Hints are emerging that the Kremlin and the Zelenskyy government in Kyiv are moving towards negotiations to close their devastating decade of conflict. Each side clearly has its priorities which could easily derail any such efforts, if true, but the trauma on both sides is proving substantial, if not permanently damaging both to the societies and regimes.
President-elect Trump campaigned on the power of his personality to solve this problem, along with others, on his inauguration day but that still appears unlikely. Based on a report I heard early this morning with a Semafor.com reporter (whose name I apologize for not noting at the time on “Way too early with Jonathan Lemire”), the Russian position does not align well with points Trump interlocutors are suggesting as the preferred outcome, casting some doubt on how probable genuine negotiations (as opposed to demands as precondition à la Beijing to commencing discussions) will be. We simply don’t know yet—nor does anyone on the field of fire nor in any other capital around the globe. Time will tell, to use that trite but perennially applicable phrase.
It’s hard to imagine Vlad the Impaler can view this as anything other than his annus horribilis in any case.
It’s worth considering the damage this conflict hath wrought, however. Ukrainian losses in physical infrastructure are vast, particularly in eastern cities such as Kharkiv or any other sites where the traditional Russian “way of war” applied indiscriminate attacks to break their adversary’s will. Photographs of the devastation will remind the world of the Russian miscalculation for decades, if not centuries. The continuing conflict is destroying infrastructure, irreplaceable historic treasures, and the way of life for millions, particularly in Ukraine but even across the Russian border.
The financial cost to rebuild Ukraine will be enormous with few obvious sources of wealth guaranteed committed to do so. The greatest cost will be any credibility, respect, or trust offered to Russians.
The death and human destruction is similarly astonishing, not least because it’s occurred over a full decade. Estimates indicate the number of post-2022 casualties exceed a million out of a population of 38 million. Additionally burdensome for Ukraine is the refugee flight which accounts for perhaps 14 million, whether the 8 million people internally displaced or the additional 6 million who fled their homeland altogether. In short, the demographic upending of this nation will be substantial, affecting its ability to remain a global breadbasket for the future.
But it’s Russia’s failures that most startle, including losing two thousand soldiers a day in late November. Russian history is replete with examples of various czars sacrificing soldiers as if feeding raw meat into a grinder; this campaign yet one more repulsive example. The exploitation of poor, vulnerable conscripts unable to escape the system, however, truly blows the mind when we ponder that merely thirty-six years ago, the United States feared the omnipotence of the Soviet Army. Estimates, admittedly with no incentive for the Kremlin to be honest, exceed 700,000 losses though many (including me) thought Russia’s size difference would allow them to crush Ukraine easily.
Vlad, of course, reminds us of his nuclear weapons when tallies of his weaknesses appear. Yes, he has nuclear weapons but he has a whole lot of disappointments, painful bargains, and incoherencies as well.
Instead of quick victory, Vlad the Impaler persists through throwing his diminishing youth population into repetitive, grinding ground operations as he also launches wide-scale long-range missile strikes. The determined military effort, whether on the ground, in the air, with drones or missiles, or shooting down commercial aircraft provides a unifying veneer for a society struggling with generational loss and hopelessness while yearning for a purported national greatness evaporating before their eyes as an invincible force, despite Vlad’s and the Russian Orthodox priesthood’s exhortations. Yet these circumstances also show unmistakably that his system is fragile and the antithesis of an agile superpower dominating the world as his mythology proclaims.
Russia’s debilitating, inexorable losses created a consequence of some interest: North Korean troops coming to Moscow’s aid. These DPRK troops are not particularly helpful as green fighting forces but offer Putin more force with which to perpetuate the conflict. This was an unexpected miscalculation by a frustrated leader in Pyongyang hoping to assert himself as a player while showing his alliance with a long-term friend of dubious quality. DPRK troops are getting combat experience but they must get home alive to apply lessons learned.
Vlad’s long-time buddy and Middle East bulwark Bashar al-Assad toppled from power earlier this month in Damascus. Providing yet further evidence of Russia’s choices to support unpopular—at home and abroad—authoritarians, Bashar and family will spend their time in Moscow at Vlad’s pleasure into the future. Those pitiful relationships remind oligarchs as well as foreign liberals where Putin’s priorities lie—never with native populations, but with isolated authoritarians willing to humor him in exchange for some specific benefit. Putin is a master a transactional international politics these days.
Teheran, another partner in isolation, has hardly had a good year as Israel has undermined its position in Lebanon and Iran proper. Plus, Iran favored Al-Assad for years, leaving the Kremlin’s ensconced as power as dramatically decreased over the past twelve months.
Russia’s dependence on China is seemingly ever more vital—and curious. While Putin and Xi Jinping declared the strategic partnership between the two great authoritarian regimes years ago, Putin’s desperation forces him to remain in China’s shadow, a noteworthy point. Putin’s craving to return his Motherland to some fanciful posture butts up against the reality of being the dependent partner in an unbalanced marriage of convenience. Neither the Kremlin nor Zhongnanhai is filled with patient guys who enjoy playing second fiddle; each needs to prove unique triumphs to mollify their potentially restive populations. Being the weaker state in an alliance risks personal credibility. You can’t claim you are returning to greatness when you are willing to let someone else call the shots.
Russia’s economy screams mono-culture export status, with extractive resources its legitimate comparative advantage over the rest of the world. While Middle Eastern petro states have similarly potent carbon-energy capacities, Russia also has a plethora of additional natural resources widely sought abroad. Beijing alone (not to mention Teheran) increasingly craves self-sufficiency should Washington attempt to impose crippling sanctions in some future crisis. Vlad lacks the internal economic engines of the United States, Germany, or China but can compensate to a great degree by exporting, regardless of harsh western sanctions, the natural resources and energy to satisfy Beijing’s bottomless demand.
Putin’s objectives to recapture Russia’s position as a feared empire using whatever options available should surprise no one. But the Kremlin’s willingness to play second fiddle to an empire with whom its historic animosities and not-too-subtle reminders of “unequal treaty” agreements over the centuries are well known is a bit more problematic for a neo-czarist bent on reviving fear of Russia’s power. China and Russia have militaries weary of each other, based on centuries of distrust over Central Asia at a minimum. Yet the Ukraine debacle forces Putin to curry Xi Jinping’s favor to assure assistance—or at least not incur Xi’s wrath for another headache for the Kremlin.
Vlad likely cannot wait to celebrate the turn into 2025 with hopes that Mr. Trump’s avowed disinterest in international entanglements will prove a respite from Ukraine’s counterpressure. The problem is Putin has built a case on reabsorbing an illegitimate Ukraine to prevent his own population from asking what he has done for them lately. That’s quite a task for an aging revisionist historian and spy master. No wonder it’s been an annus horribilis for Vlad.
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It was a stunning morning, pink and orange as only late December or January usually can be.
Have a safe, happy weekend as we prepare for 2025. May you get some rest as Harry Truman did.
Be well and be safe. FIN
Joe Edwards, “Russia’s Daily Losses in Ukraine Pass Grim New Milestone: Kyiv”, Newsweek.com, 29 November 2024, retrieved at https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-war-russia-losses-2000-daily-first-time-1993372
Mersiha Gadzo, “Record high deaths in Russia-Ukraine war: what you should know”, Aljezeera.com, 16 October 2024, retrieved at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/16/russia-ukraine-wartime-deaths
“Ukraine”, worldometer.com, 27 December 2024, retrieved at https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ukraine-population/
“Way too early with Jonathan Lemire”, msnbc.com, 27 December 2024