'if, and'

not either/or

Another gentle but wondrous Wednesday on Spa Creek. I wish everyone had a world as magical as this but, alas, we know that is not true. I am so lucky which is why I share it. I most definitely do not take it for granted.

I am also so pleased to have extended my dialogue with the son of a loyal reader. We parsed each other’s comments in two extended exchanges which are the entire point of this column. I talk about measured, civil conversation which is precisely what I am seeing. Because the individual is not a subscriber, I won’t mention his name but I hope he finds out that he truly is refining my thinking for these columns: thank you.

In particular, I realised this morning that I haven’t clearly enough articulated a primary concern I see about states reacting to foreign policy challenges globally. We were addressing the Israeli-Hamas conflict specifically but this bit crystalised something I take for granted but should realise not everyone making policy right now does: American reactions appears focused exclusively on the use of a single tool of national statecraft as if there is only a single way to respond. Most foreign policy items take multiple tries to solve the problem.

Over the past forty years, beginning specifically with the Reagan military buildup to deter the Soviets, we tend to look first at the armed forces to answer challenges. We use the incredible skill and organisation of the military for humanitarian relief efforts (2004 Indonesia earthquake/tsunami or various Pakistani earthquakes). We turn to the USNS Comfort to offer medical care not only during crises but in countries where conditions overwhelm the existing options. This form of ‘military diplomacy’ leaves positive memories on the minds of those affected. The efforts of the Comfort led China to create its own military hospital ship to achieve a similar positive outcome.

General Laura Richardson, US Army, is the most prominent government player in today’s Latin America, on par with President Biden, because her role as Southern Command Combatant Commander gets her all over the region. The centrality of U.S. military leadership in this portion of the world is a long-standing habit because the Senate (usually under Republicans when this occurs) often chooses to ignore confirming ambassadorial appointments in these countries. Generals and admirals are seen as reliable officials rather than ‘soft’ diplomats.

The list of activities carried out on our behalf by the uniformed services is extensive. That is a huge drawback because most uniformed actions do a the job but they are not always either the most appropriate tool or the best use of overall U.S. government resources. And, using the military so constantly wears down the armed forces while sending mixed messages about we believe how other states ought use them.

The military’s best task if breaking things and those who get in their way once unloosed. This is why it is often known as ‘the blunt instrument’. We ask the armed forces to do a horrible job for us and they do it efficiently and with massive force. That is what we want them to do.

The State Department works by talking and simply being there. My interlocutor over the past couple of days criticised them for being ‘too nice’ or overly focused on ‘niceness’. Yep, they are taught that keeping channels open, often through niceness is better than the devastating effects of conflict. The old phrase is ‘better to talk talk than to war war’. Foreign Service Officers have the responsibility to do the talk talk part and the military does the war war part.

But that is precisely the point. Strategy—marshalling the powers of the United States to reach a desired endstate—needs both, along with economic tools (which do a variety of things: pay for what we do, create trade, offer foreign assistance, invoke sanctions, etc.) and the information tools (how we message, cyber activities, etc.). These four most fundamental elements of our strategy-making often come down to the acronym DIME, Diplomacy Information Military and Economic instruments. In recent years, DIME-FIL (the basics plus Financial, Information operations [in an aggressive manner], and Legal) is more descriptive of what options we have.

The problem is that we have become enamoured with the M because it’s what we used to have more of than anyone else. No one, repeat no one, was thought to challenge us after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 or the Soviet Union evaporated by 1992. We were the superpower so using the armed forces was a guarantee we could achieve our goals. We wanted to do something once, then go back to everyone being nice to each other without that Soviet threat looming over us. At least that was what we thought.

Plus, as U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright asked then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell during the early stages of the Balkan conflict, ‘What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?’. Put another way, Albright showed no grasp of the instrument’s fundamental difference from trade pacts. Rather than seeing it as a blunt tool used with as much force behind it as necessary, she seemed to see it as one more thing in the kitbag. This is ironic since this is precisely how evolved into using the military after the 1993 exchange cited here. Is the military really like a public diplomacy event?

My point is not that it is an either -or choice but a sequenced choice of instruments. We may not use some of the instruments at all in our foreign policy concerns but that is fine if we have an understanding of what the instrument can achieve and why to use it. Instead, we look at conflicts as needing ‘diplomacy’ here or some ‘economy’ there or likely ‘military power’ over here. We don’t seem to think about what they are capable of doing, thus which we would use in a given challenge. In truth, almost every national security concern needs a revolving interplay between all of these instruments all of the time.

It’s foolish to consider sending in the Marines when Apple has one if its too-often trade disputes with the European Union. I imagine Apple has the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative on speed dial to help them but they don’t expect a military solution.

Yet why do we assume so many problems have a military component answer alone? Trying to win over Vietnam to any even informal alliance against Beijing in the South China Sea needs far more talking than it does military responses. Of course it matters that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin show respect to the Vietnamese armed forces but the diplomats are the ones offering the options that could perhaps inveigle Hanoi to flee Beijing’s grasp (although I am not optimistic on this one. The U.S. military in Southeast Asia, specifically Vietnam, does have a hard history.) The point, however, is that diplomats—nice or not—need a role, too, at various times.

The single biggest failure overseas for the United States in the past generation, in my mind, was rejecting participation in the Trans Pacific Partnership. There is not much that is even close in mind. Why?

Because we are almost always emphasising military aspects of power to an entire region that wants to concentrate on economic development. It was a simple choice and we blew it (bi partisan blowing it if you recall how 2016/17 went as we turned out back). The rest of the world—with notable exceptions, I acknowledge—doesn’t have the military strength or the desire to get into wars. They want to use the precious resources and opportunities to focus on economic growth, bettering their citizens’ lives, and attracting others for more trade, investment, and science/technology. We and the Chinese and the Russians talk about military strength but others just don’t have the stomach nor do they expect they will have the cash to compete with us so why bother?

Instead, we took that tool off our side of the table. We don’t have the trade power in bilateral terms with the region that China has. States want to have ties with us in many fields but recognise they are dependent on their trade with China to accomplish what is in my prior paragraph.

We need tools that are both robust and useful. The best thing we can do right now with Israel, Ukraine, or any other relationship is recognise 1. what we want to see as an outcome of an issue (it’s shocking how frequently our answer is ‘not what we have now’. That is a failing answer, friends.), 2. examine beyond the ‘fairy dust’ phase which tools have the potential to help us achieve that outcome, and 3. seriously think about how we are willing to orchestrate using those instruments to get where we want to end. Many at the decision-makig level, including the legislative branch, are not doing that.

Some times the military is unequivocally the right instrument (again, ironic that we are not willing to help Ukraine achieve that right now, isn’t it, since their case is pretty straightforward on 13 December 2023). Sometimes we really need the talkers. Sometimes we can solve it with foreign assistance which is much cheaper than the blood of our young women and men. Sometimes we need keep our mouths shut to allow cyber to help us get to where we want to be.

We continue operating as if it’s an either or world. It is breaking us—financially and in other ways. Too often it’s an ‘if, then’ or ‘if and’. We are going to break ourselves if we can’t start recognising this. My concerns may not play well in domestic chest-beating but that is what we need elected leaders to provide: leadership to deliver bad news at times. Neither party is warming my heart right now on this.

Thank you for reading today’s thoughts. How often do you think we are orchestrating and sequencing uses of tools? Why is that the case? Should we raise our DoD expenditures to fully a trillion dollars rather than spending on these cheaper, less blunt instruments? I am keen to hear your analyses.

Thank you for reading Actions Create Consequences. Please consider subscribing as I cannot express sufficiently my thanks.

Be well and be safe. FIN

Kelley Vlahos, ‘Remembering Powell’s Remarkable Exchange with Albright’, responsiblestatecraft.org, 18 October 2021, retrieved at https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/10/18/remembering-powells-revealing-exchange-with-madeleine-albright/