Most of you keep tabs open on your electronic devices as I do. Truthfully, some are open for so long that I have to revisit the tab periodically to wonder why on earth I ever opened it. This morning I remembered leaving open the American Foreign Policy Association's "Tracker: Current U.S. Ambassadors” for an Actions Create Consequences column.
The Association represents diplomats, that rarified group of individuals representing us overseas. I use rarified with profound respect as it's bloody hard to get a position in the U.S. Foreign Service—deservedly so. These folks represent us in some of the least attractive places and tedious venues. They are almost invariably the hardest realists and yet patient people I know; I can only remember a single exception. Think about a two-year tour in Dushanbe, Tajikistan versus Brussels, Belgium. The two environments sum up the political appointees as ambassadors versus professional FSOs: the career people tend to lust for places like Dushanbe or Vanuatu with the many challenges they offer on all levels. At the same time, political donors savor Beaujolais and paté in Europe (I have no idea what the national dish is in Tajikistan, but I am confident it's neither of those items).
The Tracker lists individuals serving as the U.S. emissary, the president’s connection, to 195 countries and organizations globally as of 9 April 2025. As a Constitutional reminder, the president names the individual he wants as ambassador, and the Senate approves or disapproves of the nominee.
Three-quarters of a century ago, confirmation was a straightforward process under which most nominees won Senate approval after the administration identified and vetted individuals as worthy of such a lofty position.
Over the last few decades, our political divisions slowed, if not halted, putting nominees in place, whether it's been political tension between the president and Senate (it’s hard to recall how much North Carolina Republican Jesse Helms loved to slow Bill Clinton’s nominees) or the vetting process itself which appears ever more convoluted. The current administration is hardly unique in having vacancies.
Some of you will ask, "So what? Why does it matter?" whether we are part of the United Nations Management & Reform branch. Everyone knows we tell ourselves that the United Nations is incapable of reform because it's a corrupt organization full of our adversaries asking us to pay their salaries.
However, more than half—98—of the 195 nominated seats are empty. Put otherwise, we lack a voice at fully half of the global positions where other countries send representation. Rest assured Zhongnanhai fills its positions with capable Party members (and mouthpieces) rapidly when vacancies arise. Thus China’s views on human rights (Beijing rejects the basic assumptions about universality as declared in the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights). It’s much easier to ignore workers than a formal ambassador who points out where our views differ radically from those of others.
The real problem is that these organizations will persist, often turning to the next most significant contributor to fill in the leadership and financial commitments we are abandoning. Dues for U.N. membership result from gross domestic product, where we still outshine everyone else. Without us, China becomes the country to whom the rest of the world defers decision-making when the United States is not participating on an equal footing. The days when the United Nations could not operate without us, if they ever truly existed, ended a long whie back.
That is part of being a superpower: we pay our dues, whether we like the responses we get. That is terribly distasteful for Americans but to withdraw only invites Beijing’s, if not Putin’s or Teheran’s, greater stature as a guiding voice for the organization.
We have lower-level officials staffing our foreign relations work, whether in an embassy or New York. These worker bees know the issues, prepare position papers, and do much of the day-to-day work on the relevant topics. Yet showing we care enough to send an ambassador is a not-too-subtle reminder we are in the game. Our current seeming preference for unilateral decision-making leaves our counterparts everywhere completely uncertain of whether we hear them, much less intend to work with their diplomats.
The rest of the world sees formal representation by the head of state as a vital indicator of respect. I often write about China's demand for respect to prevent what the CCP considers a replication of the Century of Humiliation; Putin demands a similar measure of esteem. The DPRK, with its hermetic Kim dynasty, equates respect with a step towards survival. Having no diplomatic representation with Washington (hardly unique to the current administration) is one of many aspirations Pyongyang retains in its frustrated interactions with the world. With its millennia-long centrality to South Asia, India is prone to demanding recognition as intensely as anyone else. Everyone values an ambassador from Washington, regardless what their rhetoric implies, as we remain the global power, even if a chaotic, wobbly one.
The current administration deploys special envoys, thus circumventing the annoyance (and oversight) of the Senate confirmation, to several places it considers most relevant. Real estate magnate Steve Witkoff serves as special representative to the Russian Federation as does former general Keith Kellogg to Ukraine. Do those individuals suffice to satisfy other countries’ nationalist pride? Perhaps, yet but the position does not entirely placate those who measure our actions by counting an appointed envoy versus fully confirmed ambassadors.
During a growing and substantial tension, we have no formal ambassador or alternate envoy in Beijing. In the China case, toss in trade warriors as yet another high level connection but how ought Beijing prioritize these buckets of policies should conflicts between our objectives develop? Put otherwise, does any single voice speak for the U.S. objectives with China? If so, who and what is she saying? How does the Senate determine what we have promised in consultation with the PRC? That is not a flippant comment but a serious interrogative as we see questions continue about whether trade negotiations are occurring.
The Ambassador is the chief of our mission in a foreign country. She ought to know all that is transpiring, if we seek accountability and consistency in policy. With the recent mixed messaging and staff upheaval at State, it’s hard to know who speaks when or where or why.
The good news is that the administration has submitted 42 individuals for confirmation, but the Senate, that exquisitely deliberative body, has yet to confirm them. The clock, however, still ticks as the states where these individuals would serve react to those formal vacancies to varying degrees.
Recent plans to reform the Department, explicitly citing the intention to scale back representation, particularly in Africa, attracted some attention domestically last week but will be interpreted far differently overseas. The world knows we have had budget issues for decades, but we rarely consider serious options to address them.
One personal anecdote informs my thinking on why these actions will play a role in foreign appraisals of the United States. The National Defense University, as an administrative body within Joint Professional Military Education (PME), is the interlocutor with defense establishments worldwide. PME institutions offering military diplomacy in times of tension. The late Army Lieutenant General Paul Cerjan led the first military delegation to China in January 1994, almost five years after the Tian'anmen Square massacre, as a step to reopening military-to-military discussions halted by our reaction to Zhongnanhai’s barbarism towards its students. NDU presidents have been three-star officers since the organization's establishment in 1976.
During the Obama administration, the Joint Staff decided lowering the rank of the NDU president to a two-star. I was in Beijing with an NDU delegation at a major Asian PME meeting in November 2012 when the Chinese host had a single question, rather than the usual exchange of mutual concerns, for our two-star NDU President. Why, the PLA NDU counterpart asked as he picked his teeth, are you merely a two-star when all of your predecessors have been three-star generals or flag officers?
Our delegation head fumbled with an answer, mumbling that we needed to cut costs. Our Chinese interlocutors were amused and disdainful, if not incredulous. In the eyes of our PLA hosts, the United States was "dissing" China rather than seriously discussing cutting costs. The conversation ended within a few minutes without our side delivering any prepared talking points on concerns. It makes many happy to “diss China” these days but the symbolism did not convey strength.
Major powers balance domestic and foreign policy issues. Still, their nations must recognize that everyone else around the world pays meticulous attention to what we say, who says it, and what power that individual has to represent our views abroad. We tend to be relatively informal, unimpressed by diplomatic niceties (even if we adore the pomp and circumstance of our British cousins having a king and queen with jewels and castles). We can't assume others see our statements about saving money as relevant for a great power as we still have far greater wealth than so many of these countries combined. I suspect many countries would like to see us address our spending challenges as an adult government rather than nibble around the edges as we are; some governments would prefer watching us fall further down the deficit hole amid domestic upheaval.
But I guarantee that diminishing our presence abroad, particularly through neglecting our formal ambassador ranks, only reinforces their doubts about superpower status. We have the power to address that, but we don't recognize the portrait we are painting of ourselves as a nation.
No, those with whom we have international concerns elect neither the president nor Members of Congress which is why foreign relations ranks so low on the priorities of many Americans. To paraphrase an old idea, we may hardly be interested in foreign affairs and who formally represents us in other countries, but the rest of the world desperately watches these nominations with keen attention.
Thank you for your time this morning. I welcome any and all feedback on this topic. Dialogue requires multiple voices so let’s hear your views.
Thank you for reading Actions. I especially appreciate the paid subscribers who make this column possible. Your support, whether it’s $8 a month or $55 a year, make such a difference in the sources I can read.
It was a beautiful Sunday in the Chesapeake, replete with my first clematis sighting of the year.
Be well and be safe. FIN
“Tracker: List of Current Ambassadors”, afsa.com, 9 April 2025, retrieved at https://afsa.org/list-ambassadorial-appointments
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, OHCRC.org, retrieved at https://www.ohchr.org/en/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
precisely. these are two nuclear armed states who went to the brink twenty-three years ago. i hope we aren't thinking Modi will listen to us over his nationalist crowd.
To your point... this exerpt from Foreign Affairs article today on the resurgence of tensions in the Kashmir region:
"New Delhi could choose simply to attempt a quieter, covert form of retribution against Islamabad, but that is unlikely to satisfy a public that seems to want more concerted action. Overt military action remains a distinct possibility. In 2019, Qamar Javed Bajwa, then Pakistan’s army chief and de facto the most powerful decision-maker in the country, was looking to reconcile with India. By contrast, his successor, Asim Munir, is politically besieged and needs to demonstrate strength; he was already making belligerent statements about India’s actions in Kashmir a week before the April 22 terrorist attack. The Trump administration is not paying a great deal of attention to the region (it has yet to appoint ambassadors to either country, and relevant State Department officials have yet to be confirmed), and unlike in 2019, it has no U.S. forces in nearby Afghanistan to worry about. It is unclear whether the United States will do much to help lower tensions today. With Modi’s rhetoric leaving little room for compromise, Pakistan’s military leadership under pressure to respond forcefully to any Indian strike, and China’s growing involvement in the region, events in Kashmir risk triggering uncontrollable escalation."
India and Pakistan Are Perilously Close to the Brink - The Real Risk of Escalation in Kashmir
~ Sushant Singh, April 29, 2025
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/guest-pass/redeem/Z7qMaDyLiZk
Note the line regarding lack of Ambassador appointments to either country by the current Administration.