stalemates and commitments

actions do have consequences

President Vlodomir Zelenskyy’s visit to Capitol Hill last night reflected the optimism and determination of a people under siege along with the respect held by most in the United States for underdogs in a survival struggle. Zelenskyy’s green fatigues versus the impeccable dress worn by 535 Members of Congress illustrated this point dramatically. We should be proud of the support we offer, predominantly without much debate, for those unjustly attacked by the irresponsible, dangerous, narcisstic Vladimir Putin.

We must recognise, however, that the commitments we are making to Ukraine currently appear open-ended. President Joe Biden, in particular, and the supporters of Ukraine on the Hill are unflinching in their advocacy that we defend our national interests by helping Kyiv. Biden stated unequivocably yesterday ‘The American people have been with you every step of the way, and we will stay with you. We will stay with you for as long as it takes.’ Toluse Olorunnipa, 'for two presidents, a show of strength and shared objectives', Washington Post, 22 December 2022. It’s hard to get much more open-ended than that statement.

I am not arguing President Biden or the other elected officials should stop supporting Ukraine: I worry we don’t understand what we are signing up to do. I fear we think this struggle can be won fairly easily with just a bit more support to the valiant Ukrainian fighters based on Russia’s failure to achieve outright victory at this point.

The incomparable Carl von Clausewitz in his On War offered many pearls of wisdom on war, society, leadership, and a long list of topics but one of them most crucial was that wars do not follow some logical path; they are human endeavours with unpredictabilities. (Vladimir Putin has discovered that on on his own.)

Are we signing up to support Ukraine as it recovers each inch of its pre-24 February 2022 territory? Are we agreeing to recover the Crimea which the Russian seized in 2014? Are we trying to build an enduring democratic government in Ukraine? Will we actually stay involved until a post-Putin regime takes over in Russia or a post-Lukashenko government in Putin’s satellite Belarus?

The clarity of our objectives matters a great deal. It’s seductive to assume that some of the outcomes coincide as desirable so they would be good. Truth is that sometimes objectives, noble as they may be, conflict with one another. Building a democratic Ukraine, for example, might conflict with beating back the Russians, odd as that sounds. Which is more important?

Without knowing when we have met them, we don’t know what it will cost in dollars or even in political capital around the world. I realise this last assertion sounds peculiar as President Biden basks in success at both hosting Zelenskyy’s visit but also in galvanising the international coalition supporting Ukraine over these past ten months. He has shown remarkable prowess that few critics (and probably even some supporters) thought he could evidence when Russia launched their action in February. But, he could easily lose that political capital if the rest of the world soured on Zelenskyy or chose to strengthen their ties with Putin.

Clausewitz’s caution, however, still matters. It appears Ukraine is thwarting Putin’s overall ambition to eradicate the country but U.S. national security assessments expect a stalemate, rather than a clear cut victor, between Kyiv and Moscow in the months ahead. Julian E. Barnes, Helene Cooper, and Eric Schmitt, 'As Ukraine prepares for a second year at war, the prospect of a stalemate looms', New York Times, 21 December 2002 Zelenskyy is clear that he needs much more military assistance to hold off the Russians and reverse whatever of their actions that he can but this is still an uphill battle for Ukraine. Its population is motivated and fighting for survival but Russia does still have petroleum and natural resources which allows them to buy arms from Iran, possibly China, and North Korea. In any case, it does not appear this will be a short fight.

Indeed, one must ask how long Russian nationalists will seek to erase Ukraine. This likely is not a ‘one and done’ conflict but one of extended, perhaps generational attrition. Much as true with China and Taiwan, inside Russia there remains a narrative advocating ending a sovereign Ukraine, subsuming it into the Russian Federation regardless of whether Putin runs that Federation or some successor. Is the United States signing up for a multi-generational conflict?

Our span of interest in this country is generally not a long one. We supported war in Southeast Asia for twenty years, then negotiated an end which led to the Vietnamese victory in 1975. Similarly, the conflict in Afghanistan painfully ended weeks short of the twentieth anniversary of the terrorist attacks which precipitated warfare. Not all wars end as decisively as defeating the Axis powers in 1945.

Why not? There are many reasons but a major one is that World War II, whether in the Atlantic or Pacific, had clearly defined objectives. We wanted to see the unconditional surrender of the Japanese who had attacked the United States in 1941. Germany signed on to support its ally Japan after the attack to they too had to offer unconditional surrender.

The Ukraine war with Russia is not our war, not matter how passionately many in the United States hate the unjust Russian attack. We talk about stopping Putin’s aggression but that begins to get mushy. We talk about his culture war but doesn’t that occur elsewhere, too? Do we respond to all aggressive actions around the globe when they occur? Do we retroactively respond? Again, how do we answer questions at home regarding success in our efforts?

Or, alternatively, what if things were to turn sour for Ukraine? Would there be a point at which we decided we could not reverse trends, thus our resources were not appropriately spent? Would we be extending conflict to avoid defeat or to assure victory? These are not the same thing.

I am not even going to mention the distinct possibility of the United States becoming enmeshed directly with Russia in conflict, as a result of these commitments, or being in a nuclear exchange. These are unlikely but real possible aspects of not clearly stating objectives in our actions.

I am not advocating ending support for Ukraine; I want to make that explicit. But, I want to make sure we are aware that open-ended commitments can be much longer than they originally appear and the United States does not have a great track record on extended commitments.

This is hypothetical today. Our repeated negative experiences, however, invariably include admonitions that we need understand our objectives better from the start. I obviously agree with that and advocate doing it on Ukraine now. It is better for us and for Ukraine. I am not optimistic, however, that we will do so. FIN