The map of Asia
What does it mean?
A recent New York Times front page contained an interactive map of the bases and associated arsenal the United States has or is in the process of consolidating in the Indo-Pacific to thwart Beijing’s ambitions in Asia. Joe Biden, building on efforts dating to the Clinton administration tentative steps with India in the final months of Bill Clinton’s tenure and subsequent administrations, is acting on solidifying steps to deter CCP leaders from acting on ambitions.
The United States has far stronger ties with Japan and Korea than at any other point, facilitating a political connection between two long-running adversaries with historic animosity. Bases across the southern portion of the Korean peninsula and the vast span of the Japanese islands offer strong geographic benefits in conjunction with the competence of two modern, high tech militaries with genuine capability and anxiety about Asia’s future.
Biden capitalised on the rising eagerness for ties with Washington as a post-Duterte Phillippines confronted a menacing PLA ignoring Filipino claims in the South China Sea. Beijing attempted to coax the anti-American nationalist Duterte into beneficial trade arrangements a decade ago but their willingness to bully Filipinos only managed to drive Manila back to Washington’s camp. As a serving U.S. official told me in January when discussing Manila’s desire for better ties, ‘I’m used to working to get countries to accept us but the Filipinos want more and more and more’. U.S. forces see better opportunity with five locations on Luzon, the northern most island, alone to assure our preparedness for event north of the Philippines nearer Taiwan or across the western Pacific in general. Facilities in southern Philippine islands serve the dual purposes of putting China on notice of bilateral Washington-Manila strength while providing always welcome assistance to the Filipinos never freed from fear about insurgencies in the more remote southern territory.
U.S. efforts to instill a greater urgency to Taiwan’s population for markedly stronger self-defense are either paying off or coinciding with indigenous recognition that the PLA might indeed not be the ‘paper tiger’ most islanders seemed to think over the past quarter century. Taiwan’s dilemma, however, is that it focused on domestic growth as PLA modernisation made intimidation efforts seem far more plausible because of the marked military inferiority the Taiwan forces suffer versus their ‘cousins’ (terminology uses often to refer to mainlanders) across the 100 mile strait. Taiwan still hopes its regional neighbours will choose to fight actively for its democracy should a conflict break out, but that remains unclear, if not dubious.
Guam, though distant in the west central Pacific, remains a crucial U.S. territory linking northern and southern Pacific partners. Continuing modernisation of Anderson Air Force Base and associated defense installations in the land of brown snakes and afternoon downpours are a message to all in the Indo-Pacific of our determination to hold our regional ground, literally, for the long-term in a competition of unknown duration.
Singapore leaders openly want to be on Team USA in this competition but no country in the world is more deft at threading tough needles than is the tiny city-state along the Strait of Malacca. Singaporeans are primary of Chinese descent which accounts for the unsurprising belief that the rank of file prefer China in the contest over Americans. While Singapore’s tiny basing options loom large because of their sophistication for American ships, this place recognises better than most the depth of Chinese efforts to achieve its ambitions through any and all instruments of statecraft .
Biden’s coup is the AUKUS arrangement which will bring Australia as the southern link in a fence developing to limit Beijing. The resulting submarines themselves won’t come on line for many years but represent a strong commitment by the Aussies and the British to inculcate American technology and advisors in a vital spot, a nation open to greater ties after a scrape with too much Chinese involvement a decade ago. The precursor base for Marines in the northern city of Darwin set the scene for greater ties. As an Australian retired Air Force officer recently told me, the intertwining of the two militaries is occurring apace and he could not imagine it failing.
Efforts remain ongoing with India as well as the other states of Southeast Asia but ambiguity characterizes the messages from Kuala Lumpur, Hanoi, Bangkok, and Jakarta. We have had little success with Phnom Penh, Vientiane, or Naypidaw as those governments enter stronger ties with a China willing to offer them assistance without requiring reform. Jakarta may adopt closer ties with Beijing should incoming president Prabowo face criticism within the body politic in Washington resulting from questions on his respect for and commitment to human rights. But Indonesia’s challenge, like all of the southeast and south Asian nations, where to put their efforts to help their own populations foremost rather than answer Washington’s concerns. Modi, in particularly, has decided differences with Beijing but has even longer-term distrust of western ideas, values, and legacies which will likely prevent the closeness Washington under any president seeks.
Biden deserves much credit for his efforts, again building on his predecessors’ work. But the problem the United States faces in Asia is impossible to ignore: China is most of Asia regardless of where we establish bases and the networks we create. As I have said repeatedly, Beijing unabashedly uses any and all instruments to coerce the behaviour it seeks but it has two overwhelming advantages of the United States, one self-inflicted and the other an imperative.
Washington chose not to ratify the Trans Pacific Partnership sought by several governments as to pressure raising for change internally to assure they qualified for eventual TPP membership. President Trump rejected the commitment but his opponent in 2016, former Secretary Hillary Clinton, had indicated she would have done the same. The TPP abdication would require us to establish a completely different, superior trade mechanism for us to be competitive with China in the Indo-Pacific. Promises of bilateral U.S. ties with regional countries are insufficient. We have no one to blame but ourselves. Trade is the primary issue in Asia rather than military power. Beijing happens to have both these days so it’s not a good position for us.
The imperative is geography, a day in and day out reality. Those located south of Colorado will have far less access to the Auroris Borealis this evening, meaning those folks in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas will likely see nothing of the massive show. Geography matters.
Geography also favour Beijing for the costs it imposes over the long term. Technology provides us some relief but not for the long term. It’s hard to supply, resupply, and respond so far from home. This is why allies and partners matter but even they may not be sufficient to assure the containment strategy we clearly are pursuing.
But how long are we willing to do this? Is it truly an open door, open credit card arrangement as that is what will be needed to secure Asia as free and open? Are we willing to spend what is required and stay in perpetuity? Why do we assume China’s aspirations will decline? What are we willing to surrender in this equation to lower the costs to something acceptable?
These are hard questions. I welcome your thoughts as I certainly don’t have sufficient answers. We need a lot more honesty about these realities. That does not mean we surrender to Beijing but it does mean we need a long chat, people.
Thank you for reading this column. Please circulate this if you find it of value. Thank you to the subscribers who spur me daily.
Be safe and be well. FIN
John Ismay, Edward Wong, and Pablo Robles, ‘A New Pacific Arsenal to Counter China’, NewYorkTimes.com, 26 April 2024, retrieved at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/04/26/us/politics/us-china-military-bases-weapons.html