queries by a savvy reader

this is what dialogue allows

En lieu of a Friday column, I want to share my responses to appropriately incisive questions from COL Dave Maxwell, a retired Army legend who’s forgotten more on Korea than I will ever know. Dave raised the following points in response to arguments I made yesterday in my column entitled “Powell’s 14th Rule”.

“with great trepidation I have some disagreement with my long time friend and mentor.

First, I fear the pottery barn rule is the excuse for not taking action when that action may be necessary. If we break it, do we really buy it? Do we have to buy it?

I do agree that externally imposed regime change is a folly because it leads Americans to make the strategic error of trying to rebuild the new nation in the US or western image.

But if a regime falls organically from within it will be up to the people of that sovereign nation to rebuild their own new country. Sovereignty and self determination of government (by the people themselves) are the principles we should believe in and adhere to. We should not conduct operations to externally impose regime change but we should take action if it is US and international security interests. Even if that means violating the sovereignty of a country like Iran to eliminate the nuclear threat.”

My responses to Dave are, with bracketed comments additions I subsequently realized I should have offered.

“Thank you so much for the feedback. If you think about the pottery barn, we do indeed buy it, regardless of what the outcome.

I am not comfortable saying we can’t act but we damned well need recall there will be consequences. I am guilty of not having made that clear as your response alludes.

Of course any regime falling organically is the responsibility of those it ruled {I should refine that to “those inheriting of the mechanisms of governance—cw} but how can we differentiate between a conflict externally created and internal affairs? That one is hard because the Iranians {themselves} have been resistant to this regime for decades but unsuccessful at changing it. This is a fine line that I find may serve our purposes but not recognize the implications.

Thank you again. I welcome any and all responses you get to this as well. I am NOT the font of knowledge by any stretch but worry a lot about steps we may have the capacity to instigate without the resilience to withstand later. Same pertains to Israel. I am well aware and sympathetic to the dangers but consequences can be ugly later.

As you point out, how do you weigh those relative questions?”

My column yesterday in no way meant to forgive the Islamic Republic of its repulsive deeds over the past forty-five years, whether it was holding U.S. hostages for 444 days, treating women like chattel in stifling, dehumanizing garb, funding and encouraging terrorism across the region, developing the infrastructure intent on acquiring a Persian nuclear capacity, or attacking a hospital amid the current conflict. Under the guise of protecting the Shi’ia sect, several generations of men made their own country virtually unbearable as a society while continuing to menace outsiders.

My point, however, was that regime change would be neither easy nor likely to be satisfying for all. Perhaps I am wrong. Maybe this time, the follow-on regime will likely result in better relations under a less nationalistic and more benevolent regime, one that is intent on adopting a sustainable governing style that responds to the frustrations of more than 90 million Iranians living stagnant lives.

Someone, however, will have to pick up the pieces of a post-mullah Teheran. Decades of externally-driven sanctions (even if justifiable) and domestic mismanagement, a central cause of why many Iranians have sought to oust the religious rulers for years, leave a broken nation.

For most of the post-1945 years, we were the nation that leaped in to provide funding and technical help to rebuild societies while opening the door to trade that was relatively beneficial for both the state undergoing repair and ourselves. We did this repeatedly not because we were stupid or altruistic (although we occasionally see ourselves that way) but because it gave us the inside track on helping them craft a regime that we found to our liking. We kid ourselves if we ignore this.

Did we make mistakes? Abolutamente. Did we spend trillions of dollars in places that fell back into their same abysmal conditions? Yes, we did, but being the nation to whom others turned for decisions was in our interest as it gave us an overwhelming voice in the international system as well as in many other countries. Would the Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, or Korea be who they are today without this role and our influence, whether as a result of regime change or incentives to evolve into global participants?

I do not dispute that we no longer wish to assume that responsibility. Got it. We want to put down that burden, and other states are delighted to see us relinquish the torch, but that does not mean the rest of the world does not understand the history we forget. Someone will fill the void.

That someone, of course, is likely to be China in parallel with Western Europe. I suspect most of us expect our European colleagues to take the torch. Still, I am dubious that Paris, London, Berlin, or Stockholm will take on supporting the much nearer problems of Ukraine in addition to a post-Islamic Republic Iran.

China, dependent on Tehran’s petroleum, will welcome stepping into this greater leadership role, even if the options it offers the Iranians are incomplete or ultimately untenable. Beijing consistently studies our history, even if we don’t, making them acutely aware of the source of U.S. power over the past eighty years. We may not want them to do this, but if we walk away, as Dave’s comments hint, Beijing is the obvious interlocutor and rebuilder of choice for Tehran (to be clear: COL Maxwell did not advocate that we leave things open for Beijing). I can’t see how things work otherwise because no one else is out there.

Earlier this week, the highly nationalistic Chinese news source Global Times chortled when the Lowy Institute in Sydney released a poll where 56% of Australians—arguably our closest allies in the Indo-Pacific along with Japan and Korea—”believe China will be the most powerful country in ten years, while only about a quarter of (27%) say the same of the U.S.”. China’s role around the world, whether it’s in finance, peacekeeping, trade, or potentially supporting other regimes, is growing, plain and simple. This description may shock Americans, particularly as many have come to prefer isolationism while demanding that others bear the burdens traditionally associated with American strength. Still, the rest of the world does not seem to view our behavior in quite the same manner. Were the rest of the world overly dependent on us? Likely, but we were reliable, talented, and able, none of which are descriptions used about us these days. China would be delighted to assume that position as the world’s indispensable force.

The current conflict and potential choices offer a dismal state of affairs because we do not want a nuclear-capable Iran. Still, the aftermath of regime change, even for Iranians themselves, is fraught with potential dangers, and we do not have the financial or political wherewithal these days to take on additional burdens.

The burdens, however, still arise, whether due to the actions of others or our actions at times. Ignoring the ramifications of our actions strikes me, at the very least, as wishful thinking of the worst kind. But I may be erring on the side of pessimism too far.

The Spanish-born historian George Santayana offered a quotation that has stuck with me as the conflict in Iran accelerates: “Those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it.” Similarly, Shakespeare’s words on the National Archives Building in our capital are worth considering: “The past is prologue.”

I pray that we see no repeats of frustrations and failures following regime changes, so we must recognize possible outcomes rather than assuming only the most positive, in which we hold no long-term role.

I am incredibly aware of the pain and fears driving Israel to this junction. Israel, day in and day out worries about its ability to survive as a home for the Jewish people and as a nation-state. Jerusalem and Washington believe these steps can prevent further strengthening by this mortal enemy in Teheran. However, it will hardly be cost-free, so we need to face that as events unfold.

In the end, the best answer primarily results from identifying clear priorities; put otherwise, what is your ultimate prize? If Israel or the United States seeks to rid the world of the Islamic Republic above anything else, then we are willing to tolerate many adverse effects. If Israel’s (or the American, for that matter) goal is unconditional security cost-free, there is likely no good answer. If our goal is to prevent China from gaining a more prestigious role in the world system, then regime change in Tehran may exacerbate our challenges.

We often conflate goals as if there were no costs associated with them. I don’t see a consequence-free outcome for the current conflict. Choosing between the evils is painful and not one I endorse with any joy as there is rarely an outstanding result from these types of choices. But, choosing is an affirmative action that many seek to exercise rather than providing time (a fickle part of this entire play) longer is a seemingly far less desirable option.

Again, I admit I don’t know the best solutions, but I sought to provide due diligence by asking these questions and examining the pitfalls we have experienced. I am not responsible to the U.S. or Israeli populations, so I recognize the luxury of analyzing versus policy-making. Yet, strategy dictates that we look beyond the immediate to the longer term before executing options. I most of all hope we isolate our goals to keep our eye on the prize. However, we explain it unequivocally.

I welcome your comments in addition to COL Maxwell’s, Col. Hudson’s and Ms. Route’s on this topic. My goal is to expand civil, measured discussion of topics precisely as pressing as those raised above. Discussion requires multiple voices so please chime in, whether on the comments section for paid subscribers or to me directly. I welcome your thoughts.

I appreciate the subscribers a great deal because they advance my work. A commitment of $8 monthly or $55 per year is a well-appreciated support to this work. I thank anyone, however, who reads the column.

We had massive storms last night, bringing out lushness in the greenery and at least one lovely monarch butterfly and a pollinator on echinacea during this morning’s walkabout.

Again, I will not publish tomorrow so I wish you a cool, happy weekend, despite the downside of us reaching the longest day of sunlight annually in the northern hemisphere (I consider this annual sadness but it’s only 6 months until the days get longer again). Be well and be safe. FIN

David Maxwell, correspondence with author, 19 June 2025.

Xu Keyue, “Over half of Australians believe China will be most powerful country by 2035: poll”, globalatimes.com, 16 June 2025, retrieved at https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202506/1336239.shtml?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

Cynthia Watson, “Powell’s 14th Rule”, cynthiawatson.substack.com, 18 June 2025, retrieved at