democracy in Taiwan
outcomes could surprise us
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Today I want to raise a possibility that we should not dismiss without consideration. It relates to Taiwan, a fascinating if controversial place of such importance to so many.
Will we be as supportive of Taiwan if its democracy were to elect a president in 2024 who advocates closer ties between the island and the mainland?
One of the most frequently-cited reasons many in the United States voice their opposition to the CCP-led China ruling over the 24 million people on the island is the thriving democracy in place since the late 1980s. As I have noted in prior posts, Taiwan was not always democratic nor was it de facto or de jure independent but it sure is now. My favourite description is Taiwan as a hyper-democracy with the institutions thriving: press, parties, and participation of the voters.
The Portuguese labelled it Formosa when they began exploring—and attempting to colonise—this land a hundred miles off the south, southeast mainland coast about five hundred years ago. The Dutch establised a short term foothold in the northwest in the early 17th century but their ouster coincided roughly with the establishment of the Manchu Qing dynasty in the 1640s. The population on Taiwan had little affiliation with the mainland as there was no central administration or any organised structure as we see on the island today. Aboriginal peoples who migrated to the island from Southeast Asia many centuries earlier lived in the interior while the more ‘recent’ arrival of Chinese from the mainland populated small cities along the island’s coast.
The Qing nominally ‘governed’ through local powers from the 1660s through surrendering the island, under the Treaty of Shimonseki, to the Japanese in 1895. Suffering this defeat was yet a further humiliation, as the Qing phrased it, by an imperial power, albeit Asian, overtook China. Japan’s power was rising as the Qing’s was collapsing at the end of the 19th century. Sixteen years after Taiwan became Japanese, the Qing dynasty fell in 1911.
Japan governed Taiwan for fifty years before the losing it after World War II. In 2023, there remain a few Taiwanese who still speak Japanese better than Chinese since business and education were conducted in that language rather than Cantonese (the common mother tongue south of the Yangtze River on the mainland) or Putungha (a common term for spoken northern Chinese).
Japan treated Taiwan less harshly than those areas it conquered during World War II with many Taiwanese far less critical view of Japan’s wartime actions than most neighbours. Japan, for its part, retains some affinity for the island, with ultra- conservative elements long arguing that Tokyo should intervene in any Taiwan contingency; most other Asians remain somewhat less committal on the question. Recent increases in defense priorities leads many analysts to believe Japan definitely would support Taiwan under attack but that remains a hypothetical at this juncture. Taiwan and Japan do, in sum, have a special history.
Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalists, or Guomindang (GMD), took control over the island in the late 1940s. The Chinese received Taiwan as part of the peace agreement followed Tokyo’s defeat and ouster in the 1945 but the Civil War distracted attention. Only four years lapsed between signing the surrender document and the establishment of a GMD regime on the island. The predominance of the resident population was ‘overseas’ Chinese whose families departed the mainland to the island during the prior four centuries. Aboriginals Taiwanese numbered in the lower single digits as a percentage fo the population. The massive influx of GMD exiles fleeing the encroaching Communist armies began in by 1947 as the end of the Civil War neared. The people predominantly spoke Taiwanese, a cognate of Fujianese or Cantonese (i.e., not Putungha) and identified themselves as being a native of the island for many generations rather than identifying themselves by their home villages on the mainland as GMD members did (and still do in some cases, seventy five years later).
Mainlanders who arrived in panic as the GMD’s hold on government crumbled believed their time in Taiwan was temporary but they distrusted the local Taiwanese who they were dislocating in power. The GMD had been in power since the 1920s and sought to continue that role. Establishing their rule lead to understandable frictions. The ‘2/27 incident’ brutally showed Taiwanese as early as 1947 that the GMD would brook little power sharing. Recognising they were unwelcome but assuming it a ‘temporary’ status, the GMD feared the Taiwanese would seek to oust them. Limits on the rights of the indigenous Taiwanese were rife: language, political association, education, and more. This period is known as the White Terror as the GMD used intimidation to keep peace on the island. The GMD under Chiang Kai-shek’s de facto power between 1949 and his death in 1975, followed by the first decade of his son Chiang Ching-kuo’s rule were harsh for Taiwanese. Resentments grew, unsurprisingly, but the fear of mainland ‘Fifth Column’ activities provided justification for continuing the GMD power over all organs of society and business.
The U.S. decision to shift diplomatic relations from Taiwan to the mainland on 1 January 1979 was a shock for the islanders and especially for the GMD. While the GMD retained executive government for all but 8 of the next 37 years, Chiang recognised the need to set the island apart from the mainland for it to survive beyond Beijing’s clutches. In the mid-1980s, he opened the government from a family dictatorship masquerading as a GMD government to a more participatory political system. Human rights, long an ignored arena on the island, become an important measure of the society’s commitment to its people. Freedom of assembly, of the press, and of association took off.
Taiwan held its first direct presidential election in 1996, leading to Beijing’s frantic and heavy-handed attempts to deter such a vote. The GMD candidate, a Taiwanese-born associate of Chiang Ching-kuo, Li Denghui, won the election, solidifying the institutions and practices of democracy for the 20 million islanders. While a GMD president, Li was also a voice for Taiwan’s nationalism.
Democracy picked up speed in Taiwan. The 2000 presidential election led to a minority candidate claiming victory. The GMD vote split between two candidates allowing the Democratic Progressive Party, a pro-environmental party with a history of desiring independence and supported largely by southern Taiwanese, to win under Chen Shui-bien. Chen was a well-known anti-GMD and human rights figure, especially prominent because an attack allegedly perpetrated by the state security paralysed his wife.
Chen’s two terms were controversial and chaotic. His DPP did not control the Legislative Yuan which limited his effectiveness. Some of the positions on domestic policy split his supporters. The greatest controversy resulted from the constant possibility he would announce independence on behalf of his supporters, to the dismay of the George W. Bush administration and other regimes around the region. Chen’s positions caused concern across the Strait. The CCP feared he would force their hand before the PLA was ready to ‘teach Taiwan authorities’ a lesson, if necessary.
Chen served the final months of his second term in prison on corruption charges. For several reasons, including Chen’s corruption and overall exhaustion at DPP rule, a GMD lawyer, Ma Ying-jeou, acceded to the presidency for two terms beginning in 2008.
Ma viewed relations with the mainland differently, huing more to the traditional GMD desire for a closer relationship with the mainland while never actively advocating for reunification. Beijing found this a more welcome attitude leading to improvements in several areas such a dramatic increase in PRC tourists visiting the island, economic and trade relations, enhanced travel opportunities: in sum, better ties. Ma actually met with Xi Jinping in Singapore not long before his second term ended in 2016, reinforcing questions about what the GMD anticipated for Taiwan-Chinese relations over the long run.
Earlier this spring, Ma became the first former Taiwan leader to visit the mainland. He proposed a path towards greater cooperation which disquieted many in the United States and Taiwan. The GMD is the major opposition party with viable candidates for the 2024 election—how widespread is support for Ma’s ideas?
Tsia Ing-wen returned the DPP to the presidency in 2016 and 2020 but is term limited. Taiwan immediately got the Beijing freeze because Tsai refused to endorse Beijing’s interpretation of the future: reunification. Tsai confronted the unavoidable modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army. She has finally begun steps to defend itself against a markedly more powerful threat a hundred miles away but the Taiwan Defense Force is little match for the PLA. U.S. assistance is vital yet still taken for granted as the sole action necessary in the eyes of many on the island. Why do we need do anything if the United States will save us?
All presidents, however, most likely win or lose their voters’ support based on domestic conditions. The performance of the economy in Tsai’s 7th year disappoints many. The population is restless about the future for Taiwan in many international organisations, despite Tsai’s efforts, which isolates the island from much of the world.
More importantly, fears grow that Taiwan is a pawn in a Sino-U.S. struggle rather than a nation on the brink of worldwide respect. Speakers Pelosi and McCarthy may have showcased their conversations with Tsai but that increased Beijing’s ire which alarms many on Taiwan today.
My question is how will we react should a candidate more similar to Ma win the presidency? Congressman McCaul of Texas recently stated he fears Beijing’s hand trying to undermine the fidelity of the upcoming contest. Chinese leaders certainly tried preventing past DPP victories using military exercises and other tools to frighten Taiwan’s population. But that is how standard Chines treats everything they don’t like: China acts to ‘teach a lesson’ as they define their moves.
The election occurs in January of next year but the candidates are not set yet within the GMD. The current Vice President, Lai Ching-te, will carry the DPP banner while another known candidate is Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party which advocates neither being the Greens (DPP and other more independence- and environmentally-minded advocates)or the Blues (GMD and smaller parties). If past elections are any indication, it will be a vibrant process with passionate supporters working to the final moment for their causes and candidates.
At president, the economy will be a major concern along with the island’s future. People in Taiwan do not think solely about the independence factor, even though we frame the island that way too often. I don’t think we can guess the outcome eight months from now.
My question, however, is whether a potentially more conciliatory GMD regime would still be as important to us? Would we withhold military support to a party dangling the prospect, at some point, of reconciliation with the mainland? How would that work?
The issue is that democracy respects the will of the people. If the people of Taiwan were to choose a GMD politician who might anticipate reunification, how do we overrule that while still respecting Taiwan’s election process and the overall principles of internal governance? I have no idea whether that could happen but it is a real possibility based on what we know about the island, its history, and its voting behaviour over several decades. Like so many countries, Taiwan’s voters tire of the government in office and local political are every day realities people consider. I don’t know what our response would be but we need be aware of this contingency as we consider our support for the island.
Put another way, are we enamoured only with an outcome where Taiwan remains separate from the mainland or are we willing to embrace their democratic decision regardless where it takes them? The answer to this question might affect many more young women and men in U.S. military uniforms than we are considering right now. FIN
Anastasia Bouchee, ‘GOP Rep predicts China Will Influence Taiwan’s 2024 Elections to Take Over’, FreedomPress.com, 11 April 2023, retrieved at https://freedompress.com/gop-rep-predicts-china-will-influence-taiwans-2024-elections-to-take-over/