China and Congress

racing to unity

The first few days of the brand new 118th Congress featured fireworks and drama. Th nis included fifteen ballots needed for Speaker Kevin McCarthy to assure his position, the voting over the new rules with which to operate the House over the next two years, the announcement that C-Span no longer has live feed off the floor, and the staffing of various committee and subcommittee memberships.

So far, there has been little drama over the bipartisan committee established to address China. Speaker McCarthy named the Republican from Wisconsin, Mike Gallagher, to chair the group of 16 (seven Democrats and nine Republicans) who promptly announced he seeks to win the new ‘Cold War’ with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Gallagher has advocated strong measures against China over the past several years from his post as the minority representative on the House Armed Services Committee. It is hard to imagine him advocating anything other than aggressive measures. This week he noted topics he anticipates considering include People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military modernisation, economic concerns such as mineral dependency and trade, cyber, and a wide ranging look at the bilateral ties. Bryant Harris, 'GOP pick to lead House China Committee vows to win 'new Cold War'", Defensenews.com, 10 January 2023

The remainder of the members equally advocate decisive steps to short circuit China’s aggression and global ambitions. Particularly important is assuring Taiwan’s ability to choose if and when it were to reunify with the mainland as the latter desires.

This is one of the handful of issues upon which there appears little difference between the political factions within the House. That is probably a more accurate way to describe the bulk of the national security community inside the Beltway and perhaps all along the BonNyWash (Boston/New York/Washington) corridor: China is the threat, an existential threat in the eyes of many, to the United States.

This in some ways plays into the hands of the Communist Party whose narrative for three quarters of a century has harped on the line that the world (read: the United States) seeks to humiliate and contain the Chinese nation.

This committee’s almost singular bipartisan topic focuses U.S. attention on China’s power as if it had no vulnerabilities. The newly-victorious Maoist regime of the 1940s and 50s certainly was weak after waging a two and a half decade civil war with the Nationalists or Guomingdang who ultimately fled to Taiwan. Mao Zedong’s famous proclamation on 1 October 1949 that ‘China has stood up’ was far more aspirational than factual. The Communist Party managed to send the Guomingdang, with its U.S. assistance, packing but China was hardly a robust nation participating in the emerging post-World War II community. Instead, it was a regime begging Stalin for support.

When the latter proved ambivalent, Mao turned within but hardly created a thriving society. Mao instead instigated a series of bizarre national campaigns to consolidate CCP power while stressing the plight of the Middle Kingdom resulted from the desire to humiliate the Chinese people. Mao and the CCP, the argument went, would uniquely defeat these threats. For his entire rule, Mao kept this a already backward nation falling further behind the west. China was not an ideological, political, military or economic power though it did detonate an atomic device in 1964.

The ‘Four Modernisations’ of the 1970s reversed some of the steps holding China back and the world, ironically, provided the conditions allowing China to grow its economic, then military, and political powers over the following 45 years. The government subtext remained, however: the CCP alone could prevent the world from humiliating and exploiting China.

China’s regime is a massively and fundamentally insecure one, fearful of its population and yet determined to retain power. All governments in China fear its massive population. Governing has always been difficult, regardless who rules. The current leadership uses persistent, draconian measures to quash dissent while unswervingly hostile to any criticism from abroad. These twin actions build on persistent worries rather than self-confidence. Confident nations do not penalise other states for imposing Covid testing requirements on travelers from their massive outbreaks. No one likes criticism but China’s government overreacts outrageously to any criticism.

The regime, even with its weaknesses, has primed the people to assume the worst aims on the part of other states. The CCP will trumpet the intent of the U.S. Congress is to keep China back, to humiliate, and to break the people by breaking the CCP.

China’s reaction is not my reason for suggesting the Committee focus on influencing things in the United States; our actions need serve our purposes and ignore China’s petulant responses. We must, however, be clear what outcome we seek and whether we have the instruments to achieve them. We have far more ability to influence our own behaviour than anyone else’s.

The Committee’s aims are unlikely to impact the decision-making of the PRC or the citizens as a whole.

U.S. critics assume the Chinese people are tired of the exploitation, eagerly ready to overthrow their oppressors, especially if the United States stops providing beneficial conditions. The United States is no longer the sole player in Asia. China is interwoven with many states who will not alter their ties because they do not believe it in their interests.

China’s authoritarian system is not impenetrable as millions of Chinese travel overseas regularly and thousands of students spend extended time overseas where they are exposed to different analyses of the world. Some of those same students overseas push back against criticisms of the PRC but many recognise the repugnant system at home. China screens those who travel for politial reliability as well as to monitor mainland-based family members who can serve as leverage. Alternate Chinese historic narratives are available but they are not the official, standard one.

The majority of the 1.3 billion Chinese citizens hear a meticulously-crafted ‘exploitation and humiliation’ story regarding the U.S. and its allies’ desire to prevent China’s rise. This is a constant refrain from a regime needing that argument to help sustain its power.

It is seductive to assume the people seek a radically different regime but the evidence does not entirely support that view. Uighurs, Hui Muslims, and other minorities certainly seek release from various levels of repression. But, many Han, 92% of the country, overwhelmingly support their government for many reasons. Some include that it prevents luan, or chaos, has improved their standard of living, and is a Chinese government engendering patriotic pride in wht it has accomplished.

The House Special Committee will serve most effectively by focusing on what it has greatest ability to control: U.S. actions rather than those of China. We control U.S. actions with Congress playing an important part in our multi-branched government..

Far too often a fundamental disconnect exists in our logic about China: if this is an inflexible, authoritarian government, then why do we believe we have the ability to change, deter or even coerce their behaviours? Even if we are successful, what evidence do we have, beyond assumptions of likemindedness and wishful thinking, that any other regime would have dramatically different interests which in turn affect the United States?

All nations have interests. We do and China does. I think our strongest endstate is to fixate on strengthening our own divided nation rather than focus on ways we hope we can alter Beijing’s behaviour. Put another way, our panoply of instruments are much more likely to work on the United States than they are on China. We have multiple experiences over the past two centuries of the United States aiming to alter other states. I am hard pressed to feel confident we have succeeded often, regardless of the desire, the hope, the investment, or even the perceived affinities.

China’s leaders will act for themselves, regardless who they are. As important as the United States is for Taiwan, the island still chooses many options anathema to Washington or the American people. We repeatedly and consistently overestimate our ability to alter internal affairs in other countries; Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya are only three recent sad cases. China, which we have awarded ‘peer’ status as a global player, will be even harder to alter, even if the House China Committee and the national security community are relatively united in their desire to do so.

We have much greater power, on our own or in partnership with others, over our own behaviour than we can hope for over the Chinese. I fear what we think we can do is change China without realising the system is more deeply entrenched than we hope for a variety of reasons. Let’s go with assuring our strength because that will endure and help us thrive. We have ignored our own internal conditions long enough. FIN