the hypocrisy of illegitimacies

Uighurs and weakness

Never underestimate the motivations to show strength for a regime with limited, if any, popular legitimacy. Beijing's unceasing reminder of its power against the vulnerable Uighur minority exemplifies this proclivity to press those weakest and least powerful while avoiding the ramifications of global criticism manifested by sanctioning its exports.

This news is hardly a revelation to anyone who has studied any history. Power is a topic frequently explored in academic circles. The question of any regime's actions is a hallmark of its credibility with others because the overuse of power is inversely related to regime legitimacy. Many of us monitor these actions partially to ascribe good and evil. Being the recipient of such attempts to prove legitimacy, despite frequent, widespread disdain, nonetheless allows pain for the vulnerable around the globe; China is far from unique in using power against the vulnerable.

I confess to a fascination with the Uighurs, an Islamic population spanning several countries in Central and Southwest Asia, because it's a microscopic view of Chinese society far outside Beijing. I visited the region several times between 2002 and 2012, during which I witnessed the modernization of the region's capital, Urumqi, as part of a long-standing Communist Party of China (CCP) effort to attract millions of Han people in an attempt to disperse the minority population concentration. William Dalrymple is only the latest author, in his masterful new volume, The Golden Road, to remind us the area has been an intersection of religions and ethnic groups for millennia. Georgetown University's James Millward has written skillfully on the struggles the Uighurs have faced, even during those rare periods when genuine autonomy seemed a realistic goal.

I also saw the sheer panic on the part of PLA handlers in 2007 when National War College students asked why they could not walk around central Urumqi rather than board a bus to go into a more controlled environment. The dozen U.S. officers and senior civilians were certainly not going to make a difference in an hour's walk around the city center. Still, the PLA and CCP recognized that we would see a profound tension existing between the Uighur and Han lifestyles and standards of living in that provincial capital.

Uighurs, like the Islamic minority of Dagestan in Russia, are targets of official overreaction and blame on the grounds of presenting a security threat to society. Mass casualty events at the Kunming rail station in April 2014, six months after an incident killed five outside the iconic Forbidden City, immediately cast suspicion on Uighurs, according to CCP officials over one six-month period alone. Concerns about Uighur discontent, fueled by workplace discrimination and substantial cultural differences, were hardly new. Still, regardless of any actual actions, Uighurs were an identifiable "malcontent" minority to blame.

Xinjiang remains heavily Uighur, creating an obvious focal point for Xi Jinping's efforts to "re-educate" the Islamic majority in de facto concentration camps first widely noticed by global observers eight years ago. CCP's steps to undermine Uighur identity also include separating men from their families, threatening their livelihoods by seizing their land, and forcing the consumption of Han education rather than a more inclusive exploration of the country. The United States and the European Union rebuked Beijing by passing legislation to prevent the importation of goods produced by economically disadvantaged Uighurs. Being an adherent to Islam, much less Uighur became much tougher across the Middle Kingdom over the past decade.

Discriminating against Uighurs is, however, insufficient to slake Beijing's demands. The Party is unbending in its determination to break the Uighur culture, as reported yesterday in an extensive New York Times exposé sure to inflame already heightened tensions between Washington and the Chinese leadership. The CCP is now forcing tens of thousands of Uighurs to work in perhaps 70 widespread factories far from their home province. The decreased job opportunities in Xinjiang, coupled with incentivizing their work for employers in the global supply chain, became a two-part method of altering the previous Uighur conditions. The Times reporting, along with other sources such as the Minority Rights Group, is a sickening tale of government power deployed out of fear.

I oppose Uighurs or anyone else engaging in violence against civilians as I also condemn wholesale attempts to eradicate a culture simply because it is different: I don't care whether it's China, Iran, Russia, or anyone else. But this is a particularly pernicious behavior by regimes whose legitimacy is weak. Thus, they default to ethnic hatred to stoke some loyalty to this regime with its supposed commitment to the "normal" or "real" population of a country.

Unmistakable hypocrisy characterizes these actions precisely as these regimes beg their citizens to bear more children to buttress sinking population levels. The babies they desire, of course, are members of their preferred ethnic, religious, or other designating group, which the insecure leadership relies upon to retain power. Putin desires more Russian Orthodox babies than those in the Caucasus Islamic areas, while Xi and the CCP want Han rather than Uighur populations to grow. Continuing a brutal conflict with Ukraine undermines Putin's wishes while sending workers far and wide within China counters Zhongnanhai's aspirations. The CCP prioritizes diminishing the Uighur population at least on par with increasing China's demographics as Uighurs would never support keeping the Party in power, the highest priority overall. These discrete actions go hand in hand with the overall sense of societal malaise, contributing to the legitimacy problems that arise in the first place.

China's leaders secondarily, of course, hope to continue exporting goods despite the sanctions against such trade. By forcing Uighurs to work in these factories integrated into the global supply chain, often hundreds of miles from their families in the Xinjiang area, Uighur uniqueness diminishes as desired. Additionally, the sanctioning countries have a far more difficult process to extricate the products from these locations that employed coerced Uighurs. Since exporters seek to increase their share overseas, few in China are willing to disclose this behavior. The tri-partite research by the New York Times reporters, Der Spiegel, and the Bureau of International Journalism was a feat in itself. With Xi Jinping's unrelenting efforts to prevent anyone from disclosing unfavorable information about events in the Middle Kingdom, few organizations find and report this sort of statistic. The fear of reprisals against local individuals and their families equals the penalties faced by global organizations that dare to criticize Xi Dada, as he is sometimes affectionately labeled. Unsurprisingly, foreign businesses with their supply chain priorities overwhelmingly prefer to maintain good relations with CCP officials while ignoring what they seem to view as an internal Chinese dilemma over Uighurs (or any other group).

The CCP's manifestation of its lack of legitimacy evident in these actions is hardly unique in today's world. However, Beijing has found a relatively new method of trying to evade international criticism. The Party's obsession with eradicating critics on behalf of a mythical ethnic harmony remains at the core of their actions because that tenuous legitimacy so deeply depends on appealing to a false definition of Chinese nationalism excluding millions of "other" citizens. Too often, those outside the country become unwitting or uninterested partners in the façade of other motivations or activities. It's the weaker parties who are usually the ones who pay the profound price, in this case, the Uighurs. It is hardly accidental.

I welcome your thoughts, questions, comments, or rebuttals on this or any other Actions create consequences column. Your engagement is a vital part of this project to create measured, civil conversation on the issues of our times.

I appreciate your time today as I do every day you read a column or circulate it to others. I thank those who contribute as paid subscribers, whether monthly at $8 or annually at $55. Your support offers me opportunities to read more widely.

The clouds have returned this afternoon with major thunderstorms predicted. The rain earlier this week did endow these marvelous photographs I snapped yesterday.

Be well and be safe. FIN

William Dalrymple, The Golden Road: How Ancient India Transformed the World. New York: Bloomsbury, 2025.

Carrie Gracie, “The Knife Attack that Changed Kunming”, bbcnews.com, 16 July 2014, retrieved at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28305109

James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. revised edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 2021.

“Uyghurs in China”, Minorityrights.org, March 2024, retrieved at https://minorityrights.org/communities/uyghurs/

David Pierson, “How China Uses Work to Reshape Uighur Identity and Control a Strategic Region”, NewYorkTimes.com, 29 May 2025, retrieved at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/29/world/asia/china-uyghur-labor.html?searchResultPosition=3

David Pierson, Vivian Wong, and Daniel Murphy, “Far From Home: Uighur Workers in Factories Supplying Global Brands“, NewYorkTimes.com, 29 May 2025, retrieved at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/05/29/world/asia/china-uyghur-xinjiang-labor-transfers.html?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

Associated Press, “Tiananmen Square Crash Suspects Sought by Chinese Police”, cbc.com, 29 October 2013, retrieved athttps://www.cbc.ca/news/world/tiananmen-square-crash-suspects-sought-by-chinese-police-1.2274987