democracy in venezuela

a tragedy centuries in the making

I taught with a better-known scholar of Latin American affairs for a few years at the National War College before he returned to his much higher salary outside of federal service (as he point out gratuitously when he departed). This fellow was so prolific as to water the eyes.

He had written on pretty much any and every topic one could conjure up. He used to tell us one of his goals during his Washington career was to compose an entire book during his various trips across town on the Metro; I initially wondered how much time he spent traveling the mass transit system. Gradually, I realized he was on the subway a lot as he rarely seemed interested in his amazing War College students and certainly was both patient and cheap so Metro an easy solution. I certainly could not compete with that: I gradually weaned myself from Metro as I was both cheap and impatient which did not match well.

My original academic focus, in a galaxy far far away, was Latin America, though I was more interested in Colombia and Argentina than he was. But he would come in to chat when he wanted something.

We had a memorable conversation not long before he departed in 1996 that blew my mind. He had just returned with a handful of other academic specialists from a journey to Caracas. What he came to say was that he could not believe how much things had deteriorated in Venezuela because “we studied it years ago and everything was solved”. Direct quote.

I about fell out of my chair laughing because there was no Latin American country less likely “solved” than Venezuela—and anyone paying attention knew that well before 1996. Today, some three decades later, I note actions created pretty important consequences for which they are still paying a price. Additionally, the Venezuelan experience was a cautionary tale for what occurs by losing sight of nourishing democracy.

So much of Latin America had a sordid relationship with participatory governing. I hesitate to use the word democracy because we tend naively to assume a relatively competitive election equals democracy. Uh, no, not by a Missouri mile. Democracy requires a sustained commitment to elections and institutions able to withstand the slings and arrows of its people for generations. Put another way, what the South Koreans or even the Japanese appear to have accomplished over the past thirty-five and seventy-five years, respectively, is remarkable because so many countries find the nurturing part the hardest, failing to achieve it.

Latin America following independence in the period between 1810 and 1825 was prone to caudiollo, or strong man rule, with occasional exceptions in Chile, Colombia, and Argentina. We can debate specific individuals, years or regimes but I stand by the problem of too many places over too many years ruled by men who had arrived on “white horses to save the place”, only to instead equate the future of whatever place to themselves. Arguably the worst might actually have been Venezuela.

Bolívar was a caraqueño of means who eventually liberated his homeland and the adjacent areas from Spain as the 1810s dawned. Bolívar ousted Spanish rule by 1820, then created El Gran Colombia which included today’s Venezuela, Colombia, and Perú as the governing structure. Interesting concept but bloody hard geography to rule under a single central regime without modern technology, among other things. Venezuela emerged as a sovereign state in the late 1820s.

From the 1830s through virtually all of the next century and a quarter, Venezuela’s rulers were authoritarian men who ruled with an iron fist, satisfying the whims of a network of large agricultural landowners as well as supporters in Caracas, Maracaíbo, and a small number of large towns. The advent of petroleum as an additional mainstay of the economy early in the twentieth century further separated the rural agricultural communities from the wealth of the export class surrounding Lake Maracaíbo and the capital.

A crucial petroleum-exporting country for the United States, little pressure existed until the 1950s to initiate a genuinely participatory system. The mindset of the Cold War, with its zero-sum fears of Soviet expansionism, propelled U.S. support for those venezolanos seeking a representative political framework rather than a series of strongmen as if it were the same country as it had been in 1820, because we thought it would keep the commies out. Americans have known little about the people who actually live in northeastern Latin America.

In 1958, the major political parties signed an accord thought affect a power sharing system, known as consociationalism to political scientists, to assure each signing party got the chance to govern and reap the benefits of power. The parties basically alternated who would govern for a four year term before turning over the nation’s reins to another party, meaning the competition for leadership positions happened within the parties rather than between them. The assumption was this arrangement would end when the nation would be ready take on the challenges of truly competitive democracy.

Here was where real problems resulted as the political parties became comfortable—too comfortable—with this arrangement rather than responsive to their constituents in the streets. Venezuela, a founding member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, in the 1960s appeared stable in its revenues because petroleum sales were growing, particularly following the embargo against the United States in 1973 which drove up prices substantially. Nationalizing the petroleum industry later that decade assured revenue to the state but created an enormous bureaucracy ripe for corruptions. Eventually, that corruption, along with massive federal spending for infrastructural development, leading to disaster but that wasn’t important quite yet.

In the 1980s, the Iran Iraq War, among other reasons, ripped apart OPEC resulting in overproduction, thus depressing prices. This led to twin problems for whichever party wore the presidential sash in Caracas. First, substantial debt resulting from both became unsustainable, rising to $33 billion by 1982. Second, Venezuela had allowed other sectors of the economy to atrophy resulting in an overdependence on oil income, that charming elastic commodity. The only option became applying to the International Monetary Fund for assistance.

Here is where the Pacto Fijo, or power sharing arrangement, showed it had not led to institutionalization of the parties within society but instead to a monopoly system where political parties were entities of their own will rather than responsive to voters. These political parties praised by scholars, such as my erstwhile colleague, as the salvation for democracy in Venezuela had in fact become insidiously self-absorbed without appreciation of the average citizen.

When the IMF demanded economic orthodoxy, including reduced government subsidies for basics such as food or mass transit, the country exploded against then president Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1989. The violence in turn led to the Armed Forces battling average venezolanos. Critics charged the classic democratic government in Caracas cared more about the IMF demands than those of the pueblo. Members of the political elite came in for scathing public criticism, putting the entire nation on tetherhooks.

Three years later, a youngish Hugo Chávez Frías led an unsuccessful coup attempt to oust the government seen as imposing harsh conditions on behalf of the United States and its IMF on the nation. Chávez Frías went to prison but emerged as a hero because, as so often true in Latin America, the military had defended the patria (in the eyes of many) against subversion. He became the underdog for the presidency in 1998. He vowed not to allow Venezuelans to suffer under the yoke of Washington but to push national assets into social programs on behalf of an increasingly destitute population.

Upon taking office, he became more vocal in his anti-U.S. rhetoric and in making public appearances with various U.S. enemies around the world, including Saddam Hussein before the latter’s ouster in 2003. The Venezuelan president was one of the first Latins to embrace stronger ties with Beijing as the CCP both sought petroleum access (albeit this was not their kind of oil) ad began tentatively stepping into long-term relations with states on that continent. Indeed, Venezuela received substantial Chinese investment and loans as rewards for its anti-gringo positions early this century, even though Chinese economics publicly questioned the economic viability of the loans or the projects for which support came from Beijing.

Within a couple of years, Chávez Frías’s anti-American positions, embrace of other out-of-favour regimes around the world, and expanding social sector subsidies led to significant public support for this man who rewarded his supporters with enhanced programs as he verbally (and occasionally more) repudiated his critics. Millions of venezolanos fled across the Colombian border west while the wealthiest took flight altogether, with their assets. By the time of Chávez Frías’s death from cancer in 2013, the economy was a wreck, Beijing was on the hook for billions in loans (thought Caracas was its fourth largest source of petroleum), infrastructure was collapsing, and the institutions of democracy were shredded. In short, things went from not great under the “democracy” into miserable under Chávez Frías and his hand picked successor Nicolás Maduro Moros.

Earlier this week Maduro Moros “won” the presidential election but with substantial doubt regarding the authenticity of that victory. Regardless of whether Maduro Moros indeed won or his primary opponents, María Corina Machado and Edmundo González, claim they have proof of their victory but the incumbent shows no indication he will vacate the presidential palace. Similarly, no one within the Organization of American States is discussing some action to force him out. All of this means the people he governs so poorly with high unemployment, demands to conform to his views, and overall dispirited attitudes are condemned to an open-ended period of this corrupt, closed regime.

U.S. government officials doubt Maduro Moros’s victory but it is Republican critics most vociferously condemning the election outcome, asking how someone can lose an election yet simply declare victory. I strongly doubt anyone in the United States would pay attention to this sad country except that China is involved financially (and buying petroleum) and Maduro Moros, like his late mentor Chávez Frías, is an avowed leftist. But, we are sounding rather hypocritical when the Republicans argue someone should not just claim victory despite losing the election.

Maduro Moros, like Beshar al Assad and countless other authoritarian rulers will ultimately fall when they run out of lies or days in their lives at some point. the fantasies they promote rarely improve anyone’s hour, much less their days. The conspiracy theories wear thin as citizens ultimately ask for results, something these blowhards can rarely produce. The end for these regimes if often ugly and violent. The problem is, of course, we have no idea whether that will occur in six months or sixteen years.

China remains Venezuela’s biggest trading partner and a major lender, though Beijing seems to have less enthusiasm over this discombobulated place than two decades ago. Government statistics are completely unreliable but seeing the unemployed on the streets is a concern. Subsidies for goods remains crucial for most venezolanos. The national petroleum company desperately needs recapitalization. In short, Maduro Moros has a long road he must follow if he somehow does have solutions beyond blaming the yanquis.

My former colleague is gone so we cannot revisit our 1996 conversation. I raised it above because it struck me as dangerous to assume democracy or a representative system was ever solved in any country. This is particularly true, I fear, in places where authoritarian rather than participatory behavior has been the historic norm.

As we are finding, participatory governing systems are hard to sustain for places that have experienced them for more than two centuries. Actions create consequences, of course, good and bad. Sadly, Venezuelans definitely experienced the bad of so many aspects of governance.

The political elite took their position in governing for granted. They did not cultivate strong institutions. They did not reinvest in the country. They did not stem, but took advantage of, corruption. Venezuela went from being one of the world’s wealthiest to one of the weakest places in the world.

Venezuela remains a cautionary note for all. If my colleague were still around, I would simply point out “it (democratic collapse) can happen anywhere so never assume it can’t”. It’s so seductive to assume the same circumstances aren’t in place but it strikes me the outcomes might be.

Thank you for reading Actions today or any other day. Please feel free to circulate if you find it of value. Thanks to the subscribers who contribute resources to this effort.

Be well and be safe. FIN

Joshua Goodman, “Venezuelan opposition says it has proof its candidate defeated President Maduro in disputed election“, apnews.com, 30 July 2024 retrieved at https://apnews.com/article/venezuela-presidential-election-maduro-machado-edmundo-results-acee6c8cd3a8fc88086c2dd71963b759

Anthony Navone, “Could China Play a Role in Venezuela’s Crisis?”, USIP.org, 27 July 2021, retrieved at https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/07/could-china-play-role-venezuelas-crisis