pay attention to what i want, not what i say

China's foreign policy missteps

Xi Jinping called Vlodomir Zelenskyy today, fully 14 months after Xi’s dear friend Vlad the impaler invaded Zelenskyy’s country again (the first invasion we all know was 2014 with the little green men). The Chinese adore these phrases that readouts from the call use such as ‘special representative’ from Beijing to Kyiv to facilitate ‘a political settlement’ because there is no winner in a nuclear war’. China is just leading the world into peace and quiet, after all. (sarcasm alert today)

Um, did Jinping tell his good bud Vlad that there is no winner in a nuclear war? Or, howsabout Beijing’s only long-term ally, [Kim] Jong Un as he continues testing various DPRK delivery systems with ever greater reach (ostensibly to include the United States as well as certainly formal U.S. allies Japan and Korea)? Or, better, has Jinping had conversations with his own diplomats—and even himself— as China threatens to protect its interests with regard to Taiwan (admittedly China retains a formal ‘No First Use’ policy but has this curious and convenient way they define offensive and defensive activities)? I have heard at least one instance where China came up with the most contorted explanation for how they would be completely justified in using nuclear weapons if we became involved on Taiwan since it is sovereign Chinese territory in the eyes of the PRC.

It strikes me that Xi (remember I am using sarcasm above in referring to his given name) is on what are ever more frequent repair calls after a foreign policy misstep.

Over the past six years, Chinese diplomats received international condemnation for their ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’, an aggressive, harsh style which repudiated prior approaches. Diplomats suffer criticisms around the world for being too meek in their pinstriped suits rather than assertive protectors of a nation’s rights; the Wolf Warriors turned that characterisation on its head.

With China’s hierarchical system, the Foreign Affairs MInistry spokesmen could not have been speaking without Xi’s explicit authorisation, if not order. The positions cast doubt on China’s alleged desire to continue the six decade-old policy of ‘peaceful coexistence’ first enunciated by Zhou Enlai. Verbal attacks in recent years on anyone not conforming to China’s position coincided with actions by the People’s Liberation Army deemed around the world as aggressive in the South and East China Seas, along the disputed border with India in the Himalayas, and against Taiwan. China is always the victim in every instance, never responsible for provoking anyone else.

China reversed course roughly 18 months ago, muzzling the primary wolf, Zhou Lijian. A persistent fixture as Foreign Ministry spokesman, Zhou combatively attacked those disputing many ‘facts’ on topics like the pandemic, China’s incarceration of the Uighurs, and various other policies which foreign journalists sought to pursue. After international criticism of Beijing’s posture led to greater alliance collaboration, such as unveiling AUKUS talks between London, Canberra, and Washington in 2021, Zhou eventually retreated from public view but the behaviour only marginally moderated.

Xi tried papering over the aggression with further expansion of the ‘benefits’ of the Belt & Road Initiative (Xi’s personal, signature program thus far) and ‘Vaccine Diplomacy’ to states unable to afford the western vaccine research early in the pandemic. Clearly aimed at calming mounting fears, Beijing pleaded with others to recognise the United States was causing the aggression by focusing on alliances and toughening positions on bilateral Sino-U.S. trade, forcing China to react defensively.

China’s ‘peaceful’ actions were a strategem as the PRC expanded military maneuvers against Taiwan while practicing ‘extraterritoriality’ against perceived opponents, such as setting upon Chinese citizens overseas who voiced opinions Beijing disputed. The menacing activities against Chinese nationals overseas, whether in schools to assure pure thought supporting Xi or preventing discussion by Uighurs, aimed to uphold a positive, if unrealistic, view of China and its governing party (especially the leader).

Most egregiously, Beijing fixed covert police presence in foreign countries where they overtly, if illegally, monitored those opposing Xi Jinping’s actions at home and abroad. The attacks on dissenters, orchestrated by the PRC Consulate in Manchester, one of the largest cities in Britain, was truly shocking to the international community. Just last week, the Justice Department arrested two PRC agents for orchestrating such an illegal operation in New York, then foolishly destroying evidence when questioned on the matter. China, of course, claims it is being falsely accused of these activities.

Late last week, the PRC Ambassador to France gave a rather startling speech where he questioned the sovereignty of the states, such as Ukraine but this could apply perhaps to the Baltics or Central Asia one supposes, following the break up of the Soviet Union. Lu Shaye’s remarks created a firestorm as the world wondered whether this was accidental or part of a coordinated message in support of some grandiose vision Xi’s ‘good friend’ Vladimir Putin has to roll the world back 31 years by recreating the Soviet empire. Was this just another way to justify PRC actions against Taiwan? Was he mad? Did he misspeak?

An Ambassador is the head of state’s personal envoy to a nation. While France might not be the closest ally for the PRC, it is clearly one of the more important nations in the world opinion. Perhaps Lu was extending what he thought Emmanuel Macron would support after his recent trip to Beijing which also ignited concerns that the French leader was sending messages to hosts that did not represent general views on the Continent, especially regarding Taiwan.

As i have argued here, none of us know for absolute certainty what happens within the sanctity of Zhongnanhai but I have a hard time believing any senior CCP diplomat ‘was off the reservation’. That is unthinkinable to me as he simply would not risk what is obviously Xi’s iron clad will as the purveyor of new ideas from China.

It does not matter whether Lu was out of line or following orders but the condemnations arose after the speech last weekend. And today, Xi finally called Zelenskyy. I cannot see any possible way that timing is coincidental: Xi was back to asserting, with this call, that China is a peacemaker, a misunderstood, cuddly panda only interested in peace without nuclear weapons.

Right. Listen to what I say, not what i do. Right. FIN