the needs and concerns of Africa leave a hole for China to fill. African states face the vicissitudes of being export-driven resource economies frequently unable to meet the needs of the economic ambitions. With little indication the United States will ever return to providing development help as we did during the Cold War through the Agency for International Development and the Peace Corps, Beijing is a better option than nothing. China’s aid also is welcome to those corrupt elites within so many countries where graft coincides with the insatiable desire for financial help without scolding. These choice may result in terrible long term ramifications and it furthers overcommitment by Beijing but these agreements are currently at least temporary marriages we are not interested in pursuing. China will never push for transparency but they don’t use it at home so why demand Africans learn to embrace the concept?
But it is unrealistic for us to lecture African about the dangers if we appear so disinterested except vis-a-vis China using our military as the tool of statecraft.
I fully acknowledge that back to the Clinton administration, the United States has sought to leverage relationships with other countries to counter a rising China. Most of those relationships have been with states surrounding China which Africa most definitely does not. We say in our policy documents that Asia is the portion of the world we care most about, even if we also send massive aid packages on occasion to Ukraine and Israel. We readily acknowledge China as our potential adversary so we worry about anything they can do to advance against us. But we will never offer massive attention to Africa or Latin America, though we could provide more assistance if we are genuinely concerned about countering China.
We cannot be surprised when China seeks to fill in that gap to advance its interests. Indeed, arguably we might be better off to allow China to develop global burdens if we genuinely believe in the strength of our system and the values we espouse. Instead, we seem fearful that anything China does hurts us, no matter that these issues are in a region we generally ignore. Does that really make sense?
Africans definitely seem not to desire a long-term bilateral military partnership with us. A more holistic set of instruments would help, though not necessarily guarantee, a stronger U.S.-African future. But we ought not be surprised that we are not making as compelling a case to leaders in Chad and Niger as we thought we were as it’s a pretty narrow one. If African really matters to us, or if Latin America outside of Mexico matters, we need offer a stronger rationale for our bilateral relationships—meaning broader step than stationing U.S. forces in their countries.
If we do that, we are likely to do less of something else. Is that worth it? Where are our priorities?
I welcome your thoughts. You may well see a completely different case than I so bring it on. The point of ACC is to expand measured, civil discussion on the issues of our world. This is only one of many but your thoughts, rebuttals, questions, or support matters.
Thank you for reading this. Thank you to the subscribers who support this newsletter. Please circulate to anyone you think might value the discussion.
Be well and be safe. FIN
Deborah Brautigan, the Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa. Revised edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Eric Scmitt, ‘U.S. to Withdraw Troops from Chad, Dealing Another Blow to Africa Policy’, NYTimes.com, 25 April 2024, retrieved at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/25/us/politics/chad-us-troop-withdrawal.html