Dam
Russian attachment to attrition
Attrition is a powerful motivator for Russia in Ukraine. We began witnessing sixteen months ago Putin’s lust to bring that country to heel with his vision of a Moscow-dominated sphere. Putin’s harsh treatment of his own forces, largely untrained youth who cannot buy their way out of service, evidences his unrelenting vision of a victorious endstate. Attrition is the way various Kremlin leaders generally orchestrate their national means to wear down an enemy’s will.
Attrition, defined as ‘the continued wearing down or weakening of resistance, especially as a result of continuous pressure or harassment’, in the words of dictionary.com, is Russia’s prefer method of addressing most problems, certainly military matters. This huge geographic entity, far bigger than our own or anyone else’s, with a lot of raw materials and energy has little else to create national cohesion. Putin is trying to spur Russian ethnic and religious connections to create a nationalist pride to justify the war but he doesn’t have much else to motivate his people to rally to his cause.
He is also using the sheer brutality Russian leaders evoke historically to achieve their goals. Because of its size and raw power, generation after generation of rulers, regardless of their titles or form of governance, hurl the widest array of government resources against any enemy. Russia appears never to invoke nuance is a favoured approach as if the associated subtlety might unmask weakness of leadership. This was Stalin’s massing strategy along the Eastern Front in World War II as it had been a generation earlier under Nicholas II or in previous conflicts. Russians simply don’t do subtle; they embrace crushing power.
Attrition means using any and all assets to wear down the other side over whatever length of time it takes to get what Russia desires. The attacks target military forces and civilians equally as both stand in the way of Russian goals. Russians begin a conflict with the assumption they are in it for the longest haul which can be a multi-year period which is why General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said months ago—and as recently as day before yesterday—that the conflict between Kyiv and Moscow will be extended rather than a hoped for quick end.
The actions leading to the destruction of the dam in southern Ukraine go hand in hand with this desire to beat down an opponent; it strikes me as ludicrous to entertain the suggestion that Ukrainians perpetrated this act. Destroying the dam is part of the psychological warfare that Russians and many others employ to undermine the confidence in populations under attack that they can withstand the pressure; Putin hopes this step will further push Ukrainians to implore Zelenskii to surrender everything.
It’s seductive to ask how Putin can be so cavalier about lives (lost or potentially so) in this war. It’s facile to say the culture is a harsh one where people bear up in frigid cold or because of the history of deprivation so characteristic of many segments of Russian society. Perhaps Russians do demand fewer luxuries or prioritise things differently than Americans but the answer probably lies in the historic ethos of fear over the thousand years of their history. Fear of outsiders (often defined as those non-Russian Orthodox living among the population in the current boundaries of the country) attacking Russia and fear of invasion (justified in two brutal wars of the first half of the twentieth century alone, much less the Napoleonic conflict a century earlier) are two powerful arguments that leaders cite to justify their brutal actions as part of a national self-defensive behaviour reappearing so often in the country’s history.
Putin, of course, denies that his forces blew up the dam any more than acknowledging this invasion was an unprovoked attack on a sovereign nation. He clearly believes, based on both his actions and rambling speeches, that Russia earns a unique exoneration to pursue what he defines as the ends best for his civilisation’s future. It’s a tall order but one built on unshakable conviction he alone understands the historic rightful position for Russia vis-a-vis its neighbour to the west.
This is also why I still worry about his threats, less now than immediately after the war began, to use nuclear weapons. He has a dangerous way of rewriting logic to suit his historic narrative.
The recent hushed hints that Ukraine’s recent successes might push Zelenskii to negotiate with Putin are fantastical to me. While Kyiv is showing the benefits of preparing since 2014 (follwoing Russia seizing the Crimea) for probable conflict, the Ukrainians have no interest in leaving conditions by which Russia can reattack in the future. Ukrainian leaders want to break Russia to preclude such a possibility but the relative size of Ukraine versus the geographic bounty the vast Russian Federation has makes that virtually impossible. I personally, as a non-specialist on these states, see nothing incentivising either capital to negotiate as each still believes it can outlast the other. Sadlly, Moscow probably still has a better likelihood of success since it seeks to destroy Urkaine rather than see it continue independently. If that means annihilating Russian-speaking sympathesisers, they will be collateral damage in this horrible conflict. The foreign support necessary for Ukraine must continue for an indefinite period to supply what Kyiv’s position demands to sustain their efforts.
Part of the reason this entire conflict befuddles us is we see conflict as a problem to solve so we can return to the assumed status quo ante of peace. Peace, our preferred environment, allows us to focus on looking ahead to improve the nation, its people, resolve tensions, and the other aspects characterising how we look at the world. We are not good at appreciating history and we certainly don’t use it as the sole justification for our actions as so many other states do. We tend to use specific identifiable actions as the reason for a war to end rather than a historic retelling or five hundred year memory. We prefer decisive battles and conflicts as we are impatient people by nature, believing an unconditional defeat closes the door on protracted problems. Sadly, not all conflicts in fact end so easily in the contemporary era because we are fuzzier about defining desired outcomes. But, the power of attrition remains at the center of Russia’s strategy and overall culture.FIN
Tara Copp, ‘Milley says fighting in Ukraine has increased and cautions it will continue for lengthy time,’ wwwstripes.com, 6 June 2023, retrieved at https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2023-06-06/milley-russia-ukraine-war-normandy-anniversary-10353137.html
Dictionary.com retrieved at http://www.dictionary.com