geography matters

for Taiwan, it always will

The Wall Street Journal presents a sobering assessment of China's ability to blockade Taiwan. I won't replicate today's article word-for-word because others reading this column can assess its accuracy better than I can. One individual on a chatroom where I participate cast doubts on its validity, largely based on its negative assumptions about how willing the international community will be to rally around the island. I am not sure that will happen but simply do not better than anyone else.

I will, however, make some observations we might consider as we ponder our future relationship with the island's leadership.

If there is a single immutable policy for the PRC leaders in Zhongnanhai, it's opposing Taiwan achieving de jure independence; this would be intolerable under any conditions because the Party views its future intertwined with opposing this. The leaders set themselves up for this moment by stoking nationalism when blaming the foreigners (a.k.a. the United States) as the obstacle to Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland. CCP leaders professor that nothing will ultimately prevent the “inevitable forces of history” as they claim to see events.

While Taiwan and Ukraine are both close to those menacing their survival, the two cases differ in at least one primary dimension. Taiwan is a mountainous island of 24 million people just over a hundred miles off a long Chinese coastline, while Ukraine shares a 1240-mile border with Russia (as of 2003 when Kyiv signed an agreement with Moscow demarcating this sovereignty line). But, Ukraine’s remaining border is with states overwhelmingly sharing its desire to resist Kremlin revanchism, providing hope for Ukraine’s survival as a sovereign country. Russia, thus, has a single extended land connection by which Moscow can infiltrate ground forces (along with ample opportunity to use missiles from its territory or neighboring pseudo-colony Belarus with which Kyvi has another 600-mile border). Those states forming Ukraine's western and southwestern borders offer a lifeline to resupply arms, food, medicine, and other needs while also serving as an outlet by which Ukrainians can flee the nation on their own feet.

Taiwan, a fiercely proud democratic country, is an island without a shared land border with its primary adversary but with a variety of vulnerabilities. Taiwan needs energy, food, water, and an exit for its products. If China were to establish a blockade around the island, as the Journal graphics indicate, Taiwan would struggle to address those needs, particularly regarding energy. Taiwan depends on energy—96% of which they import from abroad—whether natural gas, petroleum, or coal. Taiwan sorely misses the autonomous self-sufficiency of resources, making its survival outside Beijing's clutches harder to envision with massive, sustained outside support. The ruling Green coalition rejected nuclear power decades ago, so importing energy would be vital but still highly problematic. Beijing would likely pressure others not to provide the energy as a first step if a blockade went into effect.

According to unclassified sources, Taiwan's communications depend on cables flowing through a hub in mainland China. Beijing certainly would sever that link if conflict arose, curbing Taiwan’s access to much communication. Should a drought occur, the island could encounter food or water insufficiency for its residents. The flip side would be the frequent need for humanitarian assistance should an earthquake or massive typhoon overwhelm the country, as it happens roughly once a decade. In a blockade, the PRC would likely decline other nations’ humanitarian assistance flowing into Taiwan to reinforce the island’s position within the PRC.

The island has some geographic advantages, such as the mud flats along the west coast, which would slow amphibious invaders, while the sheet cliffs of the northeast would offer other challenges. However, Taiwan relies overwhelmingly on Kaohsiung, a top container facility, as an international port; the single-point concern would eliminate PLAN forces having to worry about multiple "breakout" locations for commercial shipping.

This article refers primarily to maritime issues but China also has greater air assets and missiles aimed at the small island than in the past.

China will always have a "home court" advantage in Asia, most notably regarding an island merely a hundred miles off its coast. We and other countries have sophisticated technologies and may feel compelled to respond to Chinese actions but geography will still favor China, particularly because the Pacific is so vast. PLA capabilities began improving following the 1996 Strait Crisis, with today's PLAN sailing the seven seas as a service with great confidence and seemingly sufficient replenishment capabilities to provide ample endurance far different from merely two generations ago. Recent increased PLAN exercising in the waters surrounding Taiwan reminds us of the CCP's obsession with preventing independence.

Saddam Hussein's initial foray into Kuwait on 1 August 1990 transitioned from exercises into a full-scale invasion relatively easily when Kuwait was least prepared for such danger. As the PLAN increasingly frequently conducts drills near Taiwan in the East China Sea, one cannot help but wonder how close such a move from hypothetical war to an outright military action against the de facto independent nation could be.

The number of PLAN submarines, surface vessels (perhaps to include a third indigenously built aircraft carrier as of this year), Coast Guard, and mobilized maritime militia forces far outstrip the small Taiwan military, eliminating any honest balance across the Strait. China wants Taiwan to feel it has no option but to succumb to this final recognition ending a century of conflict between the Communist victors and Guomindang Nationalists. The CCP wants to believe Taiwan will do this willingly but would use force to achieve this outcome if patience wore out or Taiwan tried to pursue what Beijing views as humiliating independence.

The PLAN is well over a quarter bigger than the entire U.S. Navy, a significant juxtaposition from the mid-1990s when the former began reversing conditions that allowed the Clinton administration to deploy two carrier battle groups despite Beijing’s fury to the region. China had no aircraft carriers in 1996; China began expanding its array of submarines, a potent deterrent to the U.S. aircraft carriers, following that Clinton action.

China also shows a marked willingness to operate its substantial Coast Guard near Taiwan, supporting PLAN actions because of their geographic proximity. This increases the number of ships available to intimidate Taipei while thwarting possible assistance to the beleaguered island.

Historians, of course, would remind us that the Allies faced similarly drastic challenges in 1948-49 as the Soviet Union attempted to prevent the resupply of basic elements to the former German capital. Berlin's location in East Germany under an anti-Western, Soviet-inspired regime imposed restrictions on ground transit in and out of the city.

Instead, the Allies delivered 2.3 million tons of food and other humanitarian needs in 300,000 flights over an eighteen-month siege. Berlin had 2 million inhabitants who needed necessities. The round-the-clock effort by Allied forces, known as Operation Vittles, provided a lifeline to an impoverished population still reeling from the devastation of World War II. The delivery of medicine, coal, food, and the requirements for survival in a ravished city was herculean by the French, British, and U.S. pilots who flew these humanitarian missions. The pilots' determination also warned the Soviets of our commitments to the Potsdam Agreement on the post-war divisions and free and open European governance in the face of Soviet intimidation.

Taiwan would be a different challenge. While the United States has bases in Japan and Korea, we do not know that the governments in those countries would allow flights to originate from their territory. Japan would be more likely to allow this than South Korea, but China's leaders would never tolerate Tokyo's decision without repercussions. Sino-Japanese relations always suffer tensions, but Japan still does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign entity, instead retaining diplomatic relations with Beijing as the "government of China."

Our relations with the Philippines have significantly improved since the election of the younger President Marcos, but China's determination to humiliate Filipinos rarely abates. Similarly, the remaining nine members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) harbor no likely aspiration to cross swords with their largest trading partner in Beijing in supporting Taiwan. We simply do not know how Asians would respond but we can’t sell ourselves on false hope, based on prior statements and Beijing’s constant pressure in the region.

Guam and Hawai'i host major U.S. Air Force bases but are far from Taiwan should an ongoing air resupply effort become necessary. AirportDistanceCalculator.com reckons a three-and-a-half-hour flight each way between Taiwan's primary international airport and the Anderson Air Force Base on Guam because of the 1733-mile distance. Honolulu's Hickam Air Force Base is more than double that distance (and associated time to conduct a resupply mission), clocking at 5046 miles over more than 10 hours. By comparison, the Berlin Airlift distance was as short as 110 miles, allowing a mission to deliver aid in under an hour, creating far less stress for the aircraft and pilots.

In a maritime blockade, Taiwan could not count on seaborne access unless the rescue force (presumably the United States) chose to break the barrier. Our position on Taiwan, known historically as “strategic ambivalence”, is certainly no clearer today than it was five months or fifteen years ago as we are divided on the question. According to the rhetoric from our last election campaign, we are too broken to accomplish anything by using the military. How is the PLA responding to those criticisms of readiness?

Chinese leaders repeatedly state unequivocally their right and determination to prevent Taiwan's independence and their expectation that reunification will occur. Beijing's decision to blockade—control the access or egress of anyone or anything relevant to the island—would be an act of war, but it was not the sole action the PRC could take. It could declare a quarantine, an action prohibiting the movement of certain goods into or out of Taiwan, to bring the Taiwan government to the negotiating table. We used such a quarantine against Soviet ships in October 1962 in hopes of stopping further transport of Soviet nuclear-tipped missiles capable of hitting the continental United States. As the Journal notes, Beijing could also use cyber actions against the island, mainly as Taiwan depends on the maritime cable providing access to the global cyber architecture.

The greatest unknown, however, is about political will in any armed Taiwan contingency. Would the island's leadership acquiesce rather than confront potential military defeat? The Lai administration is taking steps to prove greater resolve to maintain its current autonomy as President Trump seems ambivalent about a U.S. commitment. How much is necessary for Taiwan to convince others of its determination? Spending a quarter of its GDP on defense? Increasing conscription targets to enhance military capability in the face of a modernized opposition? Canceling Taiwan citizens' ability to own homes abroad to assure their commitment to the island, or does democracy ironically undermine Taiwan's stance to ensure it will fight for independence?

What role will the United States play? With our expanded tensions with allies, how deeply will resulting distrust undermine shared goals in Taiwan? Are there shared goals among states that do not recognize it at present? Is Taiwan the key to undermining the remaining shared ties across this region by uncovering diverse interests in preserving Taiwan's status versus stopping China's expanded role worldwide?

The Journal unveils a fascinating set of conditions at work in East Asia, but this article actually creates more questions than answers. Where do you stand and why? I genuinely would like to hear your thoughts so please chime in. I genuinely look forward to hearing others’ views.

Thank you for reading Actions today. I appreciate those of you who read this column any day. I thank the subscribers who put resources into my work to allow me to read a raft of sources on the panoply of issues where actions create consequences. You can become a paid subscriber for $50 a year or $8 a month.

It’s raining here today but I hope you are well. Be safe. FIN

Adam Biggs, Dan Xu, Joshua Roaf, and Tatana Olson, “Theories of Naval Blockades and Their Application in the Twenty-First Century”, Naval War College Review, 74:1 (Winter 2021), retrieved at https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8166&context=nwc-review

“Distance from Anderson Air Force Base in Guam to Taipei, Taoyuan, Taiwan”, AirportDistanceCalculator.com, 24 March 2025, retrieved at https://www.airportdistancecalculator.com/flight-guam-to-tpe.html

“Distance from Hickam Air Base to Taoyuan, Taiwan”, AirportDistanceCalculator.com, 24 March 2025, retrieved at https://www.airportdistancecalculator.com/flight-hik-to-tpe.html

History.com Editors, “Berlin Airlift”, history.com, 6 March 2025, retrieved at https://www.history.com/articles/berlin-airlift

Joyu Wang and Austin Ramzy, “China is Ready to Blockade Taiwan. Here’s How”, WallStreetJournal.com, 23 March 2025, retrieved at https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-is-ready-to-blockade-taiwan-heres-how-8cffdeb2?mod=latest_headlines

“Russia-Ukraine”, sovereigntylimits.com, retrieved at https://sovereignlimits.com/boundaries/russia-ukraine-land