'world class' means?

some thoughts on terminology versus interests

I participated in a National Bureau of Asian Research meeting this past weekend as I noted Saturday. It was some of the most engaged analysts in the U.S. Government as well as some non-governmental and non-U.S. scholars, most of whom have exquisite Chinese and spend their whole working lives parsing the specific terminology the CCP uses in discussing the future. To say it was a motivated crew understates it a bit. Kudos to NBR for hosting such a conversation.

We spent almost an hour yesterday morning on the question of what does China seek from Xi Jinping’s proclamation several years back that he expects a ‘world class military’ and how would we recognise that? It was a passionate discussion for those in the room, many of whom are decidedly fearful we are not taking the Chinese threat seriously.

I certainly am not a Mandarin linguist but I offered the observation this might not be as veiled as some seem to believe. What leader of any state, even Sudan for the most egregious example I can currently conjure up, would say anything to the contrary as an aspiration? Leaders, even dictatorial ones, make promises to their people to glorify what they are doing in power. No, of course Sudan or Somalia or Bangladesh aren’t likely ever to make it into the ranks of world class for many categories. But, I cannot imagine a CCP General Secretary—or any emperor in the old days—advertising he would like the hundredth anniversary of the founding of New China, the People’s Republic of China as of 1 October 1949, advocating something other than a world class prominence.

This is particularly true of a General Secretary trying to move the CCP back into a more formidable, enduring role in the life of China. Remember, people in China get no say in their system but the tacit agreement is that they Party is doing things on their behalf so why wouldn’t the Party say it was creating a world class economy, military, space program, EV, and chili crisp recipe?

As I asked yesterday, would we expect him to say he wants a ‘world trash military’? I hope that wasn’t what we would expect.

China has steadily progressed since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis into a formidable military. That is unquestionably true and anyone doubting it isn’t paying attention. Does that make China world class? I suspect so but is that definition itself really that important?

Underlying our discussion of the terminology is an assumption that is tough and extraordinarily dangerous but often unstated—and probably untestable. We are assuming that once China has achieved what Xi may have had in mind by becoming ‘world class’, then he will call upon that Party army to do China’s bidding militarily.

I am not certain we know that is the case. I have no doubts China definitely seethes at incidents where it feels thwarted in achieving a desired outcome—that is precisely why the military modernisation began following Clinton’s 1996 decision to send a carrier battle group to the Taiwan Strait area after Beijing lobbed missiles around the island in hopes of affecting the outcome of the presidential election that spring. Beijing’s feeling of humiliation at its inability not only to see the theater without CNN’s help but also to deter the United States from intervening on Taiwan’s behalf led to a determination not to let that happen again. Actions created definite consequences of a stronger, modernised People’s Liberation Army.

But we have known since 1949 that China views Taiwan with a proprietary entitlement. The PLA modernisation resulting from the 1996 Strait Crisis definitely led to an increase in submarine production and deployment within overall naval modernisation.

A ‘world class’ military conjures up the Soviet global aspirations that led to the 40 year Cold War. Is that what Beijing has told us it intends to do? Certainly Xi’s Belt & Road Initiative and the Global Security Initiative have worldwide implications but would they result in a global conflict?

Do we know for certain that the Party through its armed wing, the PLA, would attack someone or some status quo condition once they felt comfortable they had a world class (presumably, in this instance, on a par with the Americans) capability? At least in public I am unaware of that affirmative assumption, although I gather from hints that many in the intelligence community believe that true.

What I am less clear on is whether we believe that true because we can’t see the decision-making in a public way or because we naturally assume that communists cannot wait to launch aggressive actions. Put differently, do we prepare for the future solely because the CCP is communist (and increasingly so under Xi)?

This is where being the global superpower becomes diciest. Being prepared to defend the world against Beijing’s actions anywhere and at any level, as I hear many analysts advocate, is extremely hard and extremely expensive. It can be done but are we willing to foot the costs? Are we willing to forego something else to reallocate resources—women and men in uniform as well as the capital assets of war—to deter and defeat China anywhere? If so, what will we give up? Having an all volunteer force already deployed in dozens of countries (admittedly not in huge numbers in most cases) stresses our system already. Which of those deployments can we cancel to put more resources against China or are we only deploying forces because of China as it is?

All of this is occurring as half of the country is increasingly advocating withdrawing from multinational organisations that offer an additional method to achieve our goals. I fully understand why many Americans assume the NATO or the United Nations do nothing for us but we have had no global wars in the eight decades since those bodies began so they may in fact have helped in some ways. Partnerships and allies also offer a far cheaper manner of doing every single thing ourselves. Yet Americans are less willing to support the mutuality of these arrangements, preferring we only benefit because we are Americans. That doesn’t sell well for others who sacrifice, too.

In the final analysis, I hope we are charting our own course as much as trying to combat China’s. We have been attempting to alter Beijing’s behaviour for more than the past two generations; in fact, every U.S. president back to Nixon reopening the door to connections with China in 1972 believed he was engaging in actions aimed at modifying, if not invariably deterring, Beijing’s actions to prevent aggression. Beijing largely did its own thing as we do ours. That is what great powers do and China has been a great power much longer, to our chagrin, than we have.

States pursue their own interests, however, rather than those their interlocutors or opponents or competitors prefer. I am having trouble seeing certainty that we are deterring Beijing; whatever deterrence is at work may well because of their own internal uncertainties or alternate thinking from what we assume. We simply don’t know why they act as they do. More importantly, I doubt we would believe them if they told us much anyway. The level of distrust between Beijing and Washington is pretty high.

Yes, Xi advocates a ‘world class military’ which worries us. But our leaders actually issue own political statements appear that make other nations concerned as well. I doubt some of the capitals of the world are any less worried about us at times than they are China. Actions create consequences.

We need spend our efforts on rationalising our domestic choices, a topic over which we have more decidedly control than they do. We have a range of views on the appropriate size for our force, the distribution of assets across that force, and the long array of questions relating to our own national security actions. We still are not discussing these deep differences but defaulting to discuss questions about Beijing’s intent that is only a portion of the overall context we confront.

These are tough decisions challenging how we do defense and where it fits within the overall national priorities. But the longer we put this off, the harder it gets to accomplish much as costs continue rising steadily.

I have no doubt the CCP leadership wants a military that can deter the United States from blocking their way on aspirations they want to protect and expand. Does that have to be a ‘world class’ military? Probably but then why are we spending so much time on the definition? If Beijing thinks they have to act to protect their interests, they will do so with the military they have. I am quite confident of that.

Will they become markedly more aggressive, bent on global control should they ever achieve a ‘world class military’? I don’t know. None of us know that any more than probably China knows that for sure. We need make sure we are checking our assumptions versus our knowledge. I am pretty sure we will never have perfect knowledge about how any other government, including Britain or Canada or Australia much less China or the DPRK, will act.

Militaries prepare for worst case scenarios regularly. We do that exquisitely well and we must always do that as the most basic thing a government does is defend its people.

This is why we need determine our interests rather than trying merely to deter their actions alone. By focusing on Beijing’s assumed ambitions, we are always chasing an unknown in many ways. That is not only expensive in blood and treasure but a way to wear out popular support on the part of the American people. We are not, regardless of our proclamations to the contrary, always the most enduring supporters of policies for which we are initially completely behind. Ask the Ukrainians about out long term support in the face of naked, unrelenting aggression; it’s not a pretty picture.

Focusing on our own choices and priorities returns the power to us where the American taxpayer/citizen wants it to be. I am not saying Xi’s terminology is unimportant but it is not the end all and be all, either.

Thoughts? Rebuttals? Retorts? Please send them my way as that is the point of this column. If you find it of value, please feel free to circulate it.

Thank you for reading Actions Create Consequences. Thank you especially to the subscribers who put financial support into action as I appreciate it more than you know.

We are home from the conference. It was a beautiful sunrise.

Be well and be safe. FIN