Corruption again

Xi’s struggle continues, stress active tense of struggles

When Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the CCP in November 2012, one of his first proclamations was a war on endemic PLA corruption. The joke among Chinese citizens and analysts was that if anything were of value, it was for sale in China. Since something like command over potent and modernising military systems might be considered valuable, this was not a comforting thought in case utterly incompetent but unimaginably aggressive officers seize control over the system.

Xi’s real concern was that the populus was frustrated with the corruption that they were less able to participate in than those with access to the correct guanxi or networks across the vast nation. China has different views of behaviour than we do which leads to some ‘corruption, as we sit it. But the issues Xi sought to confront were major acquisition of funding in the pittance of a PLA salary, for example. Guanxi’s informal but foundational in China’s society is replete with opportunities for corruption which Party officials had pursued through the past forty-five years to amass incredible wealth. This wealth disparity was an obvious red flag for CCP credibility as popular frustration with a slowing economy and apparent culmination of the modernisation model left regular citizens behind, highlighting the wealth gap increasingly plaguing the nation. Xi promised to end this corruption through stiff penalties, party purges, and extended incarcerations.

Indeed, his anti-corruption campaign brought down hundreds of senior PLA officers and CCP officials. His rival, Bo Xilai and wife Gu Kailai, are in prison for life, he for taking bribes of more than $3 million and she for murdering a British business partner. This spectacular show trial demonstrated Xi’s determination to address the sins of the powerful as Bo was Party chief in Chongqing in southwestern China while conveniently eradicating a popular competitor for leading China. But the anti-corruption efforts went far beyond a big man confessing on state media to the error in his ways. Hundreds of generals left office to face prison for skimming off of PLA funds.

Almost twelve years later, the depth of the problem is all the clearer as Xi continues firing senior PLA officers, including those he personally promoted over the past few years for their loyalty—and presumably skill. China has a deep corruption problem that worries the leadership in a couple of ways.

The massive reorganisation of 2015 partially aimed to mirror what China saw as superior U.S. military outcomes following Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization of 1986. These 2015 changes also shook up the services by undermining the guanxi networks and corruption.

Now, eight years later, Xi had to dismiss the Strategic Rocket Forces leadership to root out corrupt officers, proving the actions from a decade earlier were either insufficient or completely ignored. The loyalty, fidelity, and position of the SRF is crucial because of their nuclear capacity yet here we are.

Last week, for the umpteenth time, Xi reminded the PLA of its loyalty to the Party. Only earlier this month, the General Secretary met PLA seniors in the historic Ya’nan, where the Party lived following at the end of the Long March and from which the CCP fought the Second World War, to remind the officers of the vital role their loyalty plays for the Party. The need to do that has been weekly, if not daily, for Party leaders, especially over the contemporary period.

The idea of the PLA challenging CCP decisions (or Xi’s leadership) is clearly not an acceptable state of affairs, especially for a party built on the power of the gun in achieving power. The civilian Party makes all of the decisions, with the PLA is one of the sub-national elements executing those decisions. But CCP supposedly eschews corruption so the idea of senior level officials flagrantly ignoring that that doctrine for personal gain is a threat to the centrality of the CCP’s legitimacy.

Additionally, Xi must wonder whether other aspects of the PLA are suspect when he sees corruption. Does the PLA manipulate evaluations of its systems and capability? What about outcomes of their exercises? How about officer and enlisted personnel assessments? Xi could face a decidedly negative outcome by operating off manipulated data and assumptions set forth by a corrupt PLA in a circumstance such as the South China Sea or Taiwan’s sovereignty. The Party demands a modernised military in part to assure the professionalisation to produce predictable victories for the motherland. If a data are tinged by corruption influencing the actual level of preparedness, it could alter the decision to use the military.

Yet further rebuttal to Xi’s efforts is this week’s announcement that Generals Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghu, the two most recent Defense Ministers between 2018 ad 2023, both had taken huge bribes during their tenures. Both individuals lost their military rank and will likely spend their remaining days in prison. The CCP expelled them. party member remains a key to success in the PRC so this is not only humiliating but financially devastating. Both men were Xi’s personal choice for their lofty positions, coming well into his second term as General Secretary following years of rooting out corruption.

Is all of this cause for relief for U.S. strategists? Not likely because military personnel prepare for worst case scenarios. Without transparency into their decision-making, we can’t be certain where the leadership intends to use the PLA as an asset of the Party. We can extrapolate about his discomfort with these cases but have ability to measure how this affects his calculations. We can’t know how close he really is to trying some mission regarding Taiwan. We don’t know how whether the PLA will further expand its harassment of U.S. transit of the South China Sea or pursue Filipino maritime forces over disputed claims. We simply don’t know a lot that would allow us leeway in making some choices.

Corruption and personal relationships have been part of China’s culture for millennia so no one should expect Xi, son of a Revolutionary leader who had his own guanxi, to achieve success in 12 years. At the same time, senior apartment leaders must be incredibly frustrated to find senior leaders still engaging in these damaging activities after such public scrutiny over the past decade. It makes me wonder whether the afflicted are ignorant of chances they will get caught or willfully figuring they can outwait the General Secretary’s current five year term. I also have to ask whether there have been any improvements at all on the anti-corruption side?

I welcome your thoughts on this or any column. Rebuttals, comments, and questions are essential to dialogue on the issues we confront in years ahead.

Thank you for reading ACC. Please forward it if you think it of value to others. Thanks especially to the loyal readers who support this with financial subscriptions as this helps me a great deal.

We had a good rain last night so it was a bright morning over the historic Maryland State House.

Be well and be safe. FIN

Chris Panella, “‘Crown Jewel’ of the Chinese military appears to have serious problem, but the U.S. can’t afford to bet on all of its missiles being defective”, BusinessInsider.com, 14 January 2024, retrieved at https://www.businessinsider.com/china-rocket-force-corruption-us-cannot-lower-guard-2024-1?op=1

John Sudworth, ‘Bo Xilai found guilty of corruption by Chinese court’, bbcnews.com, 13 September 2013, retrieved at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-24170726

‘Xi Jinping is obsessed with absolute political loyalty in the PLA’, TheEconomist.com, 6 November 2023, retrieved at https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/11/06/xi-jinping-is-obsessed-with-political-loyalty-in-the-pla