triggering Vlad the Impaler?

questions after Kyiv invades

Is there actually a point when Vlad the Impaler will panic? Put differently, how serious is Vlad about his periodic threats about nuclear weapons? Do we know what the tipping point is?

This month marks 79 years since the only instances—two, to be precise—of nuclear weapons use in conflict occurred. Only at Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 followed by a second device at Nagasaki three days later did the United States use these incredibly deadly devices against our Japanese enemies. War between Japan and the United States was in its third year, though Japan continued fighting in the summer of 1945. That stubbornness spurred allied preparations for a ground invasion of the main islands, likely leading to hundreds of thousands of further deaths. President Truman used the brand new weapons to preclude that ground invasion.

Thankfully, no regime has felt the need to replicate these actions. The point, however, is not to question Harry Truman’s decision to use this new weapon after a bitter war that had extended across so much of the Pacific. The newly developed bombs, only tested less than a month before deployed, were a relatively new form of warfare. The new weapons were mercilessly more efficient.

The Hiroshima atomic blast snuffed out 78,000 instantly but ultimately cost almost double that number within five months while Nagasaki similarly suffered 27,000 deaths immediately, with 70,000 by the end of the calendar year. Further deaths resulted from long-term effects of the radiation. In short, atomic reactions used against humans is deadly, depending on the size of the detonation.

Putin has dangled the nuclear threat from about two weeks into his 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Thus far, it appears an idle threat but would he do so? This column won’t answer that but it is a serious question the world out realise has major possible consequences.

A deeply persuasive taboo against using these weapons as a normal tool of warfare remains in place so far. The United States, Britain, France, China, Israel (unacknowledged by the government but is widely accepted as true), North Korea, India, and Pakistan maintain atomic arsenals as deterrents against possible threats to their existence. The damage is generally recognized as so horrifying as to stop anyone for using them EXCEPT in the most dire of cases because the weapons would justify murdering innocent civilians as a result of one of these blasts. The Soviets, for all of the ills of their system, remained members of the deterrent club.

To normalize using them would be to accept the immediate deaths and long term radiation effects in surrounding areas. The world’s ability to maintain this de facto prohibition is actually rather remarkable over the past nine decades but remains an ever more fragile condition, it would appear.

Vlad the Impaler, however, rather casually introduces talk of using of these devices as if they were a tank he intended to throw into the conflict against Ukraine rather than a weapon with massive implications. And it is not as if the effects would be only relevant for the hated Ukrainians armed forces but also for the civilian populations of surrounding states—including his own. He does not shy from the threat, however.

In particular, Vlad has said Russia would use nuclear weapons—size unspecified—should the country’s sovereignty be threatened. It’s an interesting use of terminology since he also claims Ukraine is a historic part of Russia rather than a sovereign entity of its own. Is this terminology similar to China’s statements about nuclear weapons and Taiwan, considered a domestic portion of the Middle Kingdom though the island has not been under Beijing’s control since 1895. Beijing has said that nuclear weapons on the island would be a cases belli, a reason for the PLA to respond, presumably because the nukes would violate Chinese sovereignty. To my understanding, Putin has not qualified his threats in that manner but it would seem possible he is using the same argument.

Regardless of the precise justification, the Kremlin leader repeatedly noting that Russia could respond with radioactive devices is hardly impossible. He is head of a government that regularly murders its opponents, incarcerates innocent foreigners to provide hostages to exchange for Russians caught in illegal activities in the west, and launched a completely fabricated war against its neighbor two and a half years ago next week. Putin’s army chews up young Russian men it “recruits” at an alarming rate as the Russians attempt to fill in for the 50,000 confirmed dead as of last April (Some question whether that figure is high enough to account for the poor leadership and ineptitude of the ground forces during this invasion).

We also have evidence that Vlad has a paranoid streak, which does not instill greater predictability of his actions. While he is photographed more regularly surrounded by aides than during the pandemic when he notably sat afar from everyone down a long, empty table, he is a leader who trusts those whose views are completely in sync with his own. He is a prime candidate for groupthink: hearing the views too often completely aligned with his own because the people he engages with seek to please him, dependent upon him for their political and economic positions, or because they can’t imagine differing from his whims. It’s one thing to say someone is an ally of a western leader such as President Emmanuel Macron or Prime Minister Keir Starmer but those in a participatory system often stake out their own positions to allow for political futures or out of integrity (yes, I do believe it lives). In Russia, Vlad is completing more than a quarter century of being the sole decision-maker (or breaker) in the Federation.

use of even tactical, smaller nuclear devices on the battlefield would shatter the aforementioned taboo. NATO forces might have carried such smaller weapons during the Cold Was as we feared the Red Army could overrun central Europe but few western leaders threatened to actually use them. Tactical devices would have helped only when other options ran out.

Or is Putin thinking of any actions that challenge his version of facts on the ground as being an existential threat for himself, thus for Russia? It’s hard to get into his mind to know.

The current Ukrainian incursion into Russia proper risks triggering Vlad’s profound anxieties. The New York Times today argued that Ukraine’s ability to get onto Russian soil lays bare the vulnerability and ultimate futility of a failing Russia, despite Putin’s bravado. Certainly most analysts saw the Ukrainian move this week as a surprise by the Zelenskyy government that has appeared on its back foot for so much as the past year as Republicans prevented the Biden administration from sending arms to Kyiv. Yet, how much does it concern Putin about his glowing reports to the nation of unfettered successes?

What is the red line beyond which Putin decides to react? As the war drags on into the final half of a third year, his perpetual optimism and justification surely wear thin to the Russians losing their sons (in a society already suffering tremendous demographic demise) in an enduring conflict, even if it purportedly aims to reunite a lost portion of “Mother Russia”. Putin has proved adept at surviving western sanctions, isolation, and initially lukewarm support from his buddies in Beijing and Pyongyang. Perhaps he can continue ignoring any Ukrainian actions as long as he controls the narrative and wears down a smaller nation.

Ukraine, of course, could fail in this effort, forcing a retrenchment back in its own boundaries. So many unknowns on Russia and Ukraine, among a raft of global concerns.

Yet, nuclear weapons are the one thing Vlad has. They are sovereign Russian arms. Vlad is already on horrible terms with the rest of the western world, unlikely to ever earn their respect and completely unable to garner their trust. Would there be a point at which he feels his grasp of sovereignty—however he defines it—becomes too impaired so Vlad can claim Russia’s sovereignty threatened?

Would the rest of the world ignore the use of nuclear weapons, seeing it as the actions of a madman? Would the use goad one of Vlad’s few friends, Kim Jong-un, to use nuclear weapons? Would Russia’s use against Ukraine trigger a NATO nuclear response since Kyiv is not a member of the Alliance at present? Would this end the teetering Nuclear Non Proliferation regime or actually reinforce it? Actions and consequences, consequences and actions.

I don’t know where this will go, though many of you may have outstanding analysis that would be helpful for all. I imagine you certainly have ideas, particularly if you are closer to the conflict in another part of the world or served in uniform. I welcome your thoughts as this is a matter apparently with us into the foreseeable future.

Thank you for reading Actions today. Please forward this if you find it relevant. Thanks to the subscribers or occasional readers as you keep me going.

What a world we live in. Be well and be safe. FIN

Olga Ivshina, Becky Dale and Kristy Brewer, “Russia’s meat grinder soldiers—50,000 confirmed dead”, BBC.com, 17 April 2024, retrieved at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-68819853

Associated Press, “Putin warns again that Russia is ready to use nuclear weapons if its sovereignty is threatened”, AP.com, 13 March 2024, retrieved at https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-putin-nuclear-weapons-82ced2419d93ae733161b56fbd9b477d

Reuters Fact Check, “Hiroshima and Nagasaki hit by nuclear bombs in 1945, radiation dissapated”, reuters.com, 28 August 2023, retrieved at https://www.reuters.com/article/fact-check/hiroshima-and-nagasaki-hit-by-nuclear-bombs-in-1945-radiation-dissipated-idUSL1N3A9220/

Anton Troianovski and Alina Lobzina, “Ukraine’s Incursion Into Russia Flips the Script on Putin“, NewYorkTimes.com, 15 August 2024, retrieved at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-incursion-putin.html