dissent

lessons only now seen

The National Security Archive traces itself to a legacy born of the investigative mindset fueled by Watergate. People who weren’t around or don’t remember the 1970s likely will be surprised to hear that far more questionable activities came to light than merely President Nixon’s coverup following the Watergate break-in of June 1972. Senator Frank Church’s Committee found illegal intelligence community behavior targeting U.S. citizens in many areas, to include surveillance strictly prohibited by law. Another troubling activity became clear: acting to prevent the public of knowing how its government officials were conducting business. We thus got “sunshine” laws to make clear who attends federal meetings, for example. An additional reform was the Freedom of Information Act in 1974.

FOIA focuses on declassifying material legitimately appropriate for the public interest. It does not, repeat does not, call for universally publishing information on military secrets or the plans to develop hypersonic weapons. FOIA allows a requester to petition that information be released because there is no longer a compelling reason for its restriction. The petitioned agency must determine, under pain of legal sanction, whether there is a true reason that information would harm the country if released. Often successful FOIA releases blacken the names of individuals while revealing policy details.

It’s not a perfect system, reliant on public servants—this is one of the many reasons why a professional, non-partisan civil service is foundational to our system—who may not like what they have to reveal but are following the checks and balances of our system.

The National Security Archive, founded in 1985, has been incredibly successful at using FOIA for decades. The law, which I learned about when I did an audit for the General Accounting Office in the late 1970s, provides several legitimate reasons, such as proprietary issues, for preventing disclosure of information but the law opens the door to you and me knowing what goes on in our government. The Executive Branch, rather than a partisan perspective, dislikes FOIA because it limits absolute freedom of action in the sense of embarrassing or illegal activity potentially coming to public view but the law opens visibility on how our nation operates.

The Archive used FOIA repeatedly in the 1980s and 90s to request government documents on U.S. involvement in Chile in 1970s, the Iran-Contra mess of the 80s, and other national security-related federal activities. Originally a 501 ©(3) not-for-profit, the George Washington University Gelman Library absorbed the Archive as a research organization thirty years ago this month.

It’s hard to find an institution in Washington as single-minded in its dedication to openness of our government.

It’s also vital to reminding all of us that government actually includes dissenters, people who continue working as public servants but courageously register their professional analysis rather than merely partisan screeds to ask for reconsideration of policies.

On Wednesday, 18 December the Archive released the declassified what is known as the Long Telegram of the 1990s, a take off on George F. Kennan’s prescient analysis of the durability of Soviet Union in 1946. The March 1994 document correctly outlined why the Clinton administration, and overall U.S. pressure, to force Russia to adopt free market economic policies would drive Russia away from the west. Perceptively entitling the document “Whose Russia is it anyway?”, the head of the Embassy Political section, Wayne Merry outlined precisely the trajectory that Russia has taken, though I am not sure he saw Vlad the Impaler as the primary actor.

Merry’s assessment, sent with Ambassador Thomas Pickering’s knowledge (thus approval), was unwelcome back home.

The Archive documents that Merry’s Telegram received a brush off for two primary reasons. First, we were still enamoured with the idea that free market economics and democratic governance were unquestionably entwined following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its state-dominant system over the prior five years. Americans were feeling fat and sassy that our system with the twin pillars had defeated the evil empire. The “Washington Consensus”, advocated at roughly the same period, encouraged all nations to adopt democracy while embracing market economics. We were focused not on Russia as a specific application of this idea but Clinton administration officials were certain that the theory was correct in any application, despite Merry’s plea to consider Russia’s differences.

Second, the Archive notes that Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, a larger-than-life advocate for free market mechanisms, would make things tough in an administration fumbling as it approached the 1994 mid-terms. Clinton’s policy personnel clearly did not need a fight with Summers as Newt Gingrich and the Contract for America movement were marching towards what became massive overturning of Democrats’ power in Washington.

Here is the forgotten part, however: Merry did not simply file telegram in the dustbin of history. The Ambassador offered him the ability to send it forward as a personal assessment to achieve more visability but Merry demurred. I don’t understand quite all of the ins-and-outs of Department processes but Merry does provide a retrospective on the National Security Archive site.

I also encourage the FSOs who read this column to help us understand how he used what the State Department calls the “Dissent” channel, a mechanism by which employees respectfully report where they have policy differences with the choice the administration is making and why. It’s hardly guarantees any administration will change the policy but it’s a recognition of why professionals see the path as unlikely to succeed. Perhaps it’s a forensic for future analysts and administrations.

It is, however, absolutely a crucial outlet for professionals in a democratic system. It’s one of the ways we avoid an entirely politicized and subversive bureaucracy that feels it has no options but to take matters into their own hands. That latter path would be dangerous in any and all circumstances. Professionalism and treatment as professionals is a two way street, incumbent on anyone who takes or administers the oath of office.

I am most certainly not arguing that dissent through an internal channel solves all problems; it doesn’t. Anyone truly rejecting a policy choice made by any administration has the right to resign rather than carry out something one cannot abide, as I noted Jim Leach did in the early 1970s following the Saturday Night Massacre. I once heard Colin Powell as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs tell an Army officer to either salute smartly or take off his uniform when the soldier whined about Bill Clinton’s positions on gays.

What Merry did with his decision to pursue the Dissent channel within State was an alternate approach. We want public servants who with integrity, conscience, and scruples rather than robots so using options available through a system is both responsible and desirable, even if painful.

An extremely fine line exists between dissent and subordination with the distinction one between registering differences versus operationalizing subversive efforts. When I mentioned the Uniform Code of Military Justice last week in a column on 11 December,

https://cynthiawatson.substack.com/p/four-star-removal

I made clear that question of following legal orders in the military is an utter requirement. It’s a bit fuzzier in the non-military realm but we need assure we maintain processes for dissent to prevent people sabotaging an already complicated government system. To threaten to penalize those who bring responsible alternate views with evidence leads to doubts about each and every decision as well as a highly dysfunctional workplace since we could incentivize spying on colleagues and other Soviet-era behaviors we so roundly discredited decades ago. It also would undermine the integrity of government for the people while potentially leading to utter chaos across government if individuals felt subverting orders was the only option available to them when they disagreed. Debate, discussion, and arguing with evidence is the heart of a democratic system we profess to embrace.

Wayne Merry served in government for several years before becoming associated with the Atlantic Council, then the American Foreign Policy Council where he currently works. He did participate in the National Security Archive commemoration of his assessment by submitting a reflection on his experience.

His 1994 argument, additionally, stood the test of time. Russia nor any other part of the world is ours to mold; we can do that only with our own nation. The best we can do is respect the dignity, autonomy, and unique attributes of others, hoping they will find value in what we model rather than us trying to impose it on their behalf.

I welcome your thoughts on this touchy subject so please feel free to criticize, question or anything else. I genuinely want to hear your thoughts. I look forward to debate as I am shaped by my experiences and you have your own.

Thank you for reading today’s column. Please feel free to circulate it. Thank you especially to the subscribers.

We had a marvelous, deep sunset last night. I am ready, however, for that to occur later each day than before 5 pm last night.

Be well and be safe. FIN

“Freedom of Information Act of 1974”, FOIA.gov

The National Security Archive, retrieved at https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, 1975-76, retrieved at https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/investigations/church-committee.htm