Steve, this is why asking ourselves what the desired endstate is becomes VITAL. This is also why I despise negative objectives because I want a declaratory statement clarifying what I think I am attaining. If it is negative, I fear it becomes a slippery slope of changing objectives (Afghanistan) which becomes a treadmill we are reluctant to get off.
As long as you Steve are doing what you do with an appreciation that there ARE multiple possible assumptions at work rather than a single deterministic answer, you are acting ethically in my book. My point today was that it behooves us to spend time making sure we do that extra analysis. Think back to our time in class where we asked you to acknowledge possible unintended consequences as part of strategy. That is what this is. As a nation, we must recognize that not only are there unintended consequences but relative risks.
I believe China’s leaders have decided they can tolerate that risk. I don’t know they will be happy about that but they don’t feel they have an alternative because they stroke nationalism while they complain uninterruptedly about people humiliating China. CCP is building itself a trap.
I worry we may be as well because I cannot explain what exactly we are trying to do, as I write about in paragraph 1. Hearing about the liberal international order is buzzwords to me. It is vague, we also pick and choose what we do (not as bad as China but we still do it. International Court on war crimes? Un loose?), and we leave ourselves less persuasive in convincing wavering states than we either see or want to admit.
I also worry about two nuclear armed states going at it.
So, I am just a peon writing about what I see after teaching strategy over 30 years. I don’t want to sacrifice our blood and treasure unless we are certain it is worth it. I also don’t want to write off the risks because we are good and they are bad. That is not as clear to others as we think, even though I would never choose to be anything other than an American. Cw
Steve, we may simply find our interests fundamentally in opposition. That is what occurred in WWII and we thought true in the Cold War. But we can’t go into it without recognizing the gravity. I am somber right now. Even if we are completely right, we can lose a great deal.
Cynthia, I literally just finished Bud's book (Red Shark), checked my email, and read your posting. Both offer very somber warnings about misunderstanding intentions. - which you also eluded to in an earlier posting about the fog of war. As one who is personally engaged with our government to further the restrict the export of dual-use technologies (aka 'militarily useful technologies') to the PRC, and by extension the PLA, I appreciate how PRC officials would risk translating these restrictions if actually enacted. I cannot help but feel that I may, in a very small way, be contributing to the conditions in which conflict becomes increasingly probable ignited by the smallest miscalculation of intent.
Steve, this is why asking ourselves what the desired endstate is becomes VITAL. This is also why I despise negative objectives because I want a declaratory statement clarifying what I think I am attaining. If it is negative, I fear it becomes a slippery slope of changing objectives (Afghanistan) which becomes a treadmill we are reluctant to get off.
As long as you Steve are doing what you do with an appreciation that there ARE multiple possible assumptions at work rather than a single deterministic answer, you are acting ethically in my book. My point today was that it behooves us to spend time making sure we do that extra analysis. Think back to our time in class where we asked you to acknowledge possible unintended consequences as part of strategy. That is what this is. As a nation, we must recognize that not only are there unintended consequences but relative risks.
I believe China’s leaders have decided they can tolerate that risk. I don’t know they will be happy about that but they don’t feel they have an alternative because they stroke nationalism while they complain uninterruptedly about people humiliating China. CCP is building itself a trap.
I worry we may be as well because I cannot explain what exactly we are trying to do, as I write about in paragraph 1. Hearing about the liberal international order is buzzwords to me. It is vague, we also pick and choose what we do (not as bad as China but we still do it. International Court on war crimes? Un loose?), and we leave ourselves less persuasive in convincing wavering states than we either see or want to admit.
I also worry about two nuclear armed states going at it.
So, I am just a peon writing about what I see after teaching strategy over 30 years. I don’t want to sacrifice our blood and treasure unless we are certain it is worth it. I also don’t want to write off the risks because we are good and they are bad. That is not as clear to others as we think, even though I would never choose to be anything other than an American. Cw
Steve, we may simply find our interests fundamentally in opposition. That is what occurred in WWII and we thought true in the Cold War. But we can’t go into it without recognizing the gravity. I am somber right now. Even if we are completely right, we can lose a great deal.
Cynthia, I literally just finished Bud's book (Red Shark), checked my email, and read your posting. Both offer very somber warnings about misunderstanding intentions. - which you also eluded to in an earlier posting about the fog of war. As one who is personally engaged with our government to further the restrict the export of dual-use technologies (aka 'militarily useful technologies') to the PRC, and by extension the PLA, I appreciate how PRC officials would risk translating these restrictions if actually enacted. I cannot help but feel that I may, in a very small way, be contributing to the conditions in which conflict becomes increasingly probable ignited by the smallest miscalculation of intent.