Intentions v actions
how they’re viewed
My sister-in-law alerted me to Kristin Hannah’s novels last spring, sparking a marked revision in my reading habits. For over forty-five years as an academic I felt guilty reading anything that wasn’t relevant to national security issues as there were so subjects to follow to be ready to teach national security practitioners. I am finding Hannah’s works both quite engaging for an aging boomer woman but also poignant in ways I did not anticipate.
She had a line in Home Front that I copied the day before yesterday without anticipating its relevance to today’s topic on changes afoot in our new era. It’s pretty obvious yet merits remembering.
“It’s not intentions that matter. It’s actions. My drill instructor used to say that all the time. We are what we do and say, not what we intend to.”
Secretary of State Marco Rubio, sworn in this morning as the fourth man in line to the presidency, met early with that small cadre of personnel charged with conducting the majority of our diplomatic foreign engagements (I make that distinction as clearly the senior military and some other agencies also use diplomacy but State’s role is solely that). Rubio may not be aware of it, having served as a Senator rather than a career diplomat, but it’s hard to underestimate the knocks his department’s personnel absorb on a regular basis. I fear he will learn rather quickly.
Most Americans have little interest in diplomacy, viewing it as a weak, unsophisticated instrument, preferring military power with its machismo and cojones. Certainly in the past half century, we embraced the belief that weakness prevented our victories in Korea, Vietnam or the greater Middle East rather than asking whether we had objectives that were unachievable. If we are harsh, unbending and hard, our desired outcome will result in too many American eyes. As far back as I can recall, the State Department, with no domestic constituency, was cast as full of softies who attended polo matches, played tennis, and surrendered U.S. interests to the demands of others.
I had an exchange with someone here on substack several months ago on this topic. The reader basically found FSOs worthless (not his word but pretty close) based on his experiences in another agency. I responded that I found that assessment incorrect, giving my reasons, but primarily arguing they are intended to talk talk talk because that exchange of ideas is what any diplomats do. We ultimately terminated the exchange with neither of us budging from our positions as our assumptions of both value and the role of diplomacy in national security diverged. Fair enough. I respected him taking time to respond, even if I vehemently with his criticisms.
As a society, we are, of course, notoriously ahistorical and uninterested. Americans hate lots of things without knowing much about them, often deploying gross generalizations because we don’t bother learning nuance of how our government works on our behalf. This is goes back to at least the Reagan administration when Americans bought the argument that so many of their taxes go into foreign aid. I once was on a radio show in Chicago where a caller talked about 50% of the federal budget (yes, you are reading that correctly) goes to foreign aid. Nothing I could say mattered to this man, especially when I noted foreign aid is such a miniscule portion of the federal budget but most diplomats don’t give aid at all. The late North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms loved to drone on about sending foreign aid down rat holes, with the United Nations being at the top of his (and many Americans) hit list. But, the evidence simply has never supported the charges. Plus, assistance has its role as an instrument but that’s another topic.
How many of us know that we sought to locate the United Nations in New York and had traditionally paid a significant portion of its operating budget to assure we have a disproportionately strong influence over the body’s actions? History is not always welcome, but I digress.
Diplomats are the patient, nuanced, long-term interlocutors with the world. That’s what we pay them to do. Most of the time that takes a whole lot longer than we like but it’s also much cheaper than using the military which is the less surgical and a huge, blunt instrument of foreign policy. Some problems just don’t respond to force but the country’s leadership, the command authority, decides on which instrument to use in any situation under every administration. State certainly operates within that system.
Diplomats are often, if not always, the some of the smartest people you’ll ever meet. Their language is careful for a reason: they never like to foreclose options but want to return to negotiation, talks to reach an agreement. Yes, they likely are somewhat risk averse but that’s how their culture approaches the mission. At least as importantly, the diplomats we send overseas go to some pretty crappy posts around the globe (no, not every Embassy is Canberra or the Mayflower district of London. Try the consulate in Shenyang which is a ramshackle building in a declining, polluted city in northeast China so imagine Mogadishu or Dacca) to be our eyes and ears. Diplomatic cables tell us why the actions of forces on the ground need be part of our calculations; other societies have their own interests and panoply of players we rarely understand from far away.
Much of the time other countries (including some of our closest allies) cannot be persuaded to alter their objectives anymore than we can: think Beijing’s on going threat to Taiwan or Lebanon throwing out Hezbollah. It’s not as if diplomats don’t try to advance our senior level talking points, in constant coordination with the White House via the National Security Council staff, to assure Beijing or any other country knows our position. We have told Pyongyang for decades under Democrats and Republicans that they must abandon their nuclear program to no avail.
Diplomats, I observed hundreds in the unfettered learning environment of a not-for-attribution seminar room, are also generally much more “realist” than military or any other government officials. Your read that correctly: my experience is that diplomats understand the raw hard choices of power because they know the limits of their craft and those of the rest of the government. They persist in dialogue as that’s how negotiations work: through painstaking conversation, give and take, reexamining topics, and hammering our accords. But I have only known perhaps four diplomats in my thirty years’ teaching who were anything other than the harshest advocates for U.S. national interests. The SINGLE most Realpolitik, hard power person I have ever known had spent much of his career on the DPRK so he knew that limits exist, regardless of our cultural aspirations and expectations to the contrary.
All of which comes back to what the New York Times says Secretary Rubio had to say to his troops this morning. The subtext to the headline reads “Marco Rubio told State Department Employees that changes under President Trump ‘weren’t meant to be destructive, not meant to be punitive’” yet that is precisely how the changes are are being unveiled.
Traditionally, all ambassadors tender their resignations upon the closure of an outgoing administration, regardless who follows. Ambassadors serve as the head of state’s personal envoy to another country, rather than as some independent agent of the U.S. government. The ambassadors who served Joe Biden tendered their resignations last week as expected. I strongly doubt any of them will retain ambassadorships under the new administration which is President Trump’s prerogative.
But the Foreign Service Officers are a career field within our government, one of the most difficult positions to achieve. Literally hundreds of applicants fail to make the cut so these seasoned personnel, chosen carefully to advance our interests rather than to promote individual agendas or the ideas of an independent foreign policy, need a feeling that their positions can remain a career field. To dismiss those whose specialized skills in writing cables, assessing political contexts, economic challenges, and anything else because they served under a prior administration would be diabolical for our foreign policy.
Diplomats may not agree with individual policies but they then do not necessarily thwart it. Instead, FSOs are professionals who subjugate their personal beliefs or they resign, precisely as any military officer or government official.
The real challenge is when political appointees, who every single President has the right to appoint as his personal envoy, don’t do their homework or misunderstand where their country fits into the national security aspirations of this nation. FSOs, particularly under the watchful eye of any embassy’s Deputy Chief of Mission who is a career rather than political person, serve to keep the State Department aligned with the policies as well as with the host nation where we maintain contacts.
Yet the State Department career field seems the single most common target for Americans frustrated that we don’t always get our way in the world. Turns out, to take a political science term, the rest of the world gets “agency”, or a vote on policy as much Americans do, yet we blame our diplomats when they don’t achieve our grandiose and often unachievable goals (Afghanistan or Iraq come to mind).
This takes us back to Kristin Hannah’s quote. Secretary Rubio has a tough road ahead to convince State personnel that attacks on their mission and career field integrity are not punitive. The incoming Secretary must lead a sustained effort that may not be achievable since so many critics seem to seek retribution against career diplomats by blaming them to failures that are far more multi-causal than diplomacy.
Diplomacy is a single instrument among several our country uses to achieve our objectives. It cannot achieve everything on its own nor can any other instrument, including military power. Strategy is the orchestration of instruments, sequenced and applied in concerted effort to achieve objectives to support our national interest. As I have quoted a former career diplomat from a private conversation several weeks back, diplomats work to advance our national interests rather than trying to change the rest of the world. We seem to forget that too often because it’s uncomfortable and doesn’t fit a common American recipe for running the world.
Secretary Rubio will be busy at home and abroad but his actions will be vital within his department to assure our foreign policy successes. Diplomats are not perfect but they are hard working representatives of this country on the front lines, day in and day out. Some likely did not recognize when they took their jobs that the front lines would be at home as much as in the field. The Secretary has a role in addressing that.
I welcome your thoughts, rebuttals, and questions on this or any Actions create Consequences column. My goal, as I have noted, is to expand measured, civil dialogue on the challenges (such as foreign policy) which we confront. I don’t have all of the answers but try framing the questions in some ways that may be useful.
I appreciate your time every day. I also thank the paid subscribers who support this effort. You can become an annual subscriber for less than a dollar a week.
Be well and be safe. FIN
Kristin Hannah, Home Front: A Novel. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2022.
Edward Wong, “Rubio Oversees Halt to Foreign Aid and Meets with Asian Diplomats on Day 1”, NewYorkTimes.com, 21 January 2025, retrieved at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/21/us/politics/marco-rubio-trump-administration.html
My military duties frequently took me into U.S. Embassies around the world working with Country Teams, CoS's, DATs and other agencies with representation in the embassies. It took a considerable amount of time for me to fully understand (and appreciate) "U.S. Embassy life" abroad. As you said, some of these locations are less than posh and some are downright dangerous for those working there as well as their families living in the area with school-age children.
I was mostly impressed with the passion State Dept personnel displayed in their approach to dealing with the host nation. That was the one thing that was never lacking in my experience. I was, however, very often disappointed at the Country Team's overall lack of understanding of the "blunt instrument" that is the military. Often I found that they had a fairly good understanding of the role of the SDO and/or DAT, but any other DoD "outsiders" who had legitimate missions requiring Embassy awareness, support... and most times, approval to operate w/in the country, were looked at as potential threats to the diplomatic mission vs. force multipliers. Herding cats is hard. It's even harder if you don't fully understand cat culture.
Most times, once I had access to the Ambassador or to the DCM and was able to fully explain our role, mission, goals, plans...we did receive support at that level. The RSOs were routinely the most difficult to work with. I don't discredit their obstinance out of hand. They, by far, had the most grueling task of the entire Country Team which was to keep everyone safe and secure. That's a very difficult role even in "friendly" countries where multiple threats to the shining beacon of America was so prevalent in hard to defend urban environments. I loved spending time talking to the mostly-young US Marines who were assigned to these far-flung posts. They, of course, presented in their impeccably starched and ironed uniforms looking like they were pulled right from a recruiting poster. They also had the requisite stern posture and all-business demeanor. 100% of the time, when they determined I was also military (even though I was Air Force) the barriers came down and great conversations started. They always seemed relieved to get a chance to talk about home, family, their experiences thus far, etc. Having these side-bar conversations was always one of the highlights of my Embassy experiences. Great young men and women projecting the blunt instrument of power in a very sharp and polished manner!
It was interesting to me that one of the texts we were assigned to read at the National War College was a thin volume entitled something like "Introduction to US Embassies." It was appropriate for all the military attending who had not worked in an Embassy environment. I always wondered if career Foreign Service Officers were receiving similar texts re: DoD in their training and education. Many worker-level State Dept folks I came in contact with over the years really had no clue how the military worked, was organized, etc. And sadly, many didn't seem to care to learn.
The US Army's Center for Lessons Learned out of Ft Leavenworth, Kansas has a pretty impressive "Military Guide to the U.S. Embassy" document. It's 62 pages long and does a great job of walking DoD personnel through State Department organization, discussion about USAID, National Security planning, Embassy organization, structure, roles as well as "lessons for military personnel working with American Embassies." I wish I'd had this publication at the beginning of my interactions with embassies. Again, wondering if the State Dept has anything similar they pass to their folks?
I watched Secretary Rubio's initial address to the State Department personnel after being confirmed. I tried to teleport myself into that forum and ask "how do I feel about his comments?" At just over 12 mins long and without notes, it was concise and inspirational. He touched on the DoS as being the face of the United States abroad and in many instances, the
only interaction with the U.S. many foreign nationals will ever see. I loved that he recognized
the local nationals employed by the U.S. Embassies around the world. Many times they are forgotten in the chaos of the mission. He clearly articulated the new administration's goal of advancing the U.S.'s national interests just as any country would want to do and promoting peace around the world. He also recognized the need to confront challenges and conflicts but never at the expense of our national interests. He also acknowledged the realities of the mission which sometimes results in choosing between two bad options. His leadership goal of putting the DoS at the center at how the U.S. approaches the world in order to present the best ideas and options for the President to consider was also a key point. Overall, I think he's coming in with the right tone and focus. We'll see how it all plays out.