Corruption and Latin America
The dance with countless partners
The United States is not immune to corruption as every reader can probably think of her or his most ‘shake your head’ instance (the packages of cash discovered in 2005 in Louisiana Democratic Representative William Jefferson’s freezer is hard to top) of a politician getting in trouble. Certainly European politicians also have had their problems, including a spate in the last few years for both Germany and the European Union. South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaposa just this week seems to have dodged an impeachment when the African National Congress acted to preclude such a vote in the Parliament but I doubt the saga is over. The list goes on and on from too many parts of the world.
Latin American leaders have been at the top of the news this week as the brand new President of Peru, Ms. Dina Boularte, succeeded Pedro Castillo Terrones who attempted to dissolve the national congress as it sought to impeach him over corruption allegations. Castillo Terrones failed to galvanize military support for his demanded remedy, landing him in jail. Also this week former Argentine President and current Vice President Cristina Fernandez de Kitchener received a six year jail sentence and ban against holding office resulting from public graft charges, both of which she intends to appeal.
Notable about these cases is the lack of military intervention for or against the individuals. Within living memory, especially in Latin America, the armed forces would likely have grabbed power on the grounds of ‘protecting the patria’ or their definition of the nation. This behaviour was as predictable as the night following the day, with Colombo’s and Costs Rica the only two states for most of the past century without much military rule.
What happened? Over the past three decades the sense governments run by the armed forces have not thrived in this region. The Argentine military, in particular, departed office in late 1983 with their tails between their legs after the 1983 election repudiated their ‘guerra sucia’ (dirty war) over the prior seven and a half years. Inflation, massive human rights abuse, the failed South Atlantic war over Las Malvinas (the Falklands), poor economic management and so much more left them lacking credibility so an elected civilian human rights attorney won the election , driving the armed forces back to the barracks. Similar problems in Brazil and Uruguay sent out of office in the mid-1980s.
Chile’s deeply polarising military dictatorship still retains some national prestige, though, as indicated by referendum failing to pass this autumn. One of its provisions would have curbed their protected status in government. The Chilean Constitution of the brutal Augusta Pinoche Ugarte dictatorship continues, guaranteeing the armed forces a 10% block of seats in Congress. Chileans apparently still want to ensure the armed forces’ ability to impose stability in some manner on their society.
The lack of military golpes de estado does not mean that corruption has disappeared or that the armed forces will never instigate their own rule again. This is the condition we see currently with the militaries needing raise their credibilities in all sectors of societies a great deal to improve their current low level of support today. As we know, however, few conditions remain stagnant in societies, especially those with weak shared governance and strained civil military relations. Both of of these characteristics still threaten all of the region except Costa Rica. Even Colombia has a slight chance of extra constitutional steps not commonly used—and a leftist President not liked by traditional powers in the Republic.
The remarkable point is that Latin America remains a region where elections too often do not lead to full terms in office. What will it take to transform them into stable, truly predictable systems? We in the United States too often glorify each election as having turned the corner but corruption problems always seem to defeat commitments to constitutional institutions and regimes. Enduring transformation into true responsive regimes is a ways away but how far? FIN