cruel power
Hong Kong and the rule of law
Dozens of Hong Kongers who challenged Beijing’s rule in the former British colony likely face extended prison incarcerations following their sentencing this week. The publisher of the most pro-democracy news outlet is only the most prominent.
Just a reminder that Hong Kong reverted to Beijing’s control on 1 July 1997 following a century and a half under British jurisdiction. The latters took control, in perpetuity on paper, as the result of the Qing Empire signing the Treaty of Nanking to end the First Opium War in 1842. Many folks forget that as a Crown colony, Hong Kong did not determine its legislative choices as Westminster did it for them.
The transition period after Margaret Thatcher’s government acquiesced to Britain’s declining status by negotiating with Deng Xiaoping to establish a turnover scheme for the island, the associated New Territories, and the millions affected. The CCP saw this as a measure towards closure to its “Century of Humiliation” whereby it felt disrespected by the west; Taiwan is the remaining piece of that narrative since the former Portuguese Macau reverted to China in 1999. This is why they are so obsessed with Taiwan, they boxed themselves into a corner by declaring it an unresolved issue for which they must gain respect.
The 1984 Reversion document, formally the Sino-British Joint Declaration, set forth the steps for a thirteen years’ transition. The Basic Law was the framework for this period leading to the reversion, allowing Hong Kong to established a Legislative Council, which allowed residents a measure of self-determination within the bounds of the process underway. The colony had certain other steps available during this brief period as Hong Kong was a jewel in the modernizing states of East Asia.
China promised to respect indigenous decision-making within the boundaries of the newly established Special Administrative Region (SAR) between July 1997 and 2047. In principle these years were anticipated as close to genuine self-governance as Hong Kong would ever experience although some visible indications of China’s control, such as swapping out the Union Jack for the CCP flag and elimination of many portions of British status, were unavoidable as displays of the formal transfer of sovereignty. Then-Prince of Wales Charles attended the lowering of the Union Jack as scheduled. Hong Kong’s first few years followed the script, including allowing a fairly vibrant political scene to develop. Media remained free and, most importantly for many, the financial firms so fearful of Beijing’s draconian rule either remained or often returned to the city-state as if nothing were different.
By the middle of the following decade, however, cracks in Beijing’s commitment were appearing. The CCP leadership in Beijing, hearing unnerving declarations by the Democratic Progressive Party president, Chen Shui-bian, about Taiwan’s status, made them fearful that the Party could be challenged. The CCP began making known its displeasure over certain Hong Kong administrators who smacked of being too risky for Beijing’s liking. Then the Party began more overtly promoting leadership more overtly linked to the CCP rather than with roots in the city-state. This all occurred as China was entering its most arrogant phase of its global rise, transpiring as China thought the U.S. decline falling into irreversible decline as the global power and the 2008 Olympics showcased to the Chinese nation the veneration the CCP alone revived. I was at an April 2008 speech in Hong Kong when one of the mainland business tycoons linked to Xi Jinping’s circle announced in no uncertain terms “The U.S. is over, spent. It’s China’s time so you better move off the scene”.
Youth in Hong Kong, particularly at universities, made clear their disapproval of any sort of mainland deviation from the pre-1997 ground rules. Less tolerant factions within the CCP continued advocating to rein in activities in Hong Kong, such as the annual 4 June candlelight vigil commemorating the deaths at Tian’anmen Square in 1989. But they were not so much targetting people as events at the time. Declining legitimacy for the Party on the mainland led to the Party’s perception it needed to stop any possible Hong Kong examples which could rouse anti-Party gatherings in China proper.
Between Spetember and December of 2014, not too many years after the Color Revolutions of the former Soviet Union and the Arab Spring, massive student gatherings, known at various points as the Umbrella Movement, the Occupy Movement, and the anti-Occupy Movement, became a critical test for the SAR agreement. Students began a sit-in with umbrellas in tow following mainland intervention in election reforms. Others took up protests in critical locations across the central business district, unwilling to disperse for fear of losing the ability to convince the Hong Kong and Beijing leadership of their demands.
I was in Hong Kong that November where a French scholar who had lived there for years dismissed the protests as isolated to a small portion of town rather than any broad activity as indicated by the international press. Regardless what my colleague believed, several key traffic sections of Hong Kong island remained closed by protestors for fully 77 days. Youth anger at Beijing’s unwillingness to adhere to its agreement on elections had been brewing for months but this burgeoning, extended action against rule increasingly viewed as Beijing-imposed, became intolerable. The protests may have been students but their anger included a wider slice of the public fearful of rising living costs with fewer opportunities for long-term advancement.
Beijing, as almost invariably happens, worried the protests would undermine its argument to Taiwan and the world that Hong Kong represented “one country, two systems” during this fifty year transition. I was still interacting with Taiwanese officials from whom I invariably heard defiance that the “one country, two systems” model was at all applicable. They noted Taiwan never was a British colony nor did most citizens accept that Beijing should have control over their lives so the student protests merely reinforced skepticism on Taiwan itself that anything other than respect would meet Taiwan’s needs.
Preserving “one country, two systems” became a figleaf for arresting those undermining state authority. China—many, not just CCP members—despises luan or chaos, especially when it originates from political protests. The Party becomes furious at anyone defying its mandates. Some of those most vocal Movement figures remain in prison a decade later. Others fled the SAR but most Hong Kongers were shocked at the harshness of treatment the mainland officials meted out. People thus were not surprised by Beijing passing highly restrictive legislation to dissuade future protesters.
In the months immediately proceeding the Pandemic, similar protests erupted in the SAR, this time on CCP legislation mandating that fugitives who had violated mainland law be returned to China to face justice officials. This was further evidence that China was reneging on its 1997 reversion agreement, precisely as the Party violated parallel promises to respect the International Settlement in Shanghai following the establishment of the PRC in the 1949.
A number of highly visible Hong Kong figures such as student protest leaders and a media mogul were jailed. Two lawyers received ten year sentences because “they should have known better”. It was the sentencing of the Jimmy Lai yesterday, five years after the protests began, that made clear yet again how severely Beijing demands its will win. These protesters faced conviction as posing national security threats to the regime. Lai, at 76, could spend the remainder of his life in prison, despite his actions being peaceful protests. The CCP rarely is lenient on law but under Xi Jinping the downright draconian enforcement of laws is an unmistakable message on challenging the Party’s rule.
Hong Kong is more than halfway through its fifty year transition period. Based on prior behavior, the Party’s likely argument that protesters of various laws are national security threats will accelerate mainland subjugation of the SAR. Yet Hong Kong is back to its position as a financial hub in the global markets. Land prices are lower than a few years back but Hong Kong remains one of the most desirable cities in which to live. Young people still feel frustration and anxiety about the future, much the same as youth in Birmingham (Alabama or United Kingdom) because of the twin uncertainties of the past five years and the years ahead. Taiwan never bought what China was selling about the freedoms the island could retain by reuniting because the CCP demand is always always always for the Party to control the levers of society to assure its continuity in power. Taiwan rejecting the argument never stops Beijing from making the case, however.
Occasionally interviews with Movement protesters evoke disappointment that Britain or the United States did nothing to deter China from eroding the norms it agreed to support. These are completely understandable but also utterly unrealistic: what would we have done to change the outcome? Invade Hong Kong? Sanction the biggest trading partner for most of the world? What realistic tools could we have used as armed conflict was never a possibility. I noted in yesterday’s column that Americans too often think we have a much greater capacity to change other states’s behavior than we actually do: tragically, Hong Kong exemplifies how limited our influence can be, no matter how noble the cause.
Thoughts on Hong Kong? On what our options might be in the future? I welcome any and each thought you have as I find the situation both unsurprising and deeply unsettling in an era when we advocate states pursue democracy but with limited space in which to operate. Please weigh in.
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Be well and be safe. FIN
“Hong Kong protest: what is the ‘Umbrella Movement’?”, BBCNews.com, 28 September 2019, retrieved at https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/49862757
David Pierson and Tiffany May, “After Years in a Hong Kong Jail, Jimmy Lai Has His day in Court”, NewYorkTimes.com, 19 November 2024, retrieved at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/19/world/asia/jimmy-lai-hong-kong-trial.html