“Trump is Reasserting U.S. Dominion over Latin America,” proclaimed the Wall Street Journal this morning. The article, in conjunction with reports circulating about the forthcoming national security strategy, highlights this region’s return to a central place in U.S. security concerns.
I cannot count how often I have noted that U.S. leaders ignore the Western Hemisphere, despite it being the region where we sit. Secretaries of State and senior national security personnel rarely visit the capitals south of the Florida Keys, and probably one or two were unaware that Ottawa is the capital of Canada.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a descendant of Cuban immigrants in the 1950s, is reversing that trend. Rubio regularly discusses trends he sees underway in the region, condemning long-time U.S. opponent Nicolás Maduro in Caracas and chastising Brasilia for sentencing former president Jair Bolsonaro for a 2023 coup to retain power after his electoral defeat by the current democratically elected president. Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent promise support to Javier Milei, whose Libertarian reform efforts hit a financial brick wall over recent months. U.S. officials across the board condemn illegal migration from the region (a perpetual concern for any White House) while calling attention to the scourge of global narcotics trafficking aligned with groups in this region. Ties with Havana, unsurprisingly, returned to the meat locker where they froze under Washington’s firm embargo begun sixty-five years ago when the Communists claimed victory over Cuba. The Castro brothers and Ché may no longer rule, but the Cuban Communists retain power.
Yes, we are definitely calling attention to the long neglect of this region, as we looked further across the globe. Our current agenda of focusing on “America First” naturally encourages the administration to prioritize the area nearest to America. We have largely ignored this region, with sporadic exceptions, for the entire post-World War II period, despite patience from regional countries that often hoped to strengthen ties.
Which dominion over this region are we creating, however? The dictionary mentions a couple, so let’s explore that. Dictionary.com provides the following definition for dominion:
“ noun
the power or right of governing and controlling; sovereign authority.
rule; control; domination.
a territory, usually of considerable size, in which a single rulership holds sway.
lands or domains subject to sovereignty or control.
Government., a territory constituting a self-governing commonwealth and being one of a number of such territories united in a community of nations, or empire: formerly applied to self-governing divisions of the British Empire, as Canada and New Zealand.
Theology, dominions, domination.”
Our government officials are not attempting to pursue the theological implications of the term, but let’s examine the other five possible interpretations. I am unaware of a specific commitment, as the current administration has yet to issue a national security or military strategy, nor has it been the explicit focus of the POTUS’s remarks, except in passing.
As AmericasQuarterly assessed upon his nomination for the post, the Floridian did discuss “collaboration” with non-leftist regimes across the region on the crises confronting the region. That strikes me as falling under category five above, a posture long aspired to in assuring greater cooperation and respect from Washington to the area and from the region’s capitals back to the White House.
We issued the Monroe Doctrine to assert our primacy just over a century ago, although Britain and other Europeans remained intimately involved in the region throughout the nineteenth century.
The states of the circum-Caribbean, broadly weaker, wanted us to respect their sovereignty as much as to build a community that somehow replicated a vague concept of a Western Hemisphere for Western Hemispherians. That sounds like a bare minimum, but repeated U.S. interventions for various reasons have revealed the U.S. preference for power politics over equal status by virtue of its nation-state status under international law. As I mentioned last week, my reference was to one of the most cited quotes from Thucydides’ masterful History of the Peloponnesian War, which characterizes the weak doing as they must —a theme that has been evident for many years in the Caribbean Basin, often portrayed as a weak “backyard.”
South Americans, similarly less powerful, sought to engender respect for their sovereignty through international law rather than continuing to suffer from power inequality; the Calvo Clause (1863) on foreign investment, the Drago Doctrine (1907) on debt, or the Estrada Doctrine (1930) regarding recognition illustrated regional jurists’ hope in forcing compliance with widespread legal norms. With London’s weakening following 1918, South Americans grew increasingly receptive to the idea of a partnership with the Colossus of the North. Still, they never endorsed or envisioned an arrangement intended to result in one of the first four categories above.
Few Latin Americans relish unbalanced ties with any U.S. administration, yet they recognize their options are few. Likely many leaders are nervous after the attacks on purported Caracas-driven drug trafficking. Similarly, governments across Latin America may respect Gustavo Petro Urrego’s vocal critique of the U.S. leader while cowering for fear of retribution against their own visas—or worse. The POTUS and the Secretary of State are making their demands on this region clear.
However, achieving dominion will be challenging, regardless of the intention or definition, due to China. Part of the reason we never dominated southern Latin America in the pre-World War II period was geography, as it’s further to Buenos Aires or Santiago than to Moscow. However, it was also Europe’s—especially Britain’s—role that was significant. Europe bought Argentine wheat and beef, provided both massive investment for regional railways and migrants (yes, countries did welcome immigrants once upon a time) to work in the relatively empty landscape, and was instrumental in the overall development of these states.
I have been on the record for twenty years saying that China’s steady cultivation of ties with Latin America represented our lack of interest in the region rather than a whole-scale embrace of the PRC vision of an anti-American world. I stand by those positions as Latin Americans want strong relations with the yanquís but on terms that they can explain to their populations as somewhat equal terms.
Yet, dark clouds threaten to change these steps towards U.S. dominion over the region. Few Americans appreciate that Latin America, particularly Brazil and Argentina, is now a leading supplier of food to China, rather than U.S. crops. Indeed, according to the Purdue University School of Agriculture, Beijing stopped buying soybeans only last Monday, due to tariffs on agricultural products and trade tensions across the board.
Soybeans may seem esoteric, but the United States sold Beijing $12.84 billion worth of soybeans in 2024. However, this year, few purchases—29% of last year’s revenues—occurred from this country, which ended in May, while Brasilia began supplanting U.S. sources. China is eager to turn to a partner with whom it has been cultivating a range of trade arrangements over the past two decades, while Washington increasingly disdains sales without tariffs. Soybeans are the most prominent agricultural product where U.S. farmers are experiencing massive pain, and U.S. taxpayers will provide benefits to prevent a financial disaster for the domestic industry.
China’s role as a balancer in the region is both real and potentially sustainable. While the CCP is concerned about the internal deliberations of states seeking to recognize Taiwan, only Paraguay, El Salvador, Belize, and Guatemala—none of which are major exporters of goods covered by tariffs—still recognize Taipei over Beijing. Additionally, the PRC’s increased effort through the Belt & Road Initiative (providing various trade and investment agreements with most states in Latin America) and its emphasis, albeit rhetorical, as we draw closer to ourselves, is essential. Some Latin American nations will now turn to China for the forms of support long provided by Washington, but also in hopes of garnering the international respect that every country craves.
My prediction is that China prevents us from achieving the dominion alluded to in the original title of the Journal. I think the region will welcome U.S. interest when it fosters mutual respect, but eschew demands for collective action against what we see as nefarious actors in Caracas, potentially Managua, or elsewhere. I suspect Beijing will continue its growing involvement regionally but with a diliterious effect on U.S. exporters. But China provides balance in the overall relationship that we ought not dismiss.
The real question is whether the future could evolve into spheres of influence: Latin America under U.S. dominance and Asia more under China’s, despite many China hawks’ demands. As trade negotiations between Washington and Beijing progress, Xi appears quite willing to push for his vision of the world. I wonder if that will include resurrecting a revised version of “a new type of major-power relationship”, a term he first raised more than thirteen years ago with President Obama. Xi will dress it up as something else due to our sensitivities, but a proposal could resurface to create a world of big states and little states.
Latin America, finally, is important to both Beijing and Washington but with differing views as the implications, I suspect. None of the capitals appears to hold precisely the same interpretation of the future actions and consequences with every one else.
In short, I am not convinced the Wall Street Journal’s invoking of “dominion” applies yet but perhaps it could over time.
How do you see the definition of dominion in this case? How do you react to the enhanced attention to this region? I genuinely seek your feedback as we explore the changing conditions nine months into the new term. How does our renewed engagement, beyond simply Southern Command, appear to affect our relationship there?
I appreciate your time and I especially thank those who support htis work with financial backing, whether at $55 annually, $8 monthly, or some other amount. Your support helps me open resources I would not otherwise see.
I hope you got out this weekend. It is supposed to be a pretty week as we greet October 2025.
Be well and be safe. FIN
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