quivering norms

that post-World War II system

The past seven days have been tough for the post-World War II norms we used to cherish in the United States. Yes, the one that made us so incredibly prosperous—and powerful.

Former president Donald Trump declared unequivocally that he would encourage Vlad the Impaler to attack NATO countries not meeting the 2% target for their defense spending relative to their national GDP. While some of his supporters in the Republican Party argued he would not really do that, Trump repeated the threat as if to underscore it. Europeans certainly are not hearing it as an idle threat.

Based on tracing the former president’s unavoidably clear antagonism towards most Alliance leaders—ranging minimally from former German Chancellor Angela Merkel through former British Prime Minister Theresa May to Secretary General Jens Stoltenber—over the past decade, I am sure Europeans take these threats as intended: as evidence he would not defend Europe in the face of Putin’s aggression regardless of a seventy-five year treaty commitment or any amount that European capitals spend. I don’t think he is really concerned about the 2 percent target since it’s a great campaign point as isolationism grows at home but it was never actually a contractual obligation.

If we looked at Kim Jung-Un’s interpretation of the same statement in Pyongyang (or that of several potential foes), I cannot help but assume Kim would similarly find these repeated statements as green lights for DRPK actions on the Korean peninsula versus the Seoul regime. While Trump has historically had terrific relations with Israeli Prime MInister Binyamin Netanyahu, even Jerusalem must consider the possibility that Trump’s ‘America’s First’ preferences in the face of binding international commitments could expose Israel to more dire conditions than in the past.

Then Indonesia, the country of almost 400 million I think we most under-appreciate as we scan the globe for important developments, held a democratic election resulting in a former general long tagged with serious human rights accusations finally winning the presidency. I understand why you might ask if I am unhappy Indonesia actually held representative, competitive elections. No, I am delighted by that but I am definitely troubled that the political environment there, as so many places, allowed someone credibly and repeatedly accused of conducting severe humans rights abuses to rise in national politics fully twenty-five years after the archipelago embraced the people’s will in a sustained election process.

Indonesia’s military remains a potent institution within the political system, perhaps still the main thread linking together seventeen thousand islands under a single still evolving government in Jakarta. As a force in the country, however, analysts at home and abroad have always worried it would reject civilian control should its prerogatives as an institution—or individual statures such as that of incoming president Prabowo Subianto—come under threat. The victory means Washington and European capitals will confront renewed pressure from the global human rights community to ban him from many democratic fora on the grounds he brutalised the population in East Timor in the late 1990s.

Banned in Washington until 2020, Prabowo no longer will face the severe hostility of retired Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy, long a champion of preempting normalising ties between human rights abusers and the U.S. government. Leahy may be gone but voices will still rise as Prabowo’s actions years ago resurrect painful memories of the Indonesian military doing its best to thwart independence in the former Portuguese territory on an island shared with Indonesia. The military also sileced the regime’s opponents when it wanted, reinforcing authoritarian rule by Suharto for more than thirty years. The newly elected president’s vast personal wealth, accumulated at least partially as son-in-law of the late ousted dictator Suharto, will also raise questions about Indonesia’s path forward.

Should Washington or European capitals push Prabowo, he likely would turn to stronger ties with Beijing which is keenly aware of Indonesia’s sprawling geography across the southern portion of the South China Sea. Beijing’s known antipathy towards better ties between Washington or anyone else in the Asia Pacific will serve as a backdrop for U.S. jockeying to cement relationships with Jakarta in hopes of curbing China’s influence.

Today’s news of Alexei Navalny’s death in a Russian prison is the latest headline to illustrate that rule of law, so vital as a foundation for the post-World War II world, is dead in too many countries. Navalny, a Russian nationalist who vocally opposed Putin, almost died from poisoning on a domestic flight four years ago. He courageously returned to Russia following treatment in Berlin but almost immediately fell prey to Putin’s anxiety about any criticisms. Navalny received multiple, sequential jail terms for his protests, each allegedly ‘following Russian law’ but without credible evidence according to most analysts. His death this morning ends the life of yet another gutsy Russian willing to challenge both the wealth accumulated by so many oligarchs in the post-Soviet era along with the czarist governing by Putin in prosecuting war in Ukraine, chilling domestic dissent, and thwarting any other seemingly representative political activity within Russia. Putin 1, rule of law 0.

The theme I am highlighting is not that these events happened as the post-World War II world certainly has had its share of pretty bad dudes in control of countries. (There are still many others I have not even mentioned, including some of our ‘allies’.) But, it’s the type of activities common to these three instances that are noteworthy. These specific events link by the overt rejection of what Americans long championed as desirable political behaviour, at least back to the Carter administration when human rights began to take a prominent position in our foreign policy.

Former president Trump’s choice to ignore the NATO treaty obligation ratified by the Senate in 1949 would normally create a similar separation of powers challenge to Carter shifting diplomatic relations from Taibei to Beijing on 1 January 1979. Doing so unilaterally saw the Executive revoke the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of China and the United States. In 1979, Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater attempted to thwart Carter’s decision by taking the issue to the Supreme Court. The Court refused to grant certiorari on Goldwater v Carter, 44 U.S. 996 (1979) as ‘not yet ripe for a decision’, as Congress had not responded to the Executive action under the Court’s responsibilities for Judicial Review. Congress ultimately came to the ‘clever’ decision to pass the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 in parallel with the normalisation of ties with China. Goldwater and others hated dumping an ally but were able to continue supporting Taibei.

Would the Court take the same position on a Trump rejection of defending a treaty obligation? More relevant, would the Congress hold him to that NATO responsibility? It seems far from clear that anyone would in fact force a second Trump administration to abide by responsibilities set forth in prior treaties. I am not sure Republicans care about European security in the face of Putin’s obvious aspirations to complete steps to recreate a supreme Russia on the European continent.

But this example is even more egregious as the former president is campaigning he would ‘encourage Russia’ to move against these ‘delinquent’ nations. (emphasis added). The challenge would be that no one knows how far a resulting conflict would spread—thus we are entirely uncertain whether the United States could extricate itself from existential threats resulting from a more emboldened Russia or China (since the same threat likely would apply to advising China to move against ‘delinquent’ Korean and Japanese governments if Trump’s logic persists).

The strategic stability characterising the globe over the past eight decades is quivering before our eyes yet we are not responding to shore up its norms. A substantial portion of the nation sees the threats as resulting from those conditions we established rather than from the quivering and potential collapse of the post-World War II system. The issue of protecting human rights, embodied as early as 1948 in the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights’, faces major obstacles as regimes across the globe increasingly discard portions of the system advanced over these decades with no hue and cry from the most central advocate, Washington, throughout this period. Don’t kid yourself, people. China is far from the only state seeking to alter the current status quo ante, even though it has served us far better than conflict ever could.

The quivering of the norms is far from their total collapse but this is not as comforting as it sounds. The United States no longer is the beacon of world hope as the political paralysis, domestic fracturing, and financial profligacy have become the standard rather than a temporary problem needing resolution. China, Russia and Iran advance arguments that their civilisational advantages merit equal respect as Washington’s declining ability to govern becomes all the more evident by the day.

Coupled with the possible resulting aggression around the world is the reality that the U.S. military cannot support its current missions because recruiting challenges in all of the services, except the Marine Corps, are beginning to rival the financial risks we face. It’s simplist to argue, as some do, this is because of a ‘woke’ military (whatever in the world that means) but I think, instead, the bill is coming due for the overstretch developed during Afghanistan and Iraq, the economy appealing much more than public service or patriotism to possible recruits’ pockets, and the fear that constant deployments will undermine a lifestyle so many young have come to cherish in a ‘work-life balance’. In any case, with the current paucity of recruits, it’s difficult to figure out how we will find the numbers to fill the ranks across the board, unless we turn to those very immigrants so offensive to many Americans. Plus, are there dangers to an all-volunteer force composition that doesn’t match the population? Too little conversation is considering this point, I fear.

Finally, as I wrote this morning, I received a note from my very first advisee at the National War College in the summer of 1992. A Kansas lawyer who went on from Department of the Air Force service to a distinguished career as a judge, he had a single line regarding yesterday’s column on double jeopardy: ‘Cynthia, It definitely is not double jeopardy in a Fifth Amendment sense.’ As usual, the people reading this column have varied backgrounds, specialities, and expertise from which we all benefit when we share ideas.

I welcome any and all thoughts on today’s column. Many of you may hate it while others might think it has some merit. Please send any thoughts my way! I appreciate each and every one. As I told someone this morning who preemptively said he feared spamming my inbox, let me worry about that part rather than any of you as I want to hear from you.

San Diego is a beautiful place, with Coronado even more charming by its walkability and rather eclectic vibe. Just a couple of scenes walking along the street this afternoon.

Be well and be safe. FIN

Guy Faulconbridge, ‘What Navalny said about Russia, Putin, and death’, www.reuters.com, 16 February 2024, retrieved at https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/who-was-alexei-navalny-what-did-he-say-russia-putin-death-2024-02-16/

Andrew Gray and Sabine Sebold, ‘What did Trump say about NATO funding and what is Article 5?’, reuters.com, 12 February 2024, retrieved at https://www.reuters.com/world/what-did-trump-say-about-nato-funding-what-is-article-5-2024-02-12/

Justia U.S. Supreme Court, ‘Goldwater v Carter, 44 U.S. 996 (1979)’, https://supreme.justia.com, 13 December 1979, retrieved at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/444/996/

‘Prabowo Subianto claims victory in Indonesian presidential election’, www.aljazeera.com, 14 February 2024, retrieved at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/14/prabowo-subianto-claims-victory-in-indonesian-presidential-election