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trials and tribulations of expanding NATO

Russia’s invasion of and war in Ukraine enters its 11th month, longer than many feared when it began on 24 February 2022. Support for the Zelenskii government in Kyiv warms the hearts of many democrats around the world while providing relief to those who wondered if the western alliance, broadly defined, could sustain an extended challenge. We are there and so far, as I noted earlier this week, things are pretty healthy.

Then there is NATO expansion which is not so healthy. A year ago, Finland and Sweden, those two democratic states far to the north of Europe and wary of their relative proximity to Putin’s borders because of their positions along the Baltic Sea, were not particularly talking about NATO membership. Instead, each had a unique set of relationships with other states and organisations likely to satisfy security needs.

Russia’s aggression spurred both states to apply for NATO membership in 2022. For many who want to universalise the seventy year old alliance, this was most welcome news. NATO confronting Russia with an extended line of states to its west was a message that Vladimir Putin could not mistake: a firm, united Europe rejecting Russia’s ridiculous rewriting of history to satisfy Putin’s peculiar historical fantasies. Sweden and Finland also were relatively wealthy states with educated populations and stable governments to support the western liberal notions that Putin’s narcissistic kleptocracy certainly did not.

Unfortunately, the 28 members of the North Atlantic Alliance need the 29th and 30th NATO signatories to agree to this move. Hungary, with its volatile, dictator Viktor Orban ultimately claims he will agree to the move as of next month. Orban is prickly in the best of times and downright hostile to many of the values this Alliance cherishes but he does appear likely to concur with the accession plans.

Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan, striving for his third decade as that pivotal country’s ruler, is a far greater hurdle to the process. Erdogan’s relationship with the west has always been touchy as the Islamic elements supporting him strive to distance themselves from largely Christian Europe at the same time the link to NATO provides massive credibility for any regime in Ankara to show its importance to the post-world War II international security regime. This is quite a balancing of interests. NATO wants and used Turkey historically but Islamic forces have made this a hard nation for the Alliance for several years, particularly during conflicts in predominantly Islamic countries like Afghanistan and Iraq.

Turkey’s long-sought entry to the European Union has never materialised because Europe does not welcome an Islamic state with a majestic history of the Ottoman Turkish empire but only a glancing commitment to democracy and free markets. Turkey recognises that these two last conditions are not always observed fully across Europe but none of the other states in the Union have the proud Islamic culture Erdogan and his voters embrace. Turkey’s retribution for Europe’s economic reluctance is to hold a key card in the game played over NATO membership.

My description simplifies an extraordinarily complex set of factors on all sides. I don’t mean to trivialise them but they pertain in different ways on different questions. The ultimate problem for NATO is that Erdogan sees Sweden as a possible venue for anti-Turkish forces, linked to the hated Kurdish minority in Turkey, to trumpet their distrust of the Turkish ruler and the overall desire to free Turks from Ankara’s grip. As long as Erdogan, in a heated reelection campaign, fears empowering the Kurds in any manner, enhacing NATO’s strength rates well down the list of Erdogan’s priorities, if not dead last.

Overlying all of this is Erdogan’s occasional footsie over the last few years with Putin, leading NATO to wonder about his reliability in any case as a member of the Alliance. Unpredictability rules on Turkey and NATO, period.

Finland may go forward without Sweden to access the Alliance. It is free to do so and others within the Alliance would welcome Helsinki joining as Putin wishes he could prevent the move. This is simply not as desirable but definitely more feasible as Eerdogan does not oppose Helsinki belonging.

Stockholm’s path is harder to see, though Erdogan could suffer defeat in his May reelection bid. This outcome is unknown at this point but NATO could prefer including the Swedes in the fold earlier, rather than later.

At this point, however, Erdogan is unwilling to join his partners in welcoming the new members. The power of one state often defeats many others’ desires.FIN