No, they likely are not worrying about Just War theory. and I definitely believe that lack of certainty is the name of the game. Thanks for your always, always considerable thoughts on these columns, Jim.
Aside from Nostradamus (and his veracity is debatable), none of us can predict the future. I suppose its that randomness that keeps life interesting for most. Same is true about this current situation....none of us can "accurately" predict what the outcome might be.
I've absolutely been a "subscriber" to your column's title: "Actions create consequences." But I'd also submit that inaction can also create consequences. Just as we don't know that Op Midnight Hammer might bring, we also had to be cognizant of what taking no action might bring. It's a risk calculation to be sure.
As a young Air Force officer, I was very risk adverse. I would spend more hours than necessary trying to gather as much information as I could before making important decisions. I felt it was warranted when those decisions impacted people and resources. Most times I got it right. Sometimes I was off the mark. I learned from both the rights and the wrongs. The trick was to not be "too" wrong. Nobody cares if you're "too" right...but even a little bit of wrong brings the heat down pretty quickly. As I gained experience (and confidence), I still worked on gathering necessary info, but I found I was much more comfortable in my decision making with less data than I needed in the past. I was also more astute in my risk calculation; i.e., weighing the consequences of being a little or a lot wrong. No matter how "right" I felt I was in my decision making, there was always a bit of self-doubt that lingered. It's an uneasy feeling. And that feeling comes from the unknown; i.e., not being able to see the future...and in those cases, the future of what my decision would bring. It was always an uncomfortable feeling.
As I mentored younger officers over the years, I'd tell them they needed to become comfortable being uncomfortable. I told them everyone has their own "decision confidence" percentage; meaning, what percent of information / data do you need to make the decision? When I was starting out... I was aiming for 100% or as close to that as I could get. Obviously, that's where the time component came into play. To gather that much data took more time than I had to make the decision. So as the years wore on, I got to about the 60% mark. Most of the time, I felt confident enough with about 60% of the available data to move forward or not take action. It was pretty consistent over the years.
All that to say... none of us probably knows what the President's decision confidence percentage is. I'm guessing it's probably lower than mine. With his experience and confidence (along with all the input he's getting) I'm guessing he may be down in the 40 or 50% area. None of us will know how accurate he was in his decision...maybe ever. If he'd done nothing and Iran would have assembled and used a nuclear weapon, that would be an easy postmortem. However, if Iran is never able to assemble and use a nuclear weapon, will that be attributed to these current actions? How do you evaluate a non-event? When things happen it's usually easy to dissect them for the cause. But how do you dissect a non-event for a cause if it doesn't happen?
I spent the past couple of days going over my National War College notes regarding the War Powers Act as well as the concept of "Just War." I couldn't find the notes on WPA but I do recall more than one speaker telling us that Congress was loathe to actually commit their individual votes for or against the Nation going to war for fear of having to defend that vote in an upcoming election. I did find the notes regarding "Just War" and it was interesting reading back over the concepts of Jus ad Bellum (The right to go to war) and Jus in Bello (the right conduct in war).
Jus ad Bellum: criteria were:
1) Just cause - must we waged for morally sound reasons (self-defense, protection of innocents)
2) Legitimate authority - must be properly constituted (in debate now)
3) Right intention - should be to secure peace, not conquest or revenge
4) Last resort - other peaceful alternatives have been exhausted (diplomacy / sanctions failed)
5) Probability of Success - realistic chance of achieving its goals (risk calculation)
6) Proportionality - benefit of the action must be proportional to the harm it will cause
Jus in Bello has three criteria:
1) Distinction - must distinguish between military and civilian targets
2) Proportionality - force must be in proportion to the objective
3) Responsibility - must adhere to rules and accept accountability for conduct
In my estimation, it would appear the Administration has considered all this and deemed the action to be morally and ethically sound. Of course, the Just War concept is largely a "Western" one adhered to by countries that value human life and moral correctness. Given Iran's history of state sponsored terrorism over the past 40+ years, I doubt they're spending much time on the Just War criteria. Time will tell who / what was right or wrong.
No, they likely are not worrying about Just War theory. and I definitely believe that lack of certainty is the name of the game. Thanks for your always, always considerable thoughts on these columns, Jim.
Aside from Nostradamus (and his veracity is debatable), none of us can predict the future. I suppose its that randomness that keeps life interesting for most. Same is true about this current situation....none of us can "accurately" predict what the outcome might be.
I've absolutely been a "subscriber" to your column's title: "Actions create consequences." But I'd also submit that inaction can also create consequences. Just as we don't know that Op Midnight Hammer might bring, we also had to be cognizant of what taking no action might bring. It's a risk calculation to be sure.
As a young Air Force officer, I was very risk adverse. I would spend more hours than necessary trying to gather as much information as I could before making important decisions. I felt it was warranted when those decisions impacted people and resources. Most times I got it right. Sometimes I was off the mark. I learned from both the rights and the wrongs. The trick was to not be "too" wrong. Nobody cares if you're "too" right...but even a little bit of wrong brings the heat down pretty quickly. As I gained experience (and confidence), I still worked on gathering necessary info, but I found I was much more comfortable in my decision making with less data than I needed in the past. I was also more astute in my risk calculation; i.e., weighing the consequences of being a little or a lot wrong. No matter how "right" I felt I was in my decision making, there was always a bit of self-doubt that lingered. It's an uneasy feeling. And that feeling comes from the unknown; i.e., not being able to see the future...and in those cases, the future of what my decision would bring. It was always an uncomfortable feeling.
As I mentored younger officers over the years, I'd tell them they needed to become comfortable being uncomfortable. I told them everyone has their own "decision confidence" percentage; meaning, what percent of information / data do you need to make the decision? When I was starting out... I was aiming for 100% or as close to that as I could get. Obviously, that's where the time component came into play. To gather that much data took more time than I had to make the decision. So as the years wore on, I got to about the 60% mark. Most of the time, I felt confident enough with about 60% of the available data to move forward or not take action. It was pretty consistent over the years.
All that to say... none of us probably knows what the President's decision confidence percentage is. I'm guessing it's probably lower than mine. With his experience and confidence (along with all the input he's getting) I'm guessing he may be down in the 40 or 50% area. None of us will know how accurate he was in his decision...maybe ever. If he'd done nothing and Iran would have assembled and used a nuclear weapon, that would be an easy postmortem. However, if Iran is never able to assemble and use a nuclear weapon, will that be attributed to these current actions? How do you evaluate a non-event? When things happen it's usually easy to dissect them for the cause. But how do you dissect a non-event for a cause if it doesn't happen?
I spent the past couple of days going over my National War College notes regarding the War Powers Act as well as the concept of "Just War." I couldn't find the notes on WPA but I do recall more than one speaker telling us that Congress was loathe to actually commit their individual votes for or against the Nation going to war for fear of having to defend that vote in an upcoming election. I did find the notes regarding "Just War" and it was interesting reading back over the concepts of Jus ad Bellum (The right to go to war) and Jus in Bello (the right conduct in war).
Jus ad Bellum: criteria were:
1) Just cause - must we waged for morally sound reasons (self-defense, protection of innocents)
2) Legitimate authority - must be properly constituted (in debate now)
3) Right intention - should be to secure peace, not conquest or revenge
4) Last resort - other peaceful alternatives have been exhausted (diplomacy / sanctions failed)
5) Probability of Success - realistic chance of achieving its goals (risk calculation)
6) Proportionality - benefit of the action must be proportional to the harm it will cause
Jus in Bello has three criteria:
1) Distinction - must distinguish between military and civilian targets
2) Proportionality - force must be in proportion to the objective
3) Responsibility - must adhere to rules and accept accountability for conduct
In my estimation, it would appear the Administration has considered all this and deemed the action to be morally and ethically sound. Of course, the Just War concept is largely a "Western" one adhered to by countries that value human life and moral correctness. Given Iran's history of state sponsored terrorism over the past 40+ years, I doubt they're spending much time on the Just War criteria. Time will tell who / what was right or wrong.