politix of humiliation

history matters in memory

We had a thoroughly engaging hour with Dr. William Hill, a retired Foreign Service Officer and former colleague at the National War College, about Vlad the Impaler, Russia’s culture, Ukraine, and a lot of other truly au current issues in the ‘Focus On’ webinars I also run. It was just the way I love spending afternoon as I am a regionalist so hearing someone with Bill’s expertise and experience was such a treat.

Much of what he said echoed what we hear about China today: the dictator’s centralising accrual of power, fear normal folks have of dissenting against that dictator’s views, desires to challenge and defeat the West and the United States in a number of categories, and the like.

What I also find most telling, though Bill certainly did not use these words, is what I call the politix of humiliation. I played around for years with offering a course on the topic and I crashed for one week to craft a new course for the fall of 2007. I simply called it those three words: the politix of humiliation because that struck me as a theme pursued by some leaders—good and mostly bad—during the post-World War II period.

I had no idea whether students would enroll but I did get the requisite 5 (actually I got 10) who thought it was a kicky title. No texs exisited so I used history to remind us of particularly pulverising defeats for China, Israel, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Russia. My point was to assess how a leaders could engender support in ‘avenging’ the nation’s humiliation. I also used the speeches of various leaders who, through inflamatory language and skillful use of historic examples, cited this justification for their foreign policies,

I fully confess to getting students to think from the perspectives of others which is tough but essential to strategy.

I relate this because the case where I got the greatest skepticism in 2007 was Russia, even though Putin had already given his eye-opening Munich Security Conference speech a few months earlier. Perhaps that speech merely cemented for me something I had been toying with for years as I watched bigger powers surprised that smaller states took offense at their treatment in the international system. But it was an eye-opener for those who heard his scathing criticism of American actions and self-justifications in Iraq.

Listening to Bill Hill today brought all of this back. I chose Russia as a case study then because of the downtrodden views emanating after Gorbachev left power in 1992. We viewed that era as one of hope as the Cold War ended: the United States easily forced Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, we engaged (not always easily or successfully, however) in major humanitarian operations around the world, and the millenium appeared to us to be closing with a future of stability and peace under U.S. goodwill. We thought ourselves only wanting a peaceful world as we sought to end the conflict in Southeast Europe while negotiating what Clinton thought was tantalisingly close to peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

We make a fundamental error in not looking at the world from the position of others. That does not mean they are right but that right nor wrong really matter. Others were not comfortable with our power. Otheres wondered what could happen if we somehow morphed into a malignant power; nothing is ever fully assured so benign actions cannot be guaranteed. China hated seeing its inability to force Taiwan to stop elections in 1996 because the United States was a beacon of deterrence. Russia dispised the economic reforms demanded by those who said this painful medicine to cut away the cancer of the Soviet years did not understand people were suffering mightily from the cure much as they had through the cancer.

Humiliated and weak ar by-products of other seemingly innoculous action but may sppur states to recover their sense of national pride that in the future. Minor figures in a society may nurse grievances igniting longer-term aspirations and actions with real consequences, much as Bill Hill said today ‘This war over Ukraine has real consequences for us all’.

History remains alive for many peoples well before the United States saw its first British arrive in 1607 or the Spanish in the early 16th century. The indigenous populations across the world certainly try calling our attention to their histories long predating the arrivals of outsiders. We are fixated on legally acceptable international behaviour while other states feel the deep-seeded need to return to status quo antes we simply don’t recall if we ever knew about them.

We don’t know history because we don’t value it. We have always been forward looking people who think of the future since we left pasts behind. Historically we have discouraged those who came here to bring their histories (except perhaps the Irish so we can all have a green beer along the Chicago River on St. Patrick’s Day) so they will embrace this new concept we call America. We don’t have much tolerance for nursing old wounds that seem just irrelevant to us.

Russians had a traumatic decade after the Cold War ended. First, their nation ended. Poof. On 31 December 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics disappeared so the millions living under it since 1917 became somewhat displaced. Millions of Russians became citizens of non-Russian states to the chagrin of that proud people. Of course they were delighted in most cases not to have the Stalinist constraints over their lives such as deprivation, monotony, monnitoring, and other problems.

But they also faced a completely different future with a constant reminder from the West that we won the Cold War. While that led to a better lifestyle, the pain of the decade because of the advice we gave them to reform their newly emerging states did not go easily. Economic crises, unreliable governance, drunken political leadership, and some reactionary, nationalist extremists seeking to return Russia to the ‘glory days’ of the Soviet Union all appeared between 1991 and 2000, often inflicting massive doubt and hopelessness that opened the door to humiliation.

Vladimir Putin was the deputy in 2000 when the first elected post-Soviet ruler of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, stepped down. Serving as acting president and Prime Minister upon Yeltsin’s departure, Putin initially appeared a possible partner for long-term cooperation between the west and Russia. So many people who had watched the Cold War unfold were hopefully that the new leader, a younger man who had lived in Germany as a KGB agent, would open the door to Russia joining the rest of the world follwoing a U.S. leadership. Even in 2001, with the attacks that shook the United States, Putin appeared a reasonable, sympathetic leader who Geroge W. Bush thought he trust. No one will forget Bush confidently proclaimed he the could see into his counterpart’s soul.¹

Instead, Putin’s obvious bitterness, pent up frustration at Russia not receiving its due role as a great power, his anger at U.S. unnilateralism in Iraq as if Russia were a unequal United Nations Security Council permanent member, and his feeling the world humiliated Russia after the Wall fell became unavoidable as the years progressed. Simultaneously, his concentration of power as the central figure in the vast Russian state soon looked that of a modern-day Czar.

Vlad constantly attempts to revisit a better time for Russia, where the great leader of the Slavs are respected. He expects a substantial and unimpeachable voice in the global community. He wants to orchestrate decisions for the neighbourhood. He wants a Russia not fearing the United States urging adjacent governments to threaten the security of Moscow’s regime. Putin wants to reverse the humiliation to assure the ‘mother Russia’ of his dreams so humiliation can never happen again. He envisions himself as the man to do that.

A number of Vlad’s views are somewhat similar to Xi Jinping’s in China. Both men seem to embody ‘saviour complexes’ and see the west as bent on overthrowing their regimes. Certainly there are voices in the west calling for their individual ousters but their paranoiz reflects their own inscurities over their own people as much as any western plans..

But, the key is that we forget how effectively these arguments bring the people of Russia and China to support these men promising to ‘end the humiliation’. Most Russians and Chinese do not study history any more than Americans, thus they do not grasp the distortion of historic facts to fit a narrative of humiliation benefitting the leader.

Absolutely none of this justifies any single appalling action either leader takes. They are so insecure each will use any and every tool to perpetuate their own survival over anything else. But the basic stories they tell rest on narratives of historic facts. The key is always in the interpretations.

The problem is that these narratives are real to the people living under governments highlighting humiliation. We in the United States have vastly different objectives for many of our actions but those actions create consequences. I am not advocating changing our policies to suit anyone as our strategy and policies support our national interests, pure and simple. I do believe we need be far more sensitive to alternate interpretations of our motives so we know what may confront us in the future. We definitely need realise others hear our rhetoric often to enforce their fears even though it is often spoken purely for poltical consumption at home with never a chance of implementation. Leadership is best served as measured but we recently have been anything but measured in many of our statements. Occasionally our actions are pretty extreme for domestic politics as well.

These are two worlds colliding in many ways. Thus I use the term politix of humiliation as they are used by leaders who thrive on opposing us through claiming we humiliate. That is almost never our goal but we do sound a bit triumphant at times. Perhaps we could tone it down a bit. FIN

1. https://www.nbcnews.com/video/flashback-president-bush-on-putins-soul-208352323648