Pursuing those national interests

Sino-American ties again

Two long-term China watchers, David ‘Mike’ Lampton (Professor Emeritus at the School of Advanced International Studies) and Tom Fingar (former Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis), recently published an article I recommend for recognizing the increasing action-reaction cycle in Sino-U.S. relations. ‘China’s America Policy: Back to the Future’ is a clear-eyed consideration of the dynamics at work in the bilateral relationship. While we have no control over the PRC’s behaviour, Fingar and Lampton flag our actions as motivating China more directly than we understand. Perhaps we might re-examine triggers pushing Beijing rather than simplistically demanding the PRC abandon anything at variance with our projection for the future.

The authors describe Beijing’s anxieties driving its behaviour far more than having increased capabilities developed over the past twenty-five years. The article acknowledges China’s military modernisation as well as significant internal challenges as changes for Beijing and the world. These analysts don’t buy the argument that China seeks world domination just because it is China or under the Chinese Communist Party. They do believe Xi is using the same aspirations of the Qing Dynasty two hundred fifty years ago: ensuring a prosperous and secure society, through ‘domestic tranquility, a modern economy, and a strong military’ (47). Global, especially U.S., reactions following the 2008 global financial crisis forced the Party to reconsider its definitions of success and how fully it could assure the international conditions would allow it to meet the objectives

Fingar and Lampton also join those who point out Xi Jinping’s role is not that of an absolute dictator but the first among equals in a collective leadership. That position allows him to advance his approach to addressing the economic stagnation, corruption, and gender issues it not to ignore alternate voices within the Standing Committee of the Politburo or other policy communities. But he has to operate within that Party structure and the associated constraints—dare I say checks and balances— that a Leninist party imposes. We simply don’t see them as overtly as in our own politix.

I would add the domestic frustration within the United States following the 9/11 attacks, gradual recognition of failures in Afghanistan and Iraq, the financial crisis, and understanding how China’s WTO membership assisted trade expansion were unanticipated events to which we have never reconciled itself. We were increasingly convinced of China benefitting unfairly from the international system we so long dominated while our own vulnerabilities became apparent. This led us to focus on VCnina threats far more rather than studying the consequences of our own choices.

The striking reminder one ought take from this article is the centrality of interests to its actions. This obvious point is far too often excluded from most contemporary conversation in the United States; instead, we focus on what the authors call caricatures of China, its motives and its leaders as we project what we Beijing is doing.

States have their own interests. Occasionally those interests coincide but more often run in parallel for a while before diverging. Can they reconverge or will they only keep diverging? This is absolutely normal but Americans now assume any divergences are threatening. The key is how we react to that phenomenon. We assume we can predict China will respond in a threatening manner, often including saber rattling and pushy maritime militia activity. But is this China really tHe same as when Japan struck out in the Asia Pacific between 1931 and 1945. Is that really what we are seeing?

Is it worth pursuing potential conflict over each and every one of these divergences? How do we draw the line?

Lampton and Fingar perceive of Zhongnanhai’s position as one of weakness rather than confidence. I have stated before I think the Chinese are indeed worried about their vulnerabilities far more than acting from a position of complete certainty of success. Regardless of strength or weakness, leaders opt to protect their interests, often falling into a dangerous action-reaction dynamic from which both sides find it tough to emerge for fear of—you guessed it—showing weakness in the eyes of their people’s.

I recommend this piece to offer at least a serious consideration of more nuance than we usually hear. In sum, we are in for a long period of distrust as things currently stand with only bite-sized ways to break down the tensions, if both sides so choose.

I welcome your thoughts, especially the evidence upon which you are working. These conversations influence my own thinking.

I confess to being pretty airy right now after an overnight flight from Dulles to Istanbul where I await another flight to Bangkok. I have no beautiful Spa Creek sunrise to share, alas. Tomorrow is another day.

Be well and be safe.FIN

Thomas Fingar and David M. Lampton, ‘China’s America Policy: Back to the Future’, The Washington Quarterly, 46:4, Winter 2024: 43-63, retrieved at https:doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2023.2285541