time and diplomacy
how does the instrument work?
Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced this morning that we will “move on” if the Ukrainian war isn’t resolved soon. Rubio’s tacit recognition of the challenges of advancing conversation on resolving the profound differences between Russia and Ukraine shows how hard diplomacy is, even for a superpower. It turns out diplomacy is not synonymous with negotiating leases on buildings in Pittsburgh.
I am not arguing that the United States always wins over others to our positions due to negotiation; that would be demonstrably false. We have yet, despite decades of meetings, to convince Iran to abandon nuclear aspirations as truewith India, Pakistan, or North Korea. We could not end the current Middle Eastern conflagration under Biden or Trump. China still treats too many of its people poorly despite generations of diplomats arguing our concerns to Beijing. The list sadly goes on.
The Northern Ireland negotiations took decades but ultimately resulted, after persistent negotiation, in the Good Friday Accord, which is still in place after twenty-eight years. It may not be perfect but the sustained efforts, following stops and starts, led to fewer killings and more settled conditions for Northern Ireland.
Diplomats are key to our sustained conversation with other countries. They provide a crucial channel to represent our interests by being on the ground and in contact with counterparts defending what they see as their national interests on behalf of their governments.
Secretary Rubio’s statement, however, illustrates a key difference between our all-too-frequent use of diplomacy and that of other countries: We anticipate diplomacy will achieve our desired results fairly rapidly. That is often not the case. I cannot quantify how frequently it does (or does not) occur, but any of us can recall positions we hold that other nations have ignored.
It’s seductive to argue that diplomats are inept, not dedicated, nor seeking to undermine any administration’s position on a particular subject. I suppose any of those arguments could be correct. Still, I am skeptical that the Foreign Service Officers I have known for decades would put their interests above the national ones. Diplomats rarely have any domestic constituency per se, but they are dedicated supporters of the national interest. They work for the individual duly elected to defend the Constitution, as does any military officer since public servants all have the same responsibility to do so. However, the State Department often confronts challenges with dramatically longer timelines since negotiation is frequently slow, deliberate, calibrated, and then recalibrated. Diplomats may appear to work at the speed of a glacier moving downhill while breakthroughs can occur rapidly when conditions have been allowed to develop.
Diplomacy is an iterative set of conversations.
Diplomats cannot use the harsh force that militaries can to resolve a problem. They do not involve the coercive means of sanctions, but those actions invariably also require far longer to achieve success than the military instrument.
Why is this negotiating process so slow? States defend their national interests, but their positions often conflict with ours.
Perhaps more importantly, we have a short attention span on many topics. American impatience with achieving desired outcomes is notoriously high because we see everything as solvable. Suppose we find the correct configuration for governance in Gaza and the West Bank. In that case, the Palestinians can be satisfied along with the Israelis despite profound differences in their assumptions, interests, and experiences. Suppose we explain to China that Taiwan has been under separate governance for 130 years from the mainland. In that case, Beijing will have to accept (in the eyes of many) that Taiwan will not necessarily reunify without an extremely high cost to the world. Whether we can even get Beijing to accept that position is not part of our calculation, as we did not consider whether an independent, democratic South Vietnam could ever result from the government in Saigon from 1954 through 1975. To our credit, we have a fundamentally optimistic vision that effort, applied right, can get to the outcome we find most appropriate.
Much of the world does not see things quite that unambiguously. The DPRK appears, as of 18 April 2025, unwilling to tolerate the vulnerability that surrendering its nuclear program would entail. The lessons the Kim dynasty took from Muammar Qaddafy’s 2011 fall in Libya following Saddam Hussein’s ouster almost a decade earlier were that nuclear weapons protect the regime’s survival. The interests Pyongyang has for its survival are far different from wanting to see a peaceful Korean peninsula divided between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea, much less one under participatory democracy from north to south.
However, the intractability of some of these interests is not a reason to stop diplomacy. Diplomatic engagement does not aim to resolve conflicts but provides a better understanding of the parties involved. It’s hard to overstate this central value diplomats offer. The ability of governments to keep channels open in case of crisis rather than having to create them during dangerously heightened tensions ought not be underestimated. If nothing else, ongoing diplomacy is an insurance policy against bad things when talks do become necessary in a crisis. Diplomacy may provide minor insight into divisions or personalities that play out years later to help solve problems.
The idea that the United States should walk away from the negotiations over Ukraine leads to questions worth pondering. Is it a forcing function to drive one or both sides to reconsider their positions? Probably, but not necessarily one that will satisfy those Americans who still believe fiercely in Ukraine’s position in this conflict. Bilateral talks between the enemies made little progress before our engagement, a characteristic I fear would recur without our role at the table.
Is Secretary Rubio saying we no longer see value in these talks because Ukraine and Russia have not agreed to a resolution over the past 90 days? Was that realistic to begin with?
What could motivate the parties to shift from their current positions to a more desirable end? I have repeatedly said I doubt Vlad the Impaler seeks peace because he has established a narrative that he will defend as a historical reality, much as the CCP claims Taiwan has always been part of China. Yet, diplomats might chip away at either of those obstacles by suggesting reinterpretations of positions. Without continuing participation, however, that would be impossible to accomplish. Our impatience could be a negotiating tactic, but coupled with reduced support and haranguing of Vlodomir Zelenskyy for starting the conflict, it doesn’t seem to indicate we see value in negotiating with these two states.
American diplomats anchored global negotiations for decades following World War II. Suppose we do walk away from this diplomacy. Time was when our absence was notable, but today, Beijing, Moscow’s ally and our adversary, seeks to fill the voids we leave on the chessboard. The CCP decided to act as an “honest broker” for negotiations between Riyadh and Teheran just over two years ago, a surprise development for a government long on the sidelines for brokering efforts between contentious states. I have little doubt Beijing would love to swoop in again on Ukraine. The difference is it is allied with Russia, which would hardly be a neutral position. Still, a war-weary Ukraine watching Washington withdraw could decide it had no option but to capitulate to Vlad’s demands. Burnishing the negotiating skills would enhance Beijing’s position as more reliable than Washington.
Perhaps the discussions behind closed doors are closer than we realize, spurring Rubio’s tactic. But Americans must remember that most of the world acts far more slowly, deliberately, and nationalistically than we seem to appreciate. I hope we are not solely blaming the diplomats for applying their craft, as this would fundamentally misunderstand what how that instrument of statecraft serves us, day in and day out. That would truly be dangerous.
I welcome your thoughts on this question as the Ukraine war approaches its 38th month. Please do chime in as that is the point to Actions create consequences.
I appreciate your time. I am especially thankful for those who support this column with a paid subscription as it allows me to read so broadly.
It’s Easter weekend and the end of Passover. I wish you joy, peace, and outdoor time.
Be well and be safe. FIN
“Good Friday Agreement: What is it?”, BBC.com, 3 April 2023, retrieved at https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-61968177
Luke Harding, “US ready to abandon Ukraine peace deal if there is no progress, says Marco Rubio”, TheGuardian.com, 18 April 2025, retrieved at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/18/us-ready-to-abandon-ukraine-peace-deal-if-there-is-no-progress-says-marco-rubio
“Iran-Saudi Arabia deal casts China in unfamiliar global role”, APnews.com, 13 March 2023, retrieved at https://apnews.com/article/china-saudi-arabia-iran-global-mediator-45ec807c8fd2b2aa65eef4cc313b739d