Vietnam and the future

incompatibilities?

Vietnam. The word conjures up different memories according to the generation, I suspect. For the men and the few women who served there half a century ago, often losing friends to enemy fire before returning home to jeers and dissatisfaction from those they deployed to protect, countless jumbled thoughts must cross their minds as they think back on their tours in country. Memories of the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in late April 1975 is as fresh as the 9/11 attacks.

For those who never served but lived through the evolution of national inquiry about our actions, Vietnam was a central issue in our nation’s faith in fellow citizens and distrust of institutions. Richard Nixon, Lyndon Johnson, and Vietnam all wove together into lies, disappointment, frustration, and a desire to register profound doubt and distrust to those in power.

For yet others, Vietnam is the birthplace of pho and the delicacies of a national cuisine symbolising the truly international nature of this country’s heritage. The war is an unknown, sometimes referred to by others. The new generations of Vietnamese- Americans, for this generation, indicate our embrace of others as decades roll on but I have to wonder if this generation knows of the Boat People?

In other words, what Vietnam means to individuals results from their personal experiences in the past.

Nationally, Vietnam and a markedly improved potential strategic relationship represent hopeful instruments to enhance U.S. national security. That nation, both with its population kissing 100 million and an economic dynamism allowing 6.3% growth this year, tantalises the United States by provding access to a greater role in Southeast Asia. This region, straddling the Strait of Malacca and the forming southern, eastern, and western rims of the South China Sea among its other attributes, is a place for hope, opportunities, and partnerships.

U.S. national interests, highlighted by President Biden’s visit this weekend, rest on expanding our links to Hanoi to pull it into the U.S. orbit. The United States is offering to increase trade between our nations, provide climate assistance to a nation needing to buffer its food production, reinforce its claims against CCP nationalist actions in the South China Sea, and perhaps even opening a Cold War relic, Cam Ranh Bay, to U.S. forces as a powerful sign of Washington’s long term return to an area from which we could not withdraw quickly enough half a century ago.

International relations, however, rely on satisfying the interests of all potential partners. Washington does have the potential to offer Vietnam technical assistance on addressing climate change implications. Washington can provide financial assistance and trade incentives to Vietnam. Washington and Hanoi definitely share concerns about Beijing’s aggression to ‘protect’ its self-proclaimed waters and natural resources in the South China Sea. Those are definitely shared concerns.

Looming in the background, of course, is the almost never ending American concern about China, Vietnam’s northern neighbour. No love exists between these two Asian states, regardless of how the U.S. view Beijing. China controlled two-thirds of Vietnam centuries ago, a memory angrily depicted by the national history displays in Hanoi. Beijing’s last fought ground conflict—poorly—against seasoned Vietnamese forces in early 1979. While Beijing declared the traditional ‘We taught Vietnam a lesson’, the Southast ASian state thwarted PLA actions pretty effectively.

The United States seeks allies and partners throughout Asia to remind the Chinese of U.S. links and intentions to remain a Pacific power. A success in creating a Vietnamese partnership would strengthen U.S. messaging across the world.

Two substantial obstacles, however, prevent the strong partnership desired by multiple U.S. administrations because these barriers result from Vietnam’s interests.

Geography matters in Asia as it does elsewhere as Vietnam will forever share an extensive border with China, meaning the nature of day-to-day links as well as more grandiose symbolism, inevitably reminds Hanoi of China’s role in the region. Citizens of Chinese heritage constitute roughly 1% of the population, low compared with Thailand or Indonesia, but notable because Han Chinese words are influential in the Vietnamese language and those of Chinese heritage are heavily involved in the country’s economy.

Indeed, Vietnam’s single greatest trading partner is China despite the differences over claims in the South China Sea and Vietnamese anger at many selfish Chinese activiites. In particular, Beijing’s continuing dam construction of the rivers originating in the PRC but flowing as the lifelines of South and Southeast Asia creates major heartburn in Vietnam as it also influences vital rice and fish production for the national diet. But, Vietnam has limited leverage over its much larger and consistently self-aggrandising neighbour. And that will not change.

Additionally, the establishment of the People’s Republic of Vietnam, built on the Marxist-Leninist Communism in place in China, created strong bonds between the two ruling parties. These ideological links guarantee that Vietnam will acquiesce to Beijing’s concerns if the past is any indication of future behaviour.

Oddly enough, there is little apparent grasp of this reality in the same Washington seeking enhanced long-term links with one of those Marxist-Leninist parties. Our preference for democratic regimes generates more anxiety in Marxist-Leninist governments as we talk periodically, but consistently, about eliminating the Communists in Beijing. Does that mean we would allow the Hanoi Party to survive? They definitely doubt it, particularly when calls of hypocrisy occur as Biden visits Vietnam.

Whatever Chna’s threat against Vietnam, the Communists of the two states have no incentive to eliminate each other. Washington’s actions, albeit with decidedly mixed results over the decades, contributes to anxiety about closer ties for whatever purpose. Regimes without popular legitimacy, particularly when they engage in repressive actions en lieu of democrataic support, cannot view Washington’s intentions as purely aimed at China. Americans return to human rights policies, nudging ‘reforms’, and various other actions the Vietnamese Communists have no incentive to pursue. As Dr. Zach Abuza of the National War College reminds us. this is pretty fundamental as a barrier to much deepening.

President Biden’s visit will enhance the popular opinion regarding Americans as President Obama’s trip did almost a decade ago. Evidence is that Vietnamese popular views of enhanced connections would be favourable but the Party’s reluctance is an existential concern which will outweigh any public opinion.

Another twist forgotten almost a decade later were the aspirations some Vietnamese had for the Trans Pacific Partnership which Washington abandoned, despite having negotiated it, in 2017. Some Vietnamese hoped the TPP, with its environmental standards, would have provided pressure on the country’s leadership to embrace actions ignored in the Southeast Asian state. Without Washington’s commitment to the TPP, the Vietnamese Communists could also reject those environmental standards. The voices of despair within the Vietnamese community were surprisingly common among those I spoke with (admittedly a relatively small sample) at the time. We are not as good at recognising that our actions create consequences when they are negative.

Is it worth the actions Biden is offering to enhance trade, to support food production, to show that Amerians seek a more properous Vietnam regardless of China in the equation? Of course it is but in a polarised Washington environment focused so intently on China this benefit may not get the attentnion it deserves. Time will tell. We Americans like all-or-nothing as we are not nearly as good at nuance and incremental improvements as we think we are.

The relationahip with Vietnam most definitely is already markedly different from 10 September 1973 (after Kissinger signed the ‘peace accord’ with Le Duc Tho) or 10 September 1995 as the Clinton decision to reestablish diplomatic relations led to a Hanoi embassy and thaw in ties. For many in the United States, Vietnam is still a horrible sore on our national psyche but it’s a distant past for many others. We have a new sustained relationship 27 years in the making which continues evolving. Time will tell how that ultimately ends but we must recall Vietnam seeks to be a sovereign state in a bilateral relationship with us rather than an instrument to achieve our containment of China; no one wants to be an instrument but always prefer being a de facto equal.

What are your thoughts on an enhanced relationship with Vietnam? How ought we factor human rights into our priorities? Can we successfully defeat geographic advantages Beijing has in this region as we link with other states?

Thank you for reading Actions Create Consequences. I look forward to your thoughts. Please restack (button below) or email others if you think this would appeal to someone else. Thank you especially to the subscribers who support this work.

We got our rain, now we have a beaitulf sunny Sunday afternoon. Graualism here, too, I suppose. Have a safe week and be well. FIN

---

Hannah Beech, ‘Vietnam Chases Secret Russian Arms Deal, Even as Deepens U.S. Ties’, nytimes.com, 9 September 2023, retrieved at https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/09/world/asia/vietnam-russia-arms-deal.html?name=styln-biden-vietnam&region=TOP_BANNER&block=storyline_menu_recirc&action=click&pgtype=Article&variant=undefined

Sui Lee Mee, ‘Vietnam and U.S. Forge Deeper Ties as Worries Rise About China’, nytimes.com, 8 September 2023, retrieved at https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/08/world/asia/biden-vietnam-china.html?name=styln-biden-vietnam&region=TOP_BANNER&block=storyline_menu_recirc&action=click&pgtype=LegacyCollection&variant=undefined

Worldmeter, ‘Population of Vietnam’, 10 September 2023, retrieved at https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/vietnam-population/