In looking through today’s New York Times online which I do in conjunction with reading the Wall Street Journal, London Telegraph, Washington Post, and Annapolis Capital-Gazette, I encountered an op-ed I did not see elsewhere. Just to be clear: virtually the only broadcast news I get is from the BBC World News in the evenings. It’s non-U.S., I am aware of their biases, and they cover the world rather than media creations in Tupelo or Salt Lake City. I am responsible for doing my own research so I do it through reading multiple papers for the most part.
The op-ed catching my eye was on Taiwan (again) which is a topic we all should consider. Let me repeat that: each and every one of us should ponder Taiwan seriously and repeatedly because its plight and our response/potential actions are deadly serious issues for the rest of our lifetimes.
I was relieved to read Taiwanese are actually voicing their positions much more often than we have heard for decades; this is vital. The U.S. role must be one understood and acknowledged, if not entirely endorsed, by everyone involved here and in Taiwan or we risk catastrophic mistakes falling under ‘Question the Assumptions, Stupid’ category which got us into Iraq just over 20 years back.
Teaching national security strategy between 1992 and 2022, I developed Cynthia’s Top Ten list for what a strategist must remember. Others preferred the National War College Primer1 or those it spawned at other professional military education institutions. Still more thought goes into the business strategies sometimes used as a bridge between fields to emphasise the desirability of an overall orchestration of efforts. The point is systematically making sure we cover all the major portions of strategy-making to prevent stupid decisions.
I am a pretty basic person so I just crafted some steps, done in various sequencing to meet where my understanding is on a problem that I must assure doing as I approach strategy. These are mine and yours may be better but I am most confident of decisions when I assure myself I have considered the foundations.
Questioning assumptions means we assure that we are not acting with an unspoken erroneous (and too often arrogant) idea that the interests of others match our own. No two states or people around the world seek identical ends because their contexts (another entry on my list: understand the contexts at work for everyone involved) are uniquely their own. It’s so seductive assuming everyone sees how brilliant we are, thus they embrace our goals and desired outcome even if their situations are radically different. Oh, dear.
South Korea, for example, cannot ignore Beijing quite as easily as Jakarta since, as Dr. Bernard ‘Bud’ Cole loves to remind us, the PLA can walk to Seoul which is not true for Jakarta. Additionally, South Korea’s economic interactions with the PRC’s are different than are those between South Korea and Canada, as another example.
The author of ‘In Taiwan, Friends are Starting to Turn on One Another’. is former Guomingdang (KMT or Nationalist) Culture Minister of Taiwan Yingtai Lung. She is not writing to savage the ruling party nor to attack her former boss. Instead, Ms. Ling opines that increased focus on PLA capacity and Xi Jinping’s determination to force reunification is also uncovering to stark divisions in Taiwan.
On the one hand, I find it refreshing that Taiwan is not falling into the dysfunction that divisions in our society are creating. Taiwan’s democracy, which i refer to as hyperdemocracy with fist fights on the floor of the Legislative Yuan and a robust journalism, is thriving as the two primary blocks, the governing Greens and the opposition Blue, spin up for the presidential election next year. It is so encouraging to hear that any democracy is flourishing as we can all cite examples where that is not true.
Below the state level, however, are troubling trends. She reminds us that Taiwan’s vulnerabilities are not new but they are unavoidably clear in 2023. Yet, what is developing is not a spectrum of options (always the most desirable thing for strategy in the abstract) but potential bifurcation.
In particular, the idea that the island’s leadership should reach out to the mainland, much as did former GMD (Blue) President Ma Ying-jeou’s recent visit to the PRC, equates to capitulation in the eyes of many. The charge that even discussing talks between party is surrender does not leave a lot of space.
Ling also shows that division are widening about the use of nuclear power on the island to solve its likely energy shortages. The Greens ruling Taiwan always opposed nuclear power, hence their name, but what options can a regime fall back on?
And still others belief that the PRC and the United States ultimately will decide as if Taiwan were merely a pawn rather than a sovereign nation determined to assert its path forward independent of either China or the Americans.
She also reminds her Taiwanese and American friends that the youth of Taiwan are not altering their behaviour to build the defense neededm preferring to maintain overwhelmingly their current priviledged behaviour. Of course war wakes up a society but that awakening can also serve as a chilling effect on anticipated acitivity.
Her piece illustrates that the assertions being made across the island and elsewhere are selective and incomplete in predicting how Taiwan will act and what its options will be. They are also potentially counterproductive for maintaining the peace and stability the island absolutely desires maintaining.
We run a tremendous risk of assuming, on behalf of Taiwan, that our objectives are unchallengable. Let me be clear: I hope Taiwan can survive as the vibrant, amazing place it has grown to be over almost 80 years since World War II ended. But, the paths to achieving that are several, including potentially looking at conversations with Beijing. Period.
I am not, repeat not, a capitulationist. I think the Chinese government’s behaviour in so many things is utterly and completely appalling as too often have been the actions of prior governments on the mainland and even the GMD government for the first thirty-five years after it relocated to the island.
But, to reiterate, geography is never going to move Taiwan away. I don’t see any indication that the people on the mainland—not just the current regime—will surrender to Taiwan’s desires over their future. While Taiwan’s citizens might well be more willing to go under a less authoritarian government in Zhongnanhai, the constant reminders about growing Taiwanese nationalism would make reunification with any mainland government hard to swallow.
As you also know from reading prior columns, I worry a great deal about the horror of a war with China. Fearing war is not empowering China but recognising how awful the effects would be for all. Taiwan itself would alomst certainly surrender any semblence of its current lifestyle.
Yes, World War II went well for the United States. We prospered after defeating two major adversaries, with the help of partners and allies, only to write the rules for the post-War world. But, the interconnectedness of the world today is different and the we cannot forget is that the United States and the People’s Republic China would have nuclear weapons at their disposal.
We used nuclear weapons in 1945, twice; no other state has used them, relying on them over the past 78 years a deterrence.
Yet, if we China is as awful as we believe, why would we assume they would not use weapons to protect them regime?
In short, while I hope Taiwan’s democracy continues prospering, I am not sure I entirely see any outcome that would satisfy most on Formosa except continuing the status quo. And the status quo isn’t desirable to hard ‘Green’ activists, either, as they want Taiwan to take its place as a sovereign, formally independent state.
Taiwan, in sum, is evolving its political and cultural system in heartening yet uncomfortable ways. We need watch that process, hear what it tells us, and consult with Taiwanese. In the end, however, we are foolish to forget Taiwan will follow a course for its interests and we will do the same for ours. We must recall that those are not guaranteed to be precisely the same. FIN
Steven Heffington, Adam Oler, and David Tretler, editors, A National Secruity Strategy Primer, 2nd edition (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2019), retrieved at https://nwc.ndu.edu/Portals/71/Documents/Publications/NWC-Primer-FINAL_for%20Web.pdf?ver=HOH30gam-KOdUOM2RFoHRA%3d%3d