The sunrise had that sweltering look by 0515 this morning as we push towards a hundred degrees Fahrenheit again today. I know that doesn’t sound radical to those of you in Vegas, San Antone, or Tucson but we do live along a feeder creek of the Chesapeake Bay: doesn’t a sea breeze result?? As a friend noted yesterday when we kibbitzed while she walked her darling dog, Seamus, “it’s so hot I don’t want to do anything. I don’t want to do anything and wonder about the animals and people without shelter” (I should add she is from the heart of Texas she knows these things). I was touched by her comments because of think of both the animals and those without relief so often.
My other concern today results from one of the blockbuster events yesterday. I am shocked by Florida Judge Eileen Cannon’s dismissal of the classified documents case yesterday. Of course I suppose I knew it was possible but what disturbs me, as I wrote about thirteen months ago, is how casually the documents were available for someone to read, much less pilfer, with seemingly little effort. I would not care who in did it but the reality that stuff was simply laying around for anyone to pick up is mind-boggling. Now there will be no implications for anyone.
I cannot fathom—in truly an nonpartisan way—how the evidence of that classified material left completely unattended in bathrooms can now disappear as a legal concern because a judge rejected the Special Prosecutor’s appointment. Material may be overly classified in our system, an argument many critics make, but no one disputes that this material, allegedly covering nuclear weapons, ought be highly classified. That sensitivity of the material is almost an afterthought now in the tussle of partisanship where we live.
Common on, folks. Either we have wiz bang dangerous—anything covering nuclear weapons’ technology or deployment seeming to fit that category—documents we don’t want to share with adversaries or we don’t. There is not much intervening space as I think about the question.
This is not a partisan attack as President Biden also had his own classified document foible but acknowledged it, then determined what had been left unsecured. The Mar-a-Lago indictment was volumes of stuff. No one should mishandle classified information but I don’t the the volume is comparable based on discussions last year.
I had a clearance for many years before my retirement but I never took home material classified at any level—never ever ever. I avoided looking at classified stuff as a whole, if at all possible, so I just didn’t have to consider classification in any remarks I made with anyone, from my cats to my kids to a public speech. If I did examine something, it was in an appropriate, designated, secure venue. If I heard something classified, I didn’t write it down to recirculate—again, never ever ever.
The photographs of the relevant files, clearly containing the well-known red and white “classification” cover sheets, were strewn in about as if they were discarded comic books or porn magazines. Any other federal employee caught treating material with classified covers as such expects—and receives—lengthy incarceration as a result of that laziness, ineptitude or anything more nefarious. People go to jail for mishandling classified material.
How much of our national dialogue these days focuses on foreign “enemies”? China is el Numero Uno. We accuse them of being sly, devious, unbending, menacing, and anything else threatening. Were we not concerned they could acquire or might have hold of this stuff from its pitifully vast exposure laying open on the floor? We aren’t going to pursue a case about leaving nuclear documents unattended? We aren’t even going to ask how this happened? Seriously?
Based on our varying trust in our allies and partners, we are pretty selective regarding where we share our most precious secrets. As important as our eighty year hand-in-glove relationship with Tokyo, they are excluded from the Five Eyes Accord. Wait, really? Yes, really.
We share our most closely-held secrets with four other English-speaking countries: Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Washington and London built out the shared intelligence of World War II to include Canberra, Wellington, and Ottawa as the Cold War developed. Neither Bonn/Berlin nor Tokyo receive the same information. Seoul, where we station thousands of troops and fought a nasty war, does not get the same Five Eyes intelligence.
Turns out other countries—even some of our best buds—are not always cautious about handling sensitive information as we used to be. Just last week, the Japanese government fired the senior admiral in the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force when it turned out more than two hundred personnel mishandled classified material. I imagine that brings shivers to any intelligence official, as it should, but we don’t share our best stuff with them because we have no control over this sensitive reporting once it is out of the hands of the U.S. government.
It’s easy to say that the Special Prosecutor statue is at the heart of the dismissal as Judge Cannon opined in her 93 page brief. I believe in institutions so I would normally let it go at that; people will quibble about her ruling for years to come. The consequences, however, of the signalling that we are ignoring the implications of those materials stored, unguarded, in a facility at Mar-a-Lago where we know Chinese citizens tried to get admittance during the last administration ought to worry each and every one of us.
Our foreign colleagues likely will be considerably more reluctant to share their most important materials with us in future years; they would be completely justified in any skepticism that we value protecting those secrets as much as we claim, based on this case passing away into oblivion. It may shock Americans but sometimes our allies and partners actually know more about a situation than we do so we well may lose access to that intelligence and analysis, to our national detriment. The Mar-a-Lago mess came in conjunction with Airman Jack Texeira and on the heels of Army clerk Chelsea Manning (a decade earlier), who both seriously compromised classified materials.
Additionally, even though the same application requirements will persist for anyone needing a clearance, the seriousness with which we hear about “dire threats to our national interests” will be less persuasive in the aftermath of this case.
National security ought be just that the security of the United States, its people, and territory. Judge Cannon’s ruling yesterday made clear that her doubts about the implications of the process isn’t nearly enough to warrant addressing the profound dangers this case creates. She dismissed the case and actions can have consequences years down the pike.
I welcome thoughts, observations, or comments. I also appreciate you circulating the column if you find it of value. Thank you for taking time to read any of my work. Thanks especially to those who support Actions with subscriptions as you keep me going.
Be safe in the beastly conditions and be well. FIN
Arpan Rai, “Japan removes navy chief as sweeping misconduct investigation roils military”, The Independent, 12 July 2024.
Your comment: "People go to jail for mishandling classified material." Yes...but.... In my years of dealing with classified material to include countless hours of on-line computer based training courses which had to be accomplished annually and were inspection checklist items... my conclusion was that the lower the rank or position of the person with the "disclosure" or not-following-the-rules infraction, the swifter and more severe the penalty. Fully complying with all the security protocols to fully protect classified information is an extremely time consuming and detailed endeavor. It's hammered into the heads of the worker-bees... but as you get into the higher ranks and more lofty positions, "they" don't have time to meet every single stringent protocol to view or discuss an item. It's not at all surprising to me that both Presidential mishandling incidents took place. The handling rules are a huge impediment for people at that level and the innovative work-arounds seem to be the norm.
For fun, one day I counted how many layers of security / protection were between me and reading a classified document on my work computer. I came up with 8 layers. And that's for a person who is in a vetted, trusted position with "routine" access. For documents classified at a higher level, it was many more than that. I feel safe in saying that top level officials are not going to take the time to go through 8 complex layers to get to a document they need to review. Those who recognize how serious the breaches can be take it seriously. Those who don't, don't.
shocked was a good word.