Absolutely no question his assumptions were wrong and never recalibrated because doing so raised his own vulnerabilities and led to the need to reconsider his invincibility. However, I think the issue is at least as much endstate because, like China in Taiwan, I am not sure a change in assumptions, with this endstate, would have changed behavior. Now, that raises the question of interests which could have changed him but I doubt even that would have made him reconsider. Hubris hurts
To me that drives to the heart of it. His assumptions (if the 5 I identified are somewhat aligned with Putin's actual assumptions) were pretty good. The Ukrainian government, preinvasion, was a bit of basket case and Zelensky had shown no signs of brilliance...this was the same assumption the US government also made. The Ukrainian military had not been able to do anything to stop Crimea and when stacked up against the Russian military looked very weak...again same assumption made by the US. Russian forces had been modernized, and had done well in Georgia, Crimea, and Syria...and yet again the same assumption made by the US. 4 & 5 are also backed up with recent history. In short at least 3 of the 5 were the same assumptions made by the US and other western states. BUT once those assumption proved wrong, or at least highly unlikely Putin did not recalibrate, I think for exactly the reason you say, plus likely he wasn't told the whole truth. On the other hand the US rapidly recalibrated, recognized the new situation, and changed strategy. For Putin, changing maybe one, probably 2, and almost certainly 3 of those assumptions means the initial theory of success was completely invalidated, and the war aim unachievable. But he couldn't / can't, maybe even to himself, admit how wrong he got it.
While I simply could not agree more with the need for, and frequent dramatic lack of, a challenged and realistic theory of success, in this case I think it was assumptions. I think Putin made 5 key assumptions, which were likely not seriously challenged for exactly the reasons identified in this article. I think he assumed: 1. The Ukrainian government was weak, corrupt, and self-interested and would crumble when pushed. 2. The Ukrainian military was poorly equipped, led, and sustained. 3. Russian military forces were professional, well led, well equipped, and highly capable. 4. The western nations (US and Europe) would not act markedly different than they had for his seizure of Crimea or actions in Georgia. 5. The Ukrainian population would not substantially resist Russian occupation and control.
Given these assumptions a realistic theory of success would be "A sharp attack driving at Kyiv will cause the Zelensky administration to collapse and flee, leaving an already weak and disunited Ukrainian military unable to put up a well-orchestrated defense. This will allow for rapid capture of Kyiv. Once in control of Kyiv, the Ukranian population will fall in behind a Russian controlled government achieving a rapid fait-accompli that western states will not be likely to resist, besides some survivable sanctions." Given the 5 assumptions, that is a realistic theory of success. Problem is every single one of those assumptions was wrong.
Been considering your comment all day, Steve: I think we are saying the same thing from different vectors.
On the move so longer response later. Truth short supply for him
Absolutely no question his assumptions were wrong and never recalibrated because doing so raised his own vulnerabilities and led to the need to reconsider his invincibility. However, I think the issue is at least as much endstate because, like China in Taiwan, I am not sure a change in assumptions, with this endstate, would have changed behavior. Now, that raises the question of interests which could have changed him but I doubt even that would have made him reconsider. Hubris hurts
To me that drives to the heart of it. His assumptions (if the 5 I identified are somewhat aligned with Putin's actual assumptions) were pretty good. The Ukrainian government, preinvasion, was a bit of basket case and Zelensky had shown no signs of brilliance...this was the same assumption the US government also made. The Ukrainian military had not been able to do anything to stop Crimea and when stacked up against the Russian military looked very weak...again same assumption made by the US. Russian forces had been modernized, and had done well in Georgia, Crimea, and Syria...and yet again the same assumption made by the US. 4 & 5 are also backed up with recent history. In short at least 3 of the 5 were the same assumptions made by the US and other western states. BUT once those assumption proved wrong, or at least highly unlikely Putin did not recalibrate, I think for exactly the reason you say, plus likely he wasn't told the whole truth. On the other hand the US rapidly recalibrated, recognized the new situation, and changed strategy. For Putin, changing maybe one, probably 2, and almost certainly 3 of those assumptions means the initial theory of success was completely invalidated, and the war aim unachievable. But he couldn't / can't, maybe even to himself, admit how wrong he got it.
While I simply could not agree more with the need for, and frequent dramatic lack of, a challenged and realistic theory of success, in this case I think it was assumptions. I think Putin made 5 key assumptions, which were likely not seriously challenged for exactly the reasons identified in this article. I think he assumed: 1. The Ukrainian government was weak, corrupt, and self-interested and would crumble when pushed. 2. The Ukrainian military was poorly equipped, led, and sustained. 3. Russian military forces were professional, well led, well equipped, and highly capable. 4. The western nations (US and Europe) would not act markedly different than they had for his seizure of Crimea or actions in Georgia. 5. The Ukrainian population would not substantially resist Russian occupation and control.
Given these assumptions a realistic theory of success would be "A sharp attack driving at Kyiv will cause the Zelensky administration to collapse and flee, leaving an already weak and disunited Ukrainian military unable to put up a well-orchestrated defense. This will allow for rapid capture of Kyiv. Once in control of Kyiv, the Ukranian population will fall in behind a Russian controlled government achieving a rapid fait-accompli that western states will not be likely to resist, besides some survivable sanctions." Given the 5 assumptions, that is a realistic theory of success. Problem is every single one of those assumptions was wrong.