Were former president Donald Trump to become president following November’s vote, I see probable tension ahead within his own supporters. I do not know the former POTUS (FPOTUS for future reference) nor his newly anointed Vice President. Both men have ample opportunity ahead to lay out their markers for policy in a second Trump administration. I base my thoughts on their public statements and actions in the past.
Two caveats up front. One is that none of us can possibly see the exact political configuration of our country six months from Saturday when a new president takes office. We don’t know the players yet, we don’t know the balance of power, and we don’t know how the world will appear.
i will also observe that second terms, regardless of the candidate’s party, age, pedigree, or anything else, rarely are as successful as the first. Let me say that again: second administrations tend to produce more problems than policy advances, though I confess I base my assertion on looking back anecdotally. Iran-Contra, the infamous 1986s arms-for-hostages scheme in conjunction with illegal support for contrarevolucionarios in Nicaragua, became clear during Reagan’s second term (others will cite the Soviet Union crumbling during that same term as a great accomplishment but I am one of the few who still think the evidence is that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did in their rule, precisely as George F. Kennan predicted in his 1947 “Mr. X” Foreign Affairs article, rather than us triumphantly slaying the communist dragon.)
Bill Clinton’s impeachment saga and the Kosovo mess were second term while the big item of his eight years in office, arguably, was passing NAFTA early on. After all, Clinton lost the Congress in the 1994 midterms so a subsequent agenda was hard to implement anyway.
George W. Bush held both houses until his final two years but saw his second term grind ever more into the dirt because of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Obama passed the Affordable Care Act in the first months of his government, spurring the Senate Minority Leader, Mitch McConnell, and the “Tea Party” (born of Obama’s “overreach” with the ACA mandates) to counter every single action the Chief Executive took for his remaining six years in the White House. Obama’s tenure was perhaps more successful overall than other presidents because there were no major scandals but no achievements anywhere near the importance of the ACA resulted, either.
What do we know about a possible second administration baSed on what he accomplished between 2017 and 2021?
Trump lost the Republican majorities in both houses in 2018 midterms but his primary successes were seating the Supreme Court Justices solidifying a far right, activist orientation. He had the majority on the Court early in his tenure so the rest was gravy. He managed tax cuts but they are not permanent. Covid was a disaster and no Wall solved immigration. The overall Trump record was one of fits and starts, personal attacks, and unpredictability as much as any sustained policy path.
Serving as Chief Executive is infinitely harder than running a family real estate company or starring on a television show.
Today, as the Republican Convention closes with Trump adulation this evening, voters would do well to recognize divisions already evident between the aspiring president and his newly-minted running mate. In particular, the gap between the two men on China is already spilling into the open, taking us into the unknown.
Senator Vance is firmly on record arguing that the CCP strongly menaces this country’s future. He blames the Chinese for stealing U.S. middle class jobs. Vance has challenged the Biden administration’s stress on support for Kyiv as a diversion from addressing the PLA and the Middle Kingdom. Vance’s views are pretty common to those—in both parties—arguing for well over a decade that we must address the Chinese threats now as tomorrow will be even harder.
During his sixteen months in the Senate, Vance worked to preclude Chinese students from coming to the United States for higher education. Vance adamantly sees Beijing for causing the fentanyl crisis plaguing places like his hometown of Middletown, Ohio, where the senator’s mother suffered from the drug scourage so he wants to hold them accountable. He also seeks to protect U.S. financial markets from the Chinese. In lockstep with the FPOTUS, Vance strongly supports tariffs against Chinese products coming into the United States, although neither man addresses the impact on U.S. consumers from those taxes (Tariffs, if we recall, protect U.S. industries rather than punishing China so there is some light between the two men in their joint support for the measures).
FPOTUS Trump advocates tariffs on Chinese products but is less clear on a number of other positions relating to bilateral ties with Beijing. The most obvious potential break with his Vice Presidential running mate is on Taiwan because the latter calls Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty key to our own economy while Trump is more muddled. Yesterday the FPOTUS reiterated that Taiwan must pay for U.S. efforts to defend the island, comparing the expectation to how one purchases insurance protection against a fire or some other disaster.
Taiwan long kept its defense spending at an absurdly low level for a country located so close to its existential threat. Recently departed president Tsai Ing-wen began investing more in defense during her 2016-2024 presidency, bringing the number up from 2% to 2.5% of GDP with 5% annual increases to the budget during her administrations. But, this remains shockingly low for a country FPOTUS rightly cited as “wealthy” yesterday. Since no other country will openly send military assistance to the Taipei government for fear of roiling Beijing’s anger, U.S. military aid is vital to survival.
The United States, under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, is authorized to provide articles of a “defensive nature” to the island through the Foreign Assistance Act (1961) to the tune of roughly a billion dollars’ worth annually. Biden authorized an additional $345 million last year. Taiwan buys various “defensive” platforms each year via Foreign Military Sales amounting to several hundred million of dollars. The Taiwanese military is still much weaker than the PLA which commenced seriously modernizing following the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. The island’s topography is a big asset but this nation of 24 million people prioritized economic growth over defense spending for decades.
If Trump were to demand Taiwan pay what amounts to an “insurance premium”, what would that entail? As noted, Taipei is completely isolated militarily, with no other country committed to help them. Occasionally Japanese right wing groups advocate support for the island which Japan governed from 1895-1945 but does that indicate how Japan, a major trading partner with China and nearby to this possible conflict would act? I am unconvinced Japan would support Taiwan. What precisely would Trump expect? Would we care if Taiwan did not comply?
Arguably important as well is FPOTUS’s avowed preference for avoiding foreign intervention anywhere. Would he eschew support should an offensive attack occur against the island’s democratic regime? Under the TRA, the U.S. obligation is not to defend the island “but to provide articles of a defensive nature”. How would Trump react to that nuance? Of course the specific circumstance of any threat would matter but this question is a central one for U.S. foreign policy in the 2020s as one ponders the FPOTUS’s statements about our obligations.
Even more complicating is the FPOTUS’s oft-articulated admiration for General Secretary of the CCP, Xi Jinping. While the Trump frequently cites his prior toughness on the Chinese over trade, his overall messaging with the authoritarian ruler was mixed.
Where would all of this lead in a second Trump term? Would the Vice President, more in sync with the national security community overall regarding the Chinese threat, be able to assure his views carried the day? Would Trump’s antipathy towards defense commitments, regardless who seeks them, mean he would find a commitment by Taiwan insufficient to assure protecting the island’s suffering a PLA attack? How would the mixed messaging affect our ties with allies and partners already skittish about a second term? What long term damage, if any, would this have for the U.S. economy, taxpayers, big business, and consumers? The list, as I seem to say most days, goes on and on.
We simply do not know is the only truthful answer as I don’t think the FPOTUS knows his own mind on the Taiwan or China question, much less what his actual relationship with his Veep nominee would be in practice. J.D. Vance does not strike me as pliant in a way that most people saw (wrongly on at least one crucial question) Trump’s prior pick, Mike Pence. Yet Trump’s history is not of a man who tolerates pushback from anyone.
Trump famously said in his first campaign that his negotiating style stresses unpredictability. Here is a case where unknowns could be a matter of life and death for millions of people.
Am I overestimating the dangers here? What messages are you receiving on the foreign policy challenges for a second Trump term if he were elected? I welcome any of you to respond as I sure don’t know for certain.
Thank you for taking time to read Actions today or any day. Thanks especially for those of you who subscribe as your financial support means so much. Please feel free to circulate this to others if you find it valuable.
We had a quarter inch of rain last night and a pretty sunrise.
Be well and be safe. FIN
Caitlin Campbell, “Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues”, crsreports.gov, 7 May 2024, retrieved at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12481
Christiaan Hetzner, “Donald Trump wants Taiwan to pay for U.S. protection—and that should worry stockholders of Nvidia, Microsoft, and Tesla”, Fortune, 18 July 2024
CNN Newsroom, “Hear Trump praise dictators at New Hampshire rally“, cnn.com, 12 November 2024, retrieved at https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2023/11/12/donald-trump-comments-xi-jinping-kim-jong-un-new-hampshire-rally-se-cupp-acostanr-vpx.cnn
Susan V. Lawrence, “Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations“, crsreports.gov, 23 May 2024, retrieved at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10275
Joshua Nelken-Zitser, “VIDEO: Trump complements ‘fierce’ and ‘smart’ Putin and applauds Xi Jinping for ruling China with ‘iron fist’”, BusinessInsider.com, 4 September 2022, retrieved at https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-calls-putin-smart-praises-xi-ruling-china-iron-fist-2022-9?op=1
Patsy Widakuswara, “Trump’s VP pick Vance is pro-Israel, anti-China and crating anxiety in Europe”, voanews.com, 18 July 2024, retrieved at https://www.voanews.com/a/trump-s-vp-pick-vance-is-pro-israel-anti-china-and-creating-anxiety-in-europe/7702456.html
Mr. X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, Foreign Affairs, July 1947.
Whether Trump or Biden are elected (seems improbably that Biden will remain in the contest) they'd both be lame-duck Presidents on day-1. Even if the Republicans win majorities in both Houses, the chance for stonewalling Trump initiatives and/or tamping down foreign forays seems highly likely. If their policies are questionable, staff and Congress will just wait them out. I anticipate a lot of bluster on a variety of issues but very little in the way of long-term substance or results