those unintended things
peacekeepers?
We are going to consider some hypotheticals today. I mentioned a couple of weeks ago that having a seat at any international table has both costs and consequences; surrendering a role has the same implications. The Soviet decision to storm out of the U.N. Security Council before the June 1950 vote to send troops to Korea meant Stalin surrendered their veto to prevent such a response. Americans often detest the idea of multinational organizations, but those organizations persist and decide whether we are at the table.
I have also noted that assumptions are central to all strategy. We must identify, clarify, and hopefully challenge assumptions to ensure that we understand how we view the world.
Americans often, but hardly unanimously, disdain sending U.S. funds or personnel overseas to address problems. The current uproar about closing USAID is only the latest in two centuries of feeling our borders protect us, so why worry about the remainder of the world until threats appear in the homeland? We may have deployed peacekeepers to the Balkans in the late 1990s, but we don't like such activities. In the aftermath of the painful Afghan war between 2001 and 2021, we are especially skeptical of multinational commitments.
America First, among other things, means letting the rest of the world address the mess we believe they have created because we don’t always see the problems as relevant to our security. Our assumptions include the idea that what occurs overseas rarely reaches the homeland. Second, we assume that other countries believe that the world exploits our selfless generosity, creating expensive and unnecessary obligations. As a result, many Americans currently support what is a march towards withdrawing from NATO as a costly and annoying impediment to a more peaceful world.
Any decision to withdraw might feel good, but it might well undermine our national security over the long term. To paraphrase the message I had all over my office when I was Dean of Faculty at the National War College: What prize do we seek to achieve, and are we keeping our eyes on that beyond anything else?
Bloomberg reported this morning that the chances of PLA troops becoming the primary peacekeeping force on the ground in Europe are rising. The news item cited an article by former NATO Commander Admiral James Stavridis that he had never foreseen.
For those blithely unaware, NATO began in 1949 as a shared multinational trans-Atlantic coalition to deter Russian aggression across Europe. The Atlantic Charter of 1949 ultimately included thirty-two nations signing on to all members responding should an outside force attack any single member. Members invoked Article 5 of the Charter in September 2001 when we suffered the 9/11 attacks—thousands of NATO troops deployed alongside Americans for several years in Afghanistan in response to that incident. Ukraine, of course, has never been a member of NATO, to President Zelenskyy’s frustration.
Membership requires each government commitment to funding defense to ensure the organization is robust in its capabilities, but the organization's military forces invariably are under a U.S. four-star officer. The United States contributes most of the organization's funding to guarantee our control over the Alliance's decision-making. We also maintain military facilities and forces in theater dating from World War II, invariably reminding Russians of our commitment to NATO's peace mission or our allies. Put bluntly, we created NATO rather than fell into it because the Alliance served our needs to see a peaceful Europe.
NATO is undergoing paroxysms as the Republican Party broadly seeks to withdraw from Europe. Some favor walking away as a simple reflection of preferred isolationism and exhaustion from decades of commitments abroad, while others seek to realign U.S. forces to address a more assertive China.
Europe, for any concerns it has about that same China, more immediately faces anxiety over a reinvigorated Russia. Recent events seem to empower Vlad the Impaler to view any Ukrainian actions as concessions, aka "rewards for aggression”. Europe knows Vlad and his boys can walk to most of the continent, though their toes will get wet on the way to Iceland and Britain. Europe has a decidedly eastern threat in mind. Canada supports its European allies to the hilt, though its security is not as immediately challenged by the Kremlin.
The noteworthy part is the idea that Chinese forces could serve as peacekeepers for such an agreement. The reason for this move is not merely that Moscow and Beijing are bosom buddies these days but, as Bloomberg points out, the PLA offers more peacekeepers than any other Perm Five nation on the Security Council. Beijing would be delighted to play a peacekeeping role that someone must take on despite the "teeth and lips" buddies Vlad and Xi Jinping.
No one has committed to this, but the prospect is floating around.
If conflict ends, peacekeeping forces will most likely separate the two sides since Ukraine will remain sovereign state separate from Russia. NATO or some other U.N. country, such as Brazil or Fiji, could offer those forces, but someone will need to serve as a guarantor of the two sides' respect for the agreement. The U.S. does not appear interested in playing that role. NATO might be the logical forces but the Kremlin might not even accept that.
NATO, constituted by 3.33 million women and men under arms, is primarily U.S. forces: we contributed 1.328 million as of 2024. Without the United States in the Alliance, the forces (much less the funding) to support any mission to keep the peace in Ukraine would be daunting, if not downright impossible.
The Chinese leadership is proving delighted to fill any recent gaps we leave in our traditional global engagement, including foreign assistance, vaccines, and infrastructure development. Beijing claims a neutral, helpful position as a leader of the world. Countries focus on desired outcomes for which Beijing can help as much as worrying about Beijing's heinous activities at home or abroad because China is helping meet needs we no longer seek to address. This is a shift Beijing has desired since Zhou Enlai claimed China believed in “peaceful coexistence” at the 1955 Bandung Conference.
That is a fundamental reordering of the world of our making as much as China's. During the last several years, people talked oodles about the liberal international order under threat from Beijing, yet too many seemed to ignore the fact that we are less committed to a system from which we benefitted a great deal. Instead, many Americans blame the post-World War II order for current economic dislocation at home.
The U.S. results from globalization, like anything else, have proven beneficial for some and detrimental for others. But, public sentiment in many quarters sees the world vastly screwing us over (technical term), despite the incredible increase in our standard of living over the past three quarters of a century.
Americans often assume they practice realpolitik, pragmatic protection of national interests. Embedded in that concept is the understanding that no relationships are permanent, neither as allies nor enemies. But therein lies a challenge for Americans: if we work hard enough, we can solve conflicts, implying ultimate solutions. We never forget that allies and adversaries are not permanent but situationally dependent.
If we withdraw from NATO, Europeans believe they face a significant threat from Russia, as they have for much of the past. From Warsaw to Copenhagen or Ottawa, NATO members will take action to protect their interests. If China can help them instead of our support, they would turn to there, regardless of the threats China poses later. That is how realpolitik operates.
The CCP also recognized the power of instruments of statecraft, often as we began to shed those very tools. Pre-1992, China rarely engaged in multilateral niceties. Sure, they became a Perm 5 member of the Security Council following that body's ousting of Taiwan in 1971. Still, in the 1990s, Beijing moved into multilateralism much more forcefully by embracing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1970) and the baby steps of a few peacekeepers. China's 2001 commitment to both the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and accession to the World Trade Organization opened the door to China's growing role in these multilateral groups while illustrating Zhongnanhai's sense of confidence.
As the Bloomberg story illustrates, the PLA contributes more to peacekeepers than the other four members of the Permanent Five. This commitment to an unpleasant and frequently unsavory task allows China to argue that its actions mirror those of all nation-states at the time that Americans are withdrawing from shared global responsibilities. It's no wonder that Europe might consider PLA peacekeepers on the ground if U.S. withdrawal from NATO were to occur; it's a logical, if not unavoidable, outcome. China's troops in Europe or potentially in the Middle East would be a lesser evil than an unfettered Russian Army, in short. Europe hopes it never comes to this, but we live in interesting times.
We may be assuming—certainly some foreign policy wonks do—that Europe shares our mounting concerns about a modernizing and aggressive China. Europeans in fact experience the influence of the Belt & Road Initiative more directly than we do with projects extending to the European mainland. London worries about the new Chinese Embassy becoming a hub for PRC espionage, an all-but-certain outcome that menaces Europeans beyond Oxford Street or Warwick Castle.
However, the threat of Russia being empowered by gaining its desires in Ukraine despite massive Western opposition for three years seems a far more immediate threat to European leaders than distant China. Today's story hints that Europeans, confronted with a different dynamic than even five months ago, feel obligated to prioritize the immediate over ideological or long-term anxieties.
We often forget that other states, especially the PRC, study our successes and failures. China has modernized the PLA over the past thirty years, building on what they see as the Joint Force. The 2015/16 reforms Xi Jinping implemented created a structure with several (though certainly not all) structural characteristics. Perhaps this does not flatter us, but the evidence of such mirroring is hard to dispute, as they recognized our successes over the years. China, as a result, sees that peacekeeping adds status while also offers a foot in the door to other nations.
My point today is not to condemn those who seek to withdraw from NATO, though I disagree Europe is delinquent regarding their investment in the Alliance. Our investment has benefitted and continues to serve our interests over seventy-five years. My argument is that withdrawing from NATO may empower precisely the threat many Americans most fear: our alliance partners, facing a Russian bear, might facilitate more extensive Chinese military activities rather than lesser of them around the world.
Actions create consequences that we cannot always control or intend. My preference would be to limit, wherever possible, the reactions we do not want rather than facilitate them. National security policy often selects the lesser danger rather than the perfect option.
I welcome your thoughts on this topic. We are not there yet: the United States is still actively committed to NATO and remains a force supporting the Alliance's collective defense posture. Yet, we would be foolish not to consider the implications of the policies under consideration. Please chime in.
Thank you for your time today and every day you read Actions Create Consequences. Please consider an annual subscription for barely a dollar weekly. In any case, please circulate this column if you find it valuable.
Change your clocks tomorrow night. I know some hate Daylight Savings Time but I absolutely adore the later light of summer it brings. This was our dawn today in Eastport.
Be well and be safe. FIN
Atlantic Council experts, “How European Leaders are Responding to Trump’s approach to Ukraine and Europe”, AtlanticCouncil.org, 6 March 2025, retrieved at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/how-european-leaders-are-responding-to-trumps-approach-to-ukraine-and-europe/
John Liu, “Xi’s Troops in Europe?”, Bloomberg: Next China Newsletter, 7 March 2025.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC, “Wang Yi on Ukraine Crisis: No One Wins in a Conflict but Everyone gains in peace”, MInistry of Foreign Affairs,People’s Republic of China, 7 March 2025, retrieved at https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202503/t20250307_11570143.html
“Number of active military personnel in NATO countries in 2024”, Statistica.com, retrieved at https://www.statista.com/statistics/584286/number-of-military-personnel-in-nato-countries/
Diana Stancy, “‘Amerexit?’ Republicans Push for US to leave NATO amid stalled Ukrainian peace negotiations”, Yahoo!news.com, 3 March 2025, retrieved athttps://www.yahoo.com/news/amerexit-republicans-push-us-leave-231810814.html
James Stavridis, “Europe is Getting Ready for the End of NATO”, Bloomberg.com, 5 March 2025, retrieved athttps://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2025-03-05/europe-is-getting-ready-for-the-end-of-nato?cmpid=BBD030725_CN&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&utm_term=250307&utm_campaign=china
“Xi Addresses Conference Marking 70th Anniversary of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, CCTV Video News Agency, 28 June 2024, retrieved athttps://duckduckgo.com/?q=peaceful+coexistence&iax=videos&ia=videos&iai=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DYpwI00CHNVw